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INTRODUCTION 
When Jean Kambanda, former prime minister of Rwanda, pled 
guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity for his role in the 
mass violence that engulfed his country in 1994,1 he expected leniency 
1 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S,Judgement and Sentence, para. 
3 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence], reprinted in 2 
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999, at 793, 794 (Andre Klip 
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in return. Brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR or Rwandan Tribunal),2 the seemingly repentant 
Kambanda not only expressed his intention to plead guilty immedi-
ately, he also provided the prosecution with nearly ninety hours of re-
corded testimony for use in subsequent trials of senior political and 
military leaders3 and promised to testifY for the prosecution in those tri-
als.• For these efforts, Kambanda got nothing. The ICTR Trial Cham-
ber acknowledged that guilty pleas are generally considered mitigat-
ing circumstances in the domestic courts of most countries" but 
nonetheless followed the prosecution's recommendation and sen-
tenced Kambanda to the most severe penalty that the ICTR can im-
pose: life imprisonment.6 Outraged, Kambanda immediately stopped 
cooperating with the prosecution,' and he sought to revoke his guilty 
plea and proceed to trial.8 On appeal, Kambanda claimed, among 
other things, that the Trial Chamber had failed to consider the gen-
eral principle of law that a guilty plea warrants a sentence reduction.!' 
The Appeals Chamber rejected Kambanda's appeal, but it did not call 
& Goran Sluiter eds. , 2001) [hereinafter 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS). 
2 The United Nations established the ICTR in order to provide: 
[A] n international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons re-
sponsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens respon-
sible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
3 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing 
Brief, 22-23 (Aug. 31 , 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing 
Brief] (on file with author). 
4 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Plea Agreement Between Jean 
Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor, para. 42 (Apr. 29, 1998) [hereinafter 
Kambanda, Plea Agreement] (on file with author) ; see also Lawyer for the Former Rwan-
dan Prime Minister A1gues joT Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998) (reporting prose-
cutors' comments that Kambanda would testifY in the genocide trials of other govern-
ment and military leaders), at http:/ / www.internews.org/ activities/ ICTR_reports/ 
ICTRNewsSep98.html . 
5 Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 61. 
6 !d. at Part IV. 
7 Letter from Carla Del Ponte, to Agwu Okali, ICTR Registrar (Apr. 25, 2000) (on 
file with author) ; Interview with Mohamed Othman, former ICTR Chief of Prosecu-
tions Qan. 25, 2002) . 
8 Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, judgement, para. 3 (Oct. 19, 
2000) [hereinafter Kambanda, Appeal], at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ wwwroot/ENGLISH/ 
cases/ Kambanda/ decisions/ 191 OOO.htm. 
" !d. at para. 10(4) . 
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into question his assertion that guilty pleas are normally compensated, 
0 b d 0 10 as It were, y sentence re uctwns. 
Indeed, Kambanda is correct: The countries that use guilty 
pleas-primarily Anglo-American countries-usually secure those 
pleas by means of the controversial practice of plea bargaining. Plea 
bargaining can take many forms, 11 but the term most typically refers to 
the prosecutor's offer of some form of sentencing concessions in ex-
change for the defendant's guilty plea. 12 Although many American 
scholars decry plea bargaining, 13 the practice remains, in the 1971 
10 Rather, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber had not 
abused its discretion in determining that the aggravating factors of the case negated 
the mitigating factors, including the guilty plea. !d. at paras. 120, 122, 126. 
11 See HERBERT S. MILLER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, at xii (1978) 
(observing that no single definition of plea bargaining is universally accepted); 
Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 199, 199-200 
(1979) (noting tha t plea bargaining can involve "negotiation over sentence as distinct 
from charge, over dropping all charges as distinct from reducing them, over facts as 
distinct from the purely instrumental manipulation of charges [and that each form] 
can be implicit or explicit"). Robert Weninger, for instance, states that "[t]he widest 
definition of plea bargaining ... includes any inducements that are offered in ex-
change for a defendant's concession of criminal liability." Robert A. Weninger, The 
Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, 'Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 
289-90 ( 1987) . Additionally, plea bargaining can be understood to include instances 
in which the defendant does not concede his own criminal liability but testifies against 
other defendants or becomes an informer. See William F. McDonald, From Plea Negotia-
tion to Coercive justice: Notes on the &specification of a Concept, 13 LAw & Soc'v REv. 385, 
389 (1979) (discussing "(n]egotiation to obtain the state's evidence," such as one party 
offering evidence to help convict another party in exchange for a favorable deal from 
the state). 
12 E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21 (3d ed. 2000) (explain-
ing that guilty pleas arise when "the prosecution offers certain concessions in return 
for the defendant's entry of the plea"). 
" Because the literature critical of plea bargaining is vast, this note lists only a 
sampling. See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF jUSTICE 71-86 (1977) (considering 
plea bargaining a "reversal" of the purported theoretical model of all criminal proc-
ess); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 
( 1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate] (asserting that neither 
sentencing nor dispute resolution functions serve as adequate justifications for plea 
bargaining) ; Albert W. Alschuler, 77te Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE 
LJ. 1 179 (1975) (hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role] (claiming that the plea 
bargaining system is destructive to attorney-client relationships and that the mere 
presence of defense counsel does not adequately guarantee fairness in guilty plea ne-
gotiations); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Al-
ternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931 (1 983) (hereinafter Al-
schuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial] (listing multiple problems 
involved with plea bargaining and calling for its abolition in many circumstances) ; Al-
bert W. Alschuler, Plea Bmgaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1979) 
[hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History] (relying on the history of plea 
bargaining to refute claims that it is a "necessity" in the ·criminal justice system); Albert 
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words of the United States Supreme Court, "an essential component 
of the administration of justice" in the United States!4 And, as a result 
of plea bargaining, American defendants who plead guilty do receive 
substantially lower sentences than do defendants who are convicted 
after trial. 15 
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968) 
[hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role] (arguing that personal and political interests 
of prosecutors bias the plea bargaining system, leading to practices such as overcharg-
ing); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1059, 1151 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, Trial judge's Role] (addressing the no-
tion that "even when judicial plea bargaining is formally disapproved, it is difficult to 
prevent"); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REv. 695, 697-99 
(2001) (criticizing some forms of plea bargaining); Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea 
Bargains, German Lay judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547 
(1997) (proposing that plea bargaining is contributing to a legitimacy crisis in the 
criminal justice system); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The 
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 38 (insisting that prosecutors 
"substantially dictat[e] the terms of plea agreements" by making their own assessments 
of criminal culpability and appropriate punishment); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal justice 
and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 105 (1976) (suggesting that "bargains are out of 
place in contexts where persons are to receive what they deserve"); Kenneth Kipnis, 
Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 555, 555 (1979) (arguing 
against those who wish to reform the plea bargaining system by maintaining that plea 
bargaining as a whole sacrifices the value of just deserts and violates basic liberties); 
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 ( 1978) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining] (drawing parallels between the American prac-
tice of plea bargaining and the medieval European practice of torture to obtain the 
necessary testimony);John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargain-
ing, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 261, 261-62 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Short History] (ar-
guing that plea bargaining has been allowed to "subvert the design of our Constitu-
tion" and eliminate the opportunity to present defenses and have guilt proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt); Raymond Moley, The Vanishingjury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928) 
(offering data to show an increasing number of guilty pleas while denouncing the si-
multaneous lack of public responsibility and the unfettered prosecutorial discretion 
involved in obtaining these pleas); George W. Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American 
Criminal justice (l!.specially Our Guilty Plea System): Reflections Derived from a Study of the 
French System, 36 LA. L. REv. 947 (1976) (proposing that an alternative to the current 
process for determining guilt should be entertained); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea 
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Is Plea 
Bargaining Inevitable?] (utilizing a sample urban jurisdiction to maintain that plea bar-
gaining can be eliminated or, at the very least, contained); Stephen]. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979 ( 1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Plea Bargain-
ing as Disaster] (asserting, among other things, that plea bargaining does not minimize 
conviction of the innocent, optimize deterrence, or accurately assess the risk of acquit-
tal and advocating for its abolition); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bar-
gaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1971) (suggesting reforms to "minimize 
the undesirable consequences of plea bargaining"); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea 
Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1387 (1970) (attacking the state's goal of efficiency as an 
unjust reason for usurping constitutional protections). 
14 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,260 (1971). 
15 See William L.F. Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 6 2002-2003
6 UN!Vt'RSITY OF P.t'NNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1 
As accustomed as American lawyers are to plea bargaining, many 
do not realize that the extent of our reliance on the practice is excep-
tional. In most Continental European countries, for instance, guilty 
pleas are unknown, and all cases involving serious crimes proceed to 
some sort of trial. 16 The question thus arises as to whether plea bar-
gaining should be practiced in international criminal tribunals, estab-
lished to prosecute the most heinous offenses. Two ad hoc tribunals 
now prosecute those accused of committing genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; similar 
entities are being established in Sierra Leone 17 and East Timor, 18 and a 
permanent international criminal court opened its doors in July 
2002. 1!) The ICTR and its sister tribunal, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IC1Y or Yugoslavian Tribunal),20 
309, 314 (1979) ("In the United States, defendants who plead guilty are, in the aggre-
gate, sentenced less severely than those who insist on trial."); Schulhofer, Pka Bargain-
ing as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1993 (noting that, in general, American defendants 
who plead guilty receive sentences ranging from 25% to 75% lower than similarly situ-
ated defendants who are convicted at trial). 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 142-46. 
17 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), available at http:/ /www.un .org/Docs/ 
sc/ reports/ 2000/915e.pdf; see also Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra 
Leone: t.xpe~iments in lnte/7!ationaljustice, 12 GRIM . L.F. 186, 231-41 (2001) (focusing on 
the creation of the Special Court in Sierra Leone) ; Daryl Mundis, New Mechanisms for 
the t.nforcement of lnte/7!ational Humanitarian Law, 95 AM . J. INT'L L. 934, 935-38 (2001) 
(describing differences and similarities between various international criminal tribu-
nals); Sierra Leone: Agreement on War Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at AS (discuss-
ing the creation of the Sierra Leone Tribunal) . 
18 Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor, U.N. Transi-
tional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (2000), 
available at http:/ / www.un.org/peace/etimor/untae tR/ Reg11.pdf; Regulation No. 
2000/15 on the t.stablishment of Panels with Exclusive jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Of 
fences, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/ 
2000/ 15 (2000) , available at http: / /www.un .org/ peace/ etimor/ untaetR/ 
Reg0015E.pdf; see also Linton, supra note 17, at 202-30 (explaining establishment of 
UNTAET and the Administration 's authority to adjudicate serious criminal offenses); 
Mundis, supra note 17, at 942-45 (detailing the judicial functions of UNTAET). 
19 Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, lnte/7!ational Court Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
July I, 2002, at A3. The International Criminal Court was established pursuant to the 
Rome Statute adopted by 120 states in July 1999. Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l83/9 (1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). 
20 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 
(1993) (determining that "an international tribunal shall be established in Yugoslavia for 
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 "); S.C. Res. 827, 
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have adopted procedures blending adversarial features, prevalent in 
the United States, with non-adversarial features common to the Con-
tinent. By providing for guilty pleas, both Tribunals adopted the 
American approach, but if they expect any defendants to plead guilty, 
they must also adopt the American practice of offering sentencing 
concessions to induce those guilty pleas. At the same time, however 
one views the desirability of such concessions in the domestic context, 
they appear particularly unseemly in the international criminal con-
text given the gravity of the crimes being prosecuted. Kambanda, for 
instance, admitted to orchestrating and encouraging a genocide that 
killed approximately 800,000 people in one hundred days. Kambanda 
committed crimes vastly more serious than the ordinary fare of do-
mestic courts and, guilty plea or no, it would be hard publicly to justify 
any but the most severe sentence for him.21 
These differing perspectives highlight, at the micro level, the de-
bate surrounding the practice of plea bargaining and, at the macro 
level, the difficulty inherent in transplanting domestic criminal pro-
cedures to international tribunals adjudicating in the unique and de-
veloping field of international criminal law. Whether or not it is prac-
ticable, let alone desirable, to employ plea bargaining, or any other 
domestic procedure, depends on a wide variety of factors, including 
the purposes for which the ICTR and ICTY were established, the way 
the Tribunals are organized, the nature of the crimes over which the 
Tribunals have jurisdiction, and the Tribunals' existing system of pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules. Any examination must draw upon the 
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing the 
ICIY). 
21 This point is particularly compelling since lower-level, argu.ably less culpable, 
Rwandans are being sentenced to death in Rwanda's domestic courts. See Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-9tK-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Sen-
tence] (discussing Rwandan courts' authorization to sentence similar defendants to 
death), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 810, 812; Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecu-
tion of War Crimes, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 393, 403 
(Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW) ("Rwan-
dan national courts can impose a death penalty and have done so after abbreviated 
trials lacking defense counsel. Thus, the political leaders of the Rwanda genocide who 
were surrendered to the ICTR by neighboring countries face at worst a life in jail, 
rather than summary execution."); Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent jurisdic-
tion: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE]. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 356-57 (1997) (observing 
that the Rwandan penal code provides for the death penalty while the ICTR charter 
does not). 
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experience of plea bargaining in domestic jurisdictions. Plea bargain-
ing constitutes a vital feature of the American criminal justice system, 
though it plays a relatively insignificant role in most Continental 
criminal justice systems. The historical, functional, and ideological 
reasons for the different values these two systems accord the practice 
of plea bargaining must inform any assessment of the desirability of 
the practice in the international tribunals. 
This article will comprehensively analyze the functional and ideo-
logical role that plea bargaining plays in various domestic jurisdictions 
to create a theoretical framework in which to understand and evaluate 
the emergence of plea bargaining in the realm of international crimi-
nal prosecutions. Part I constructs a functional account of the role 
that plea bargaining plays in various domestic jurisdictions. Section A 
details the historical rise of plea bargaining in Anglo-American juris-
dictions. This section shows that plea bargaining developed primarily 
in response to the introduction of increasingly complex and time-
consuming criminal procedures. Building on this history, Section B 
will describe the role that plea bargaining currently plays in the 
United States criminal justice system. Section C will then examine 
plea bargaining's lesser functional role in Continental European 
criminal justice systems and in the United Kingdom and Israel, two 
countries whose criminal procedures resemble, but are not as adver-
sarial as, those of the United States. In sum, this Part establishes a 
correlation between the complexity of the country's criminal proce-
dures and the prevalence of plea bargaining: the more complex and 
costly a country's criminal procedures, the more often plea bargaining 
will be used to evade those procedures. 
Part II moves the analysis from the functional to the theoretical 
plane. The adversarial procedures of the United States and the non-
adversarial procedures of Continental countries derive from various 
structural and ideological features of the countries utilizing them. 
Part II describes these features and explores plea bargaining's rela-
tionship to them. The Part concludes that plea bargaining is theoreti-
cally consistent with the structure and ideology of the American 
criminal justice system but is not especially compatible with the struc-
tural and ideological features that underpin Continental criminal jus-
tice systems. Plea bargaining's theoretical "fit" with American adver-
sarial procedures, then, provides an additional explanation for its 
prevalence and resilience in the United States. 
Parts III and IV apply this theoretical framework to international 
criminal prosecutions. Section A of Part III introduces the IC1Y and 
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ICTR and examines the Tribunals' structural components and key 
players; Section B describes the procedural and evidentiary amalgam 
that the Tribunals have created. With this groundwork laid, Part IV 
explores the emergence and evolution of plea bargaining in these in-
ternational criminal tribunals. Applying the functional and ideologi-
cal considerations relevant to domestic plea bargaining, Section A sets 
forth certain hypotheses concerning the importance of plea bargain-
ing and the role it is apt to play in international tribunals. Section B 
tests those hypotheses against ICTY and ICTR practice to date. It de-
tails the cases that have been disposed of by guilty plea, drawing not 
only upon information available from written sources but also upon 
interviews with prosecution and defense attorneys involved in the 
cases.
22 Section C summarizes plea bargaining's evolution at the Tri-
bunals-from disfavored to encouraged practice-and explains the 
particular forms of plea bargaining that have emerged as products of 
the Tribunals' unique structural and ideological features. 
I. PLEA BARGAINING: ITS FUNCTION AND ROLE IN 
DOMESTIC jURISDICTIONS 
Most criminal cases in Anglo-American countries are disposed of 
by guilty plea.2:{ Guilty pleas are particularly prevalent in the United 
States, where they account for the disposition of approximately 90% 
of all criminal cases.24 The vast majority of these American guilty pleas 
22 The footnotes identify some interviewees, but many current and former Tribu-
nal officials spoke to me on condition of anonymity. Therefore, in many footnotes, I 
simply cite documentary sources and omit reference to the interviews. In cases in 
which no documentary source was available, I cite the interview, identifying the inter-
viewee only by pseudonymic initials. 
23 See Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Proc-
ess: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183, 183 (1997) ("The standard form 
of disposition for most English and American criminal cases is the guilty plea, by 
means of the plea bargain."); cf Kent W. Roach, Canada, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY 53, 75 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) (finding that in Canada, plea 
bargaining "concerning both charges and sentences occurs openly and is encouraged" 
and "[a]n early guilty plea is a significant mitigating factor in sentencing"); Alschuler, 
Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973-75 (discussing 
plea bargaining in England and Canada). 
24 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.lO (1970) (relying on estimates 
"that about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty"); 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 21-22 (observing that no more than 15% of felony 
charges and only 3% to 7% of misdemeanor charges are likely to be resolved by trial); 
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 13, at 1 (" [R] oughly ninety percent 
of the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal courts plead guilty."); George 
Fisher, Plea Barganining's Triumph, 109 YALE LJ. 857, 910 (2000) (noting that in mod-
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are obtained through plea bargaining.25 For purposes of this Article, 
plea bargaining can be defined as bargaining through which a defen-
dant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for sentencing or charging 
reductions. Most plea bargaining is explicit; that is , the prosecution 
and defense bargain openly about the concessions the defendant is to 
receive. And it typically takes the form of sentence bargaining or 
charge bargaining. When engaged in sentence bargaining, the prose-
cutor will expressly agree to recommend a specific sentence which the 
court will almost certainly impose.26 As for charge bargaining, the 
prosecution will agree not to charge certain crimes or to dismiss 
charges already brought.27 Plea bargaining can also be implicit: 
whether or not any express bargaining takes place, in many jurisdic-
tions it is well established that judges impose more lenient sentences 
ern American courtrooms, "guilty plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five percent 
are common"); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1993 ("[E]ighty 
to ninety percent of defendants currently plead guilty."); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, 
Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining? The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining 
Critics, 47 EMORY LJ. 753, 753 (1998) (reporting on a 1992 survey of the seventy-five 
most populous counties in the United States which showed that guilty pleas accounted 
for 92% of all convictions in state courts). 
25 See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 675 (1980) 
("Although a guilty plea may occasionally be the unilateral product of the defendant's 
genuine remorse .. . or his ignorance of the advantages to be gained by manipulating 
the system, it is infinitely more likely to result from a bargaining process in which the 
guilty plea is tendered in return for inducements . .. ."); see also John Paul Ryan & 
James]. Alfini, Trial judges' Participation in Plea Bargaining: An E-mpirical Perspective, 13 
LAW & Soc'v REV. 479, 479 (1979) (stating that plea bargaining "is at the core of the 
criminal justice system") . 
26 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 956 (explaining that a prosecutor may 
"promise a certain sentence upon a guilty plea" and that the possibility is slight that the 
trial judge will not follow his recommendations); Alschuler, Trial judge's IW!e, supra 
note 13, at 1065 ("Students of the criminal courts of many American jurisdictions have 
noted that judges almost automatically ratify prosecutorial charge reductions and sen-
tence recommendations."); id. at 1063-64 (noting that five of the six felony judges in 
Houston, Texas followed the prosecutor's sentence recommendation in almost every 
case, while the sixth judge followed the prosecutor's recommendation in 90% of the 
cases); Gifford, supra note 13, at 68 (" [R]egardless of the articulated standard, courts 
rarely intervene in plea agreements.") . In most jurisdictions, judges are not strictly 
bound by a prosecutor's promised sentence, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1)-(2), but 
few judges choose to upset the bargain reached. 
27 E.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 956 (explaining that an "on-the-nose" 
guilty plea to one charge may be exchanged for the prosecutor's agreement to drop 
other charges) . In many cases, the dismissed charges carry mandatory sentences 
higher than the range of sentences available for the remaining charges, so the dis-
missal of the more serious charges necessarily results in a reduced sentence. See id.; 
Michael Bohlander, Plea Bargaining Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICIY PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 151 , 151 (Richard May et al. 
eds., 2001). 
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following a guilty plea than following a conviction at trial.28 The in-
troduction of sentencing guidelines in the federal system and in some 
states regulated the practice of plea bargaining to some extent but did 
not curtail it to any significant degree.29 The following sections detail 
plea bargaining's rise, its current role in the United States, and its 
more limited role in Continental Europe and other jurisdictions. 
28 See Alschuler, Trial judge's &le, sufrra note 13, at 1076 (describing implicit plea 
bargaining in the federal courts) ; Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical 
Perspective, 13 LAW & Soc'v REv. 247, 253 (1979) (discussing the unspoken understand-
ing between defendants and judges that results in defendants being better off follow-
ing a guilty plea); McDonald, sufrra note 11, at 386 (explaining that defendants may be 
aware that sentencing may be more harsh if they insist on proceeding to trial) . In 
some jurisdictions, judges also impose more lenient sentences following bench trials , 
which are relatively short and informal, than following jury trials. See Alschuler, Imple-
menting the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, sufrra note 13, at 1029 (asserting that 
"Philadelphia and Pittsburgh discouraged exercise of the right to jury trial in more or 
less the same fashion as other cities by rewarding defendants who waived this right and 
by threatening defendants who exercised it with unusually severe sentences"); Schul-
hofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, sufrra note 13, at 1062 (describing Philadelphia de-
fense lawyers' belief that in that jurisdiction "defendants convicted injury trials receive 
sentences substantially more severe than those imposed in bench trials"). Jury-trial 
waivers can also be the product of express bargaining. Alschuler, Implementing the 
Criminal Defendant's Right to Tria~ sufrra note 13, at 1029. 
29 See Colquitt, sufrra note 13, at 700 ("Th[e] widespread use of plea bargaining 
exists whether or not a jurisdiction uses guideline sentencing."); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Plea Bargaining as Comjlromise, 101 YALE LJ. 1969, 1977-78 (1992) (describing bargain-
ing under the federal sentencing guidelines and noting that the "percentage of guilty 
pleas in federal criminal cases accordingly has been stable"). The federal sentencing 
guidelines provide for a decrease of two levels in the offense level when the defendant 
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 3E1.1(a) (2001). Parties in the federal system can still engage 
in sentence bargaining: they can enter into an agreement whereby the parties desig-
nate a specific sentence which the court may then accept or reject or the prosecutor 
can agree to recommend a specific sentence, FED. R. CRJM. P. 11 (e}(1)(B)-(C), but the 
court may impose the sentence only if it is either "within the applicable guideline 
range" or "departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons," U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 6Bl.2(b)-(c) (2001). As for charge bargaining, 
the prosecutor can move to dismiss some charges upon the defendant's plea of guilty 
to one or more other charges, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (1) (A), although the federal sen-
tencing guidelines instruct judges to accept such an agreement only if they determine, 
"for reasons stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the 
seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not 
undermine the statutory purpose of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines," U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 6Bl.2(a) (2001). The parties can evade these re-
strictions to some extent by beginning their bargaining before the indictment is issued. 
LAFAVE ET AL., sufrra note 12, at 963. 
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A. The Historical Rise of Plea Bargaining 
Before the twentieth century, the vast m~ority of criminal cases in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions were disposed of by jury trial rather than 
by guilty plea. Guilty pleas were considered rather ill-advised,30 and 
empirical studies focusing on particular jurisdictions indicate that 
guilty pleas and plea bargaining in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom were relatively rare until the latter half of the nine-
teenth century.31 Their use increased, sometimes dramatically, during 
the decades following the American Civil War and soon reached, dur-
30 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 
971 (explaining that, before the nineteenth century, "[w)hen defendants offered to 
plead guilty, judges strongly urged them to reconsider");John H. Langbein, The Crimi-
nal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 278 (1978) (reporting on several 
late-seventeenth-century and early-eighteenth-century cases "in which, when an ac-
cused pleads guilty on arraignment or starts to plead guilty before the jury after having 
pleaded not guilty on arraignment, the court urges him to go through with the con-
test"). Alschuler reports that the first common law treatises do not mention any pro-
cedure resembling the guilty plea, and when guilty pleas do make their appearance, at 
least by the seventeenth century, courts were hesitant to receive them. Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and Its History, supra note 13, at 7, 9-12 (providing examples of, and expla-
nations for, judicial reluctance to accept guilty pleas). 
" See Feeley, sujrra note 23, at 187 (observing that guilty pleas increased dramati-
cally while trial rates declined in the mid-nineteenth century); see also Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and Its History, supra note 13, at 4 (contending that "plea bargaining was es-
sentially unknown during most of the history of the common law"); id. at 10 (describ-
ing a study showing that only 11% of the defendant~ who came before the Boston Po-
lice Court in 1824 pled guilty); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 121 (1983) (reporting 
that guilty pleas were rare in the mid-eighteenth century); Moley, supra note 13, at 108 
fig.1 (showing that in 1839 only 25% of New York's felony convictions were by guilty 
plea); cf Fisher, supra note 24, at 966-67 (reporting that in Middlesex County, Massa-
chusetts, guilty pleas reached a high of 71% of all adjudicated •ion-liquor cases in 1789-
90, dropped dramatically to 26% by 1834, and remained comparatively rare until the 
late 1870s). For most of American history, plea bargaining was considered illegitimate. 
See id. at 915 (describing judicial hostility to plea bargaining in the late nineteenth cen-
tury); Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Pub-
lic Interest, 31 I SR. L. REv. 169, 172 (1 997) (noting that for most of American history 
"bargaining by the parties for the 'waiver' of such rights was virtually prohibited by the 
formal legal system" because the pleas "tended to nullifY the criminal law, ... seemed 
inherently coercive[,]" and thus were presumptively unlawful); see also Griffin v. State, 
77 S.E. 1080, 1084 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) (noting that "the law favors a trial on the merits" 
and that it "does not favor confessions, either in or out of court"); Golden v. State, 49 
Ind. 424, 424 (1875) (labeling a plea arrangement between the prosecutor and defen-
dant a "corrupt agreement" and comparing plea bargaining to "corruptly purchas[ing] 
an indulgence"); Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351, 357 ( 1868) (holding that it would unac-
ceptably broaden "the generally recognized force of the obligation of contracts to hold 
that a defendant charged with crime might, without a trial, enter into a binding contact 
with the prosecuting attorney ... to go to the penitentiary for a certain number of years 
in satisfaction for the offense .... "). 
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ing the early decades of the twentieth century, the prevalence associ-
d 'th . 32 ate WI contemporary I:Imes. 
It is sometimes asserted that plea bargaining arose as a means of 
managing increasingly burdensome case loads. 33 While crowded dock-
ets might explain plea bargaining's current prevalence, historians 
have convincingly argued that plea bargaining emerged largely as a 
response to increasingly complex trial procedures.34 Indeed, to say, as 
I have above, that in past centuries jury trials constituted the primary 
means for the disposition of criminal cases is somewhat misleading 
because the trials of old bear scant resemblance to contemporary tri-
als. John Langbein and Malcolm Feeley, among others, have reported 
that during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, jury 
trials were rapid,35 summary proceedings.36 Well into the eighteenth 
century, for instance, London's Central Criminal Court, the Old Bai-
32 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 220 (finding that guilty pleas and plea bargaining 
were well-established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). For in-
stance, during the mid-1920s, 85% of all felony convictions in Chicago were by guilty 
plea; in Minneapolis, 90%; in St. Paul, 95%; in Los Angeles, 81 %; and in St. Louis, 
84%. Moley, supra note 13, at 105; see also Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, su-
pra note 13, at 27 (noting that in 1908 approximately 50% of all convictions in federal 
courts were by guilty plea; by 1916, 72%; and by 1925,90%, the same level as in recent 
years). 
33 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 184 ("Observers ... conclude that plea bargaining is 
an adaptation to the pressure of heavy caseloads."); Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea 
Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAw & Soc'v REv. 515, 516-17 (1975) ("Much of the in-
formed thought and literature on plea bargaining assumes ... that plea bargaining 
can be best ... understood as a function of case pressure."). Others have contended 
that plea bargaining originated in England in the seventeenth century as a means of 
mitigating unduly harsh punishment. See jAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND 
GUIL1Y PLEAS § 107[1] (1975) (describing early English plea bargaining methods by 
which a defendant could "confess[] his guilt and accuse[] a certain number of othe1· 
persons" in exchange for a reduced sentence granted at the Crown's discretion (cita-
tions omitted)). 
34 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 202 (arguing that as the jury trial became more 
complicated, there was a lise in guilty pleas and plea bargaining); Alschuler, Plea Bar-
gaining and Its History, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that the number of cases in federal 
courts declined in 1916 at the same time that guilty plea rates substantially increased 
and concluding, therefore, that "the increase cannot be attiibuted to the pressures of 
the caseload"). 
35 Langbein, supra note 31, at 115 (noting that "[n]othing distances the trial pro-
cedure of the [1750s] from its modern counterpart so much as its dispatch" and that 
Sir Dudley Ryder, a tiial judge in the 1 750s, "saw more felony jury trials in a day or two 
than a modern English or American judge would expect to see in a year"). 
36 E.g., Feeley, supra note 23, at 190;John H. Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDis-
cretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 445 (1974) ('jury trial in early modern times 
was a summary proceeding."); Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 262. 
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fi " ley, would hear between twelve and twenty elony cases per day. 
Such efficiency and expediency could be obtained in large part be-
cause neither the prosecution nor the defendant were represented by 
counsel in most criminal trials.38 There was also no voir dire of pro-
spective jurors,3!1 and the same panel of jurors would hear evidence in 
several unrelated cases before retiring to formulate verdicts in all.40 
Finally, " [ t] he common law of evidence, which has injected such vast 
complexity into modern criminal trials, was virtually nonexistent as 
late as the opening decades of the eighteenth century."41 Because 
these jury trials were so brief and simple, there was little motivation to 
encourage defendants to waive their right to them.42 
These early trials, while perhaps enviably efficient by modern 
standards, were also notably lacking in procedures safeguarding de-
37 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 262; see also Langbein, supra note 30, at 
276 ("[A] single Old Bailey jury commonly [tried] dozens of cases at a single ses-
sion[]."). 
38 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 188; Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 263 
("The most important factor that expedited jury trial was the want of counsel. Neither 
prosecution nor defense was represented in ordinary criminal trials."); Langbein, supra 
note 30, at 282; see also id. at 307-08 (describing the reasons justifying the prohibition 
on defense counsel). 
39 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 263. "In ordinary jury practice at the 
Old Bailey," wrote Langbein, "challenges were quite rare. According to the December 
1678 pamphlet, the clerk at the Old Bailey faithfully made the ritual proclamation to 
the accused that they should 'look to their Challenges,' but none did." Langbein, su-
pra note 30, at 275; see also id. at 279 ("[S]ince in practice the prosecution and defense 
took the jury as they found it, no time was spent probing jurors' backgrounds and atti-
tudes."). 
40 Langbein, supra note 36, at 439 ("In the seventeenth century a criminal trial 
jury would be impaneled and hear evidence in six or seven unrelated cases before re-
tiring to formulate verdicts in all."); Langbein, supra note 31, at 275 ("[The] practice 
of a single jury hearing many cases and leaving to deliberate on all of them at once was 
also routine."). 
41 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 264; see also Langbein, supra note 30, at 
300-06 (discussing the modem instrument of the law of evidence). Other factors con-
tributing to the speed of trials included the scheduling of trials soon after the crimes 
took place, prompt pre-trial evidence gathering, the recurrent use of jurors who were 
well experienced, and the guidance that the jury received from the judge, who freely 
commented on the merits of the case. /d. at 273-300; see also Langbein, Torture and Plea 
Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10 ("[T]he exclusionary rules of the law of criminal evi-
dence were still primitive and uncharacteristic."). 
42 Langbein, supra note 30, at 278 ("So rapid was trial procedure that the court was 
under no pressure to induce jury waivers. We cannot find a trace of plea bargaining 
[in the mid-1680s to the mid-1730s]."); Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 264 
("[T]here was no particular pressure ... to encourage the accused to waive his right to 
jury trial."). 
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fendants' rights. 43 In addition, Langbein has identified a series of 
practices that were used to investigate crimes and gather evidence 
during the mid-eighteenth century which actually encouraged false 
testimony and the condemnation of innocent defendants.44 As the 
flaws in these practices became known, procedural safeguards were 
developed to remedy them. For instance, certain evidentiary rules 
were introduced that were designed to screen untrustworthy evidence 
from the jury.45 Also, lawyers· increasingly came first to represent 
prosecuting victims and then defendants.46 The introduction of de-
fense counsel led to a series of major structural changes in the crimi-
nal trial, including the elimination of the defendant as a testimonial 
resource, the prevalence of evidentiary objections, and the evolution 
of the privilege against self-incrimination from an empty slogan into a 
doctrine of consequence.47 In sum, during the course of the eight-
eenth century, English criminal procedure underwent a transforma-
tion from a predominantly non-adversarial system to an identifiably 
adversarial one.48 The introduction of these adversarial features, while 
providing necessary safeguards, at the same time greatly lengthened 
and complicated the heretofore summary jury proceedings.49 With 
more issues of law raised, more expert witnesses testifying, and more 
43 See Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 265 ("We should also not be sur-
prised that this summary form of jury trial perished over the last two centuries. The 
level of safeguard against mistaken conviction was in several respects below what civi-
lized feoples now require."). 
4 See Langbein, supra note 31, at 84-114 (describing the crown witness and reward 
systems). 
45 See id. at 96-105 (tracing the development of the corroboration and the confes-
sion rules). 
46 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 192; Langbein, supra note 31, at 124 (discussing the 
number of times prosecution counsel and defense counsel appeared in Old Bailey 
cases); Langbein, supra note 30, at 311 ("It appears that in the decade of the 1730s, 
certainly from 1734-1735, defense counsel began to be permitted to examine and 
cross-examine witnesses."). 
47 See Langbein, supra note 31, at 132; Langbein, supra note 30, at 283 ("[F]rom 
the 1670s through the mid-1730s I have not noticed a single case in which an accused 
refused to speak on asserted grounds of privilege, or in which he makes the least allu-
sion to a privilege against self-incrimination."). 
48 See Langbein, supra note 31, at 123 (describing the adversarial procedures to 
which English criminal procedure shifted in the eighteenth century); cf Feeley, supra 
note 23, at 192 (arguing that what we now call the adversary system developed in the 
eighteenth century). 
49 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 202 (noting that "in the late seventeenth century 
and well into the nineteenth, a single judge and jury heard over four cases per day 
[but] by 1912, the average was less than one per day"). 
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cross-examination occurring, jury trials became time-consuming, 
complex events dominated by professional advocates. 
A second and corresponding transformation also occurred. As 
trials became more complex, the lawyers who were beginning to 
dominate them developed a more expedient alternative for case dis-
position: plea bargaining. Feeley, for instance, identifies a series of 
indicators of legal complexity, aggregates them to form a "Legal 
Complexity Index," which provides a single summary indicator of ad-
versariness, and shows that as the Legal Complexity Index increased 
so did the percentage of cases disposed of by guilty pleas. 5° These de-
velopments led to a de facto bifurcation of criminal case disposition: 
a handful of cases were disposed of by increasingly complex trials 
while the vast majority were disposed of by guilty pleas secured 
through plea bargaining. Thus, as some historians have ironically 
noted, the reforms to the system brought about by the introduction of 
evidentiary rules and the dominance of lawyers ultimately destroyed 
the system by rendering trials unworkable as the routine way of dispos-
ing of serious criminal cases.'" 
B. The Functional Role of Plea Bargaining in 
Contemporary United States Practice 
From the eighteenth century until the present day, American 
criminal proceedings have increased in complexity, length, and law-
yer-domination. A brief description of the contemporary American 
adversarial system provides a useful starting point and a relevant con-
trast to the Continental non-adversarial procedures that will be taken 
52 
up next. 
''
0 /d. at 215-17. The Legal Complexity Index represents the sum of seven vari-
ables: (1) the presence of prosecution attorneys; (2) the presence of defense attor-
neys; (3) the vigor/complexity of prosecution; (4) the vigor/complexity of defense; 
(5) the use of expert witnesses; (6) whether either party raised questions of law; and 
(7) ~uestions of evidence and procedure. !d. at 217. 
1 E.g., Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 265. 
52 No domestic system of criminal procedure contains purely adversarial or purely 
non-adversarial forms; every system is something of a blend. See Mirjan Damaska, Evi-
dentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 
121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 577 (1973) (explaining the "basic theme either of inquiry or 
contest is orchestrated in real life with heavy borrowings from the other camp, so that, 
as a result, all criminal processes appear mixed"); RichardS. Frase, Comparative Crimi-
naljustice Policy, in 17teory and in Practice, in lNT'L CONF. FOR THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE lNT'L lNST. OF HIGHER STUD. IN CRIM. SCI., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYsTEMS: FROM DIVERSIW TO RAPPROCHEMENT 109, 112-13 (1998) (concluding that 
"all systems in the world today are 'mixed' or hybrid systems-incorporating some 
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Criminal proceedings in the American adversarial system are 
structured in the form of a contest. The adversarial model gives to the 
parties the responsibility for investigating the facts, researching the 
law, and presenting the case in the manner most favorable to their 
own position.53 In contemporary trials, these tasks are carried out not 
by the parties themselves but by their lawyers. Thus, lawyers have 
emerged from playing no role in criminal cases to now dominating 
adversarial proceedings.54 Proceedings in an adversarial system are 
conducted before a factfinder who is uninformed about the case prior 
to trial. 55 In most cases that factfinder is a lay jury, 56 and the jury too 
has evolved over the centuries from a somewhat experienced body57 
features typical of the Common Law, adversary, or due-process models, along with 
other features typical of the Civil Law, inquisitorial, or crime-<:ontrol models") ; Patrick 
L. Robinson , Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Triall at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 569, 574 (2000) (observing that neither the 
common law accusatorial system nor the civil law non-adversarial systems actually exist 
in pure forms). But despite this hybridization, most systems of domestic criminal pro-
cedure are predominantly adversarial or non-adversarial, and their features vary 
enouph that useful contrasts may be drawn. 
5 See MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 74 (1997) [hereinafter DAMASKA, 
EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFT) (describing the adversary system as "a system of adjudication in 
which procedural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains es-
sentially passive"); MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORilY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 3 (I986) [hereinafter DAMASKA, 
FACES OF JUSfiCE) (discussing the differences between the adversarial and the non-
adversarial mode of process); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 31 (describing the par-
ties' responsibilities under the adversary system and noting that "[e]ach party is ex-
pected to present the facts and interpret the law in a light most favorable to its side") ; 
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 57 (I988) (stating that the 
adversary system is characterized by, among other things, "assignment to the parties of 
the responsibility to present their own cases and challenge their opponents"); Malcolm 
Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYsTEM 753, 
753 (Robertj.Janosik ed., 1987) (stating that, in an adversarial system, it is "the duty of 
the advocate ... to present his or her side's position in the very best possible light"); 
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. LJ. 30I, 
302 (1989) ("The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation 
and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who 
merely listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard.") . 
54 See Gordon van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Tria~ 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 403, 43I (I992) ("Lawyers in the United States produce, direct and 
dominate the trial process."); Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Percep-
tion, justice, and the "Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. I267, 1280 
(I996) ("Trials have become ... places where lawyers can display their artistry."). 
55 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 31; Sward, supra note 53, at 308-10 (discuss-
ing the elements of fair adjudication, including an uninformed decisionmaker). 
56 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 22 ("Over the country as a whole, roughly 
70% of all felony trials are tried to a jury . . . . "). 
57 Supra text accompanying note 41. 
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that was strongly influenced, if not controlled, by the judge,58 to an in-
experienced but essentially autonomous body. Because contemporary 
jurors, unlike their predecessors, do have the power to decide the 
cases they hear, the selection of jurors has become an important fea-
ture of contemporary American trials. Voir dire and the exercise of 
peremptory challenges often comprise a significant part of the guilt 
phase of a trial and, in some cases, the jury selection process lasts 
longer than the trial itself.5n The law of evidence has also evolved into 
a complex, technicallabyrinth.60 For example, the notorious hearsay61 
rule, with its many exceptions and rules prohibiting the introduction 
of character evidence, is difficult to apply and thus frequently gives 
rise to objections.62 In addition, the United States constitutional pro-
hibition on the admission of illegally obtained evidence6~ results in 
many motions for exclusion, which add to the length and complexity 
of contemporary American criminal proceedings. 
The typical contemporary American criminal trial thus features 
extended voir dire, numerous evidentiary objections, complex jury in-
structions and argument thereon,64 motions for exclusion, motions 
58 Langbein, supra note 30, at 284-300 (describing the methods judges used to 
control juries). 
sn See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 460-61 (noting that "voir dire and the exercise 
of peremptory challenges often compose a significant part of the trial of criminal 
cases" and giving examples); see also Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's 
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1000 (criticizing the "devotion of substantial resources 
to voir dire examinations [and] to the investigation of prospective jurors outside the 
courtroom"); Bradley & Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 1283 (identifying the jury selec-
tion process as "perhaps the most egregious example of the adversary system run 
amok"). 
c.o See 0AMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 10 (obse1ving that, 
"[v]iewed through Continental eyes, [Anglo-American evidence law] seems a maze of 
disconnected rules, embroidered by exceptions and followed by exceptions to excep-
tions"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 463 (reporting that Europeans "look upon our 
complex system with bewilderment"); cf Alschuler, lmfJlementing the Criminal Defendant's 
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1021-22 (describing the unnecessary and complex evi-
dentiary rules inherited from the common law). 
61 
"Hearsay" evidence is defined as a "statement .. . , othe r than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." BLACK'S LAW DICfiONARY 726 (7th ed. 1999). 
62 See, e.g., van Kessel, supra note 54, at 463-64 ("Our rules against hearsay and 
character evidence provide ample opportunity for objections to relevant evidence 
which might be misused by the lay jury.") . 
63 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 ( 1961) (reaffirming an earlier Court ruling 
that the exclusionary rule is "of constitutional origin"). 
64 Cf Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient jury Instructions, 
73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1105, 1108-09 (2000) (proposing rules for jury instructions which 
make them easier for the jury to understand). 
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designed to preserve appellate issues, and a host of tactical maneuvers 
made by counsel eager to advance their clients' interests.1;5 Whereas in 
the Old Bailey between twelve and twenty felony cases could be heard 
in a day, now one typical felony trial takes between two and three 
days,66 and these days are preceded by considerable time (and re-
sources) spent in preparing for trial-in investigating the facts, re-
searching the law, and "preparing" the witnesses,67 among other 
things. The contemporary American trial provides a defendant with 
every means to vigorously contest the charges against him, but in do-
ing so has become, in the words of one commentator, "the most ex-
pensive and time-consuming in the world."1;8 
Indeed, American criminal trials have become so expensive and 
time-consuming that they can only be provided to a small percentage 
of criminal defendants.69 As noted above, approximately 90% of all 
American criminal cases are disposed of by a guilty plea secured 
through plea bargaining.70 Stated differently, "[e]very two seconds 
during a typical workday, a criminal case is disposed of in an Ameri-
can courtroom by way of a guilty or nolo contendere plea."71 Such 
high guilty plea rates are commonly believed necessary in order for 
the system to function. 72 Indeed, even the harshest critics of plea bar-
65 See Langbein, supra note 36, at 445-46. 
66 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 22. In the late I 980s, the average felony trial in 
the United States federal courts lasted three days, van Kessel, suf:;ra note 54, at 473, and 
some states' felony trials took longer; for example, a 1986 study conducted by the Na-
tional Center for State Courts showed that trials in Oakland, California, lasted nearly 
six days and capital cases took considerably longer. ld. at 471. 
67 E.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 647-48 (1986) ("Lawyer 
interviews with witnesses in preparation for testimony have become an accepted and 
standard practice in the United States."). Lawyers in Continental countries are not 
normally permitted to "prepare" witnesses for trial. See id. at 648 ("[C]ontinental ju-
risdictions are quite severe in their prohibition against lawyer preparation of witnesses 
for hearings."); Mirjan Dama.Ska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1083, 1088-89 (1975) (noting that in countries utilizing non-adversarial 
procedures, "[t]he parties are not supposed to try to affect, let alone to prepare, the 
witnesses' testimony at trial" because "' [c]oaching' witnesses comes dangerously close 
to various criminal offenses of interfering with the administration of justice"). 
68 William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 155. 
69 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 408; Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defen-
dant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 971-72 ("Reluctant to reconsider our expensive 
trial procedures, we press most defendants to forego even the more expeditious forms 
of trial that defendants once were freely afforded as a matter of right."). 
70 Supra text accompanying note 24. 
71 Colquitt, supra note 13, at 696. 
72 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("Properly administered 
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gaining have limited their abolition proposals to cases involving the 
more serious crimes and have acknowledged that reducing or elimi-
nating plea bargaining will require the expenditure of additional re-
sources and the simplification of procedures.73 
Prosecutors have shown little interest in pursuing such reforms, 
however, and instead have sought to maintain high guilty plea rates, 
often by offering increasingly generous concessions to defendants.74 A 
[plea bargaining] is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a 
full-scale trial, the States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many 
times the number of judges and court facilities."); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITHjUSTICE 
FOR SOME: PROTECriNG VICriMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 191 (1996) ("In the 
American system, plea-bargaining seems to be inevitable. If all those who now plead 
guilty insisted on a jury trial, the system would collapse under the burden."); LAFAVE 
ET AL., supra note 12, at 961 (noting that "[t]here is a considerable body of thought 
that .. . it is not possible to abolish plea bargaining" given the assumption that "the 
system can function only if a high percentage of cases are disposed of by guilty plea 
and that this will happen only if concessions are granted to induce pleas"); Craig M. 
Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model of Criminal Proce-
dure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471,474 (1996) ("Given the limited resources available to the crimi-
nal justice system and the high cost of jury trials, the majority of cases must be resolved 
without a trial."); Langbein, supra note 36, at 446 ("The system as now practiced de-
pends on the prosecutor's exclusive authority to grant concessions in order to induce 
waivers of the right to jury trial."); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 725 (noting that there 
"are insufficient quantities of judicial and other necessary trial resources to provide a 
trial in more than a small percentage of cases") ; Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in 
the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RES. 52, 55 (1967) ("Among those in the system, it 
is generally believed that if the trial model were to become the routine mechanism for 
settling issues of criminality, the system would conceivably break down from overuse-
there would be too many cases for too few courts."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 408 
("This system requires that the accused be subjected to threats of increased punish-
ment for going to trial.") . 
73 For instance, Albert Alschuler contends that the United States could provide 
three-day jury trials to all felony defendants who reach the trial stage by adding ap-
proximately $850 million to annual criminal justice expenditures; as for misdemeanor 
prosecutions, Alschuler proposes a short-form non-trial procedure modeled on the 
German penal order, Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, su-
pra note 13, at 936, whereby the prosecutor proposes a specific penal sanction not in-
volving imprisonment, the court approves it, and the defendant can either accept it or 
go to trial, id. at 956-57; see also John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental 
Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE LJ 1549, 1565-66 (1978) (describing 
penal orders). Alschuler also suggests simplifying American criminal trial procedures 
by, among other things, reducing the size of juries, simplifying jury selection proce-
dures, and simplifying evidentiary rules. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's 
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1016-22. Stephen Schulhofer, by contrast, has main-
tained plea bargaining can be eliminated by using bench trials rather than jury trials. 
Schulhofer, ls Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, sufJra note 13, at 1037-38. 
74 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining anrllts History, supra note 13, at 235 ("The high 
rates of guilty pleas in the 1920s left little room for dramatic increases. In recent years, 
however, prosecutors may have found it necessary to offer greater concessions simply 
to keep those rates constant.") . The criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s likely 
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not atypical example is provided by Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 15 in which a 
defendant was offered a five-year sentence if he pled guilty but re-
ceived a life sentence after conviction at trial. 76 Generally speaking, 
American defendants who plead guilty receive sentences ranging from 
25% to 75% lower than similarly situated defendants who are con-
victed at trial. 77 Critics of plea bargaining argue that such punishment 
differentials are coercive and effectively penalize defendants who ex-
ercise their right to trial, while proponents maintain that these differ-
entials are well within the range to be expected from a bargaining 
process.78 However one characterizes the sentencing differentials, 
everyone agrees that they are what motivate most defendants to plead 
guilty. Defendants accused of relatively trivial infractions may plead 
guilty without any promise of leniency, particularly when the time and 
increased the "cost" of guilty pleas by giving defendants additional procedural rights to 
use in obtaining concessions. See id. at 239 '(quoting defense attorneys who stated that 
"'rights are tools to work with"' and "' [a]s the defendant gains more rights, his bar-
gaining position grows stronger'"). 
75 434 u.s. 357 (1978). 
76 !d. at 359; see also People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (reject-
ing a plea bargain which would have resulted in a prison term of two-to-six years, the 
defendant was instead sentenced to a forty- to eighty-year term); Alschuler, Changing 
Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 656 (noting that "in a great many cases the sen-
tence differential in America assumes shocking proportions"); Alschuler, Prosecutor's 
Role, supra note 13, at 62 (describing a defendant who was sentenced to thirty-five 
years' imprisonment after rejecting a plea offer of five years' imprisonment and a de-
fendant put to death after rejecting a plea to voluntary manslaughter); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 312 (1983) 
("Opponents of plea bargaining point out that the [sentence] differential is quite 
large. Accused murderers may plead to manslaughter and receive five years in jail in-
stead of thirty years or life in tried murder cases. Thieves receive months instead of 
years."); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 680-81 (detailing the "enormity of established 
sentencing differentials"). The possibility of receiving a death sentence further moti-
vates many American defendants to plead guilty. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 31-32 (1970) (concerning a defendant who maintained that he pled guilty to 
avoid the possibility of death penalty). 
77 Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1993; cf Stephen J. 
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The 
First fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 245 n.71 (1989) (reporting that the 
United States Sentencing Commission estimated that, before the federal sentencing 
guidelines, defendants who pled guilty received sentences 25% to 35% lower than de-
fendants convicted at trial). 
78 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 311-12. Easterbrook maintains that the "sentenc-
ing differential available from surrendering the chance to be acquitted depends on 
both the likelihood of acquittal and the discount rate applied to future years in jail." 
!d. at 312. He sets forth tables with equivalences between sentences after trial and by 
plea for selected combinations of discount rate and conviction probability; these tables 
reveal that a combination of discount rate and probability of acquittal can produce a 
steep sentencing discount for pleading guilty. !d. at 313-15. 
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trouble of going to trial is disproportionate to the expected penalty.7!' 
But virtually no defendants charged with serious crimes will plead 
'1 b . 80 gm ty a sent concessiOns. 
Plea bargaining thus plays an essential role in the American 
criminal justice system,81 and its pervasiveness shows no signs of abat-
ing.82 Indeed, there is little reason to expect it to abate because it not 
only provides a necessary expedient alternative to the time-consuming 
procedures that have developed, it also serves the needs of those in 
power: prosecutors, defense attorneys, and, to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent, judges. Plea bargaining concentrates enormous power in the 
hands of prosecutors who, in order to bargain effectively, must be af-
forded broad discretion over virtually all prosecutorial decisions,H~ and 
who, by reaching agreements with defendants as to the punishment to 
be imposed, largely assume the role of judge in both guilt determina-
79 See Malcolm Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 461, 
461-62 (1979) ("The primary question for many defendants in lower courts is not 
whether to got to trial but whether to show up in court at all."). 
80 See Nemerson, supra note 25, at 675 (attributing guilty pleas to the bargaining 
process). Indeed, defendants typically will not even waive their right to a jury trial in 
favor of a bench trial without the assurance of sentencing concessions. Schulhofer, Is 
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, supra note 13, at 1062-63. The very few defendants who do 
plea guilty absent concessions simply recognize that they have no viable defenses to the 
charges. See Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 657 (acknowl-
edging that some defendants plead guilty because they "sense no chance of victory at 
trial"); Weninger, supra note 11, at 293. 
81 See Colquitt, supra note 13, at 700 ("Plea bargaining permeates the criminal jus-
tice process."); RichardS. Frase, Comparative Criminal justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. 
L. REv. 539, 626 (1990) ("Plea bargaining is central to the American system .... ") . But 
cf. Lawrence B. Mohr, Organizations, Decisions, and Courts, 10 LAW & Soc'y REv. 621, 621 
(1976) ("Alternatives to the textbook method of handling cases are not anomalies; 
they are institutions in their own right."). 
82 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRJM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 753 (1996) (assessing that "the likelihood of abandoning the plea 
bargain is almost non-existent") . 
83 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 299 (describing prosecutorial discretion); 
Frase, supra note 81, at 612 ("The American prosecutor has broad discretion both over 
initial decisions to decline to file charges, and over postfiling decisions to drop all 
charges."); Misner, supra note 82, at 743-59 (providing a detailed description of the 
sources of broad prosecutorial discretion); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 442 ("Ameri-
can prosecutors have broad discretion limited only by the ethical duty not to bring a 
case to trial which is not supported by sufficient evidence."). Although prosecutorial 
discretion was seen as key to the emergence of plea bargaining as an initial matter, see 
Fisher, supra note 24, at 892-93; Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 266-67, plea 
bargaining itself has become so essential to the American administration of criminal 
justice that prosecutorial discretion must now be maintained to accommodate the 
practice such discretion once helped spawn, see Langbein, supra note 36, at 446. 
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tion and sentencing.84 Plea bargaining is additionally attractive to dis-
trict attorneys, particularly elected district attorneys,85 because it helps 
them maintain high conviction rates, foster good relationships with 
influential private attorneys, and avoid high-profile triallosses.86 Simi-
larly, plea bargaining serves the interests of assistant prosecutors, 
whose goals often coincide with those of their superiors and who also 
desire to manage their case loads efficiently.87 
As for defense attorneys, plea bargaining offers substantial finan-
cial advantages; some defense attorneys virtually never have to try a 
case yet earn substantial fees. Retained defense attorneys typically 
charge a flat fee for their representation. That fee is always sufficient, 
and frequently generous, for the work involved in securing a guilty 
plea,88 but it is often woefully inadequate as compensation for taking a 
case to trial.89 Plea bargaining is also attractive to public defenders, 
84 See Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, supra note 13, at 18 ("The dominant 
version of American plea bargaining ... requires the prosecutor to usurp the determi-
native and sentencing functions, hence to make himself judge in his own cause."). 
Some prosecutors, however, are not entirely comfortable with the responsibility that 
such power brings. See Michael L. Rubenstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska's Ban on Plea 
Bargaining, 13 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 367, 371 (1979) (reporting that after Alaska banned 
plea bargaining, some prosecutors were "relieved at being out of the sentencing busi-
ness"). 
85 See generally Misner, supra note 82, at 733 (noting that the great majority of local 
prosecutors are elected officials). 
86 See Maley, supra note 13, at 103; Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra 
note 13, at 1987; see also FLETCHER, supra note 72, at 192 (arguing the "state's interest 
may become equivalent to the prosecutor's personal political needs"); Alschuler, Pros~ 
cutor's Role, supra note 13, at 106. 
87 See Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 13, at 54 (quoting assistant prosecutors 
who, for instance, will "'do anything ... to avoid adding to the backlog"'); Schulhofer, 
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1987-88 (noting that assistant prosecutors' 
motivation in plea bargaining may reflect professional interests, such as career ad-
vancement and job satisfaction, as opposed to finding the optimal strategy for control-
ling crime). · 
88 Cf. Alschuler, Defense Allorney's Role, supra note 13, at 1182-84 (discussing a de-
fense attorney practice of securing as many guilty pleas as possible in order to earn 
money quickly). Indeed, most defense attorneys structure their fee systems on the ex-
pectation that the vast majority of cases will be disposed of quickly, through plea bar-
gaining. 
89 See id. at 1181-1206 (describing the defense attorneys' incentive, once retained, 
to convince their clients to plead guilty); AbrahamS. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as 
Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 15, 28 
(1967) (explaining the criminal defense lawyer's incentive to limit the scope of litiga-
tion rather than to battle); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, ·at 
1988 (observing that defense attorneys often render services at trial free of charge if 
plea negotiations fail); Skolnick, supra note 72, at 61 (noting the economic advantage 
that can accrue to the private attorney who pleads his client guilty); van Kessel, supra 
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who, although not laboring under intense financial conflicts, often la-
bor under heavy caseloads which give them an institutional interest in 
resolving their cases expeditiously.!!() Plea bargaining also serves the 
interests of judges, though perhaps to a lesser extent. Judges, like the 
other professionals in the criminal justice arena, are concerned about 
backlogs;91 thus, many happily acquiesce in plea bargaining as a means 
of efficient case disposition.92 Plea bargaining also relieves judges of 
the sole responsibility for sentencing, a responsibility that some find 
burdensome.!13 Finally, by eliminating the trial, plea bargaining elimi-
note 54, at 502 (finding that retained attorneys "make more money disposing of cases 
by plea bargain than by trial" and that some lawyers "complain of 'losing money by go-
ing to trial"'); see also Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining in Black Hawk County: A 
Case Study, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1053, 1059 (1975) (detailing other benefits that plea bar-
gaining provides to defense attorneys) . 
90 See Alschuler, Defense Attorneys Role, supra note ] 3, at 1 248-49; Fisher, supra note 
24, at 1063 (noting that public defenders have limited power to adjust their heavy 
caseloads and therefore have an incentive to plea bargain and more efficiently handle 
their caseloads); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1989-90 (ob-
serving that public defenders do not face financial incentives to avoid trial but do face 
institutional pressure to move cases). Fisher reports that those who advocated the es-
tablishment of public defenders' offices in the early decades of the twentieth century 
did so with the claim that public defenders would be able to secure more guilty pleas. 
Fisher, supra note 24, at 1057. Early public defenders seemed to do just that-in 1913-
1914, Los Angeles public defenders resolved 70% of their cases by guilty plea as op-
posed to 62% for private counsel assigned to represent indigent defendants and 49% 
for retained lawyers. /d. at 1062. But see Skolnick, supra note 72, at 60-61 (finding that 
in a California county studied in the early 1 960s, five of the six leading private defense 
attorneys reported settling a greater percentage of their cases by guilty plea than did 
the public defender) . Plea bargaining can also afford public defenders occasional 
power to influence systemic decisions. A public defender's office may periodically ref-
use to plea bargain certain types of cases when it believes that prosecutors are not mak-
ing reasonable otTers. The threat that all such cases will proceed to trial often forces 
prosecutorial concessions. See Alschuler, Defense Attorney 's Role, supra note 13, at 1249-
52 (describing public defenders' ability to encourage a "general strike" in which all 
clients choose to exercise their rights to trial rather than plea bargain); Skolnick, supra 
note 72, at 63 (describing the public defenders' ability to frustrate the prosecutor's of-
fice). 
91 See Skolnick, supra note 72, at 55 (noting that judges observed and interviewed 
exhibited a "potent interest" in calendar movement). 
92 Fisher reports, for instance, that judges in nineteenth-century Massachusetts 
initially viewed plea bargaining as an unwarranted incursion into their sentencing 
power but increasing caseload pressures, particularly involving civil cases, led them to 
embrace plea bargaining as a necessary means of moving their dockets. Fisher, supra 
note 24, at 988-89. 
93 Cf Rubenstein & V.'hite, supra note 84, at 372 (reporting that a plea bargaining 
ban in Alaska resulted in "a heavier burden on sentencing judges, some of whom have 
objected that they would like more guidance from the district attorney" and that 
"[s]omejudges believe that a district attorney abdicates his responsibilities by not mak-
ing specific recommendations") . 
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nates the possibility of errors in the trial and thereby protects trial 
judges' reputations by shielding them from appellate reversals.94 
In sum, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges each have their 
own good reasons for favoring plea bargaining. Indeed, although 
they have largely divergent formal interests and role obligations, their 
mutual interest in processing cases efficiently exerts a potent pressure 
to cooperate and thus to subvert the conflict norms on which the ad-
versary system is based.95 Organizational theorists and social scientists 
have pointed to these factors, as well as to group dynamics and the 
human desire to minimize conflict and uncertainty, as additional rea-
sons to consider plea bargaining an inevitable feature of the American 
criminal justice system.96 
In keeping with its pervasive role in the American criminal justice 
system, plea bargaining influences virtually all significant decisions 
made in that system. A prosecutor's initial charging decisions depend 
not only on what crime the defendant is suspected of committing but 
on a host of other factors relevant to the bargaining that is expected 
to occur. Prosecutors commonly over charge defendants, expecting 
to eventually withdraw some charges as part of a plea bargain.97 The 
94 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 867; Moley, supra note 13, at 103. 
!lf> See Skolnick, supra note 72, at 53; see also Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the 
Criminal justice System: An Organizational Perspective, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 407, 415-19 
(1973) (reviewing scholarship on the subversion of conflict norms in the plea bargain-
ing process). Lawrence Mohr notes the goal compatibility among these actors: 
Judges wish to save time, keep things simple, avoid certain undesirable im-
ages, and maintain political favor. Prosecutors wish to maximize production, 
maximize convictions and guilty pleas, avoid over-leniency in the more serious 
cases, and earn favorable recommendations from superiors. Defense lawyers 
wish primarily to earn a fee quickly (since it cannot be large) and keep clients 
satisfied. The public defender wishes to relieve the time pressure of his 
caseload, maintain a good reputation for the office, and obtain certain re-
sources (e.g., confidence, prosecutorial information) . . . . Basically, the 
prosecutors and judges need a certain level of convictions and guilty pleas, but 
most often it does not matter crucially to what charges, with what sentences, 
and with what arrangements for bail, probation, etc. Defenders and lawyers 
need to do well for their clients, but this is measured much more in terms of 
penalties than in terms of formal outcomes of guilty or not guilty. Compati-
bility is to be found, therefore, in a plea of guilty to some charge .... 
Mohr, supra note 81, at 637-38. 
96 See Ryan & Alfini, supra note 25, at 480-81 (reviewing recent social science 
scholarship on the importance of relationships and social groups to plea bargaining); 
Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, supra note 13, at 1041-43 (discussing "two ... 
theoretical perspectives-organizational analysis and socialization (or adaption) analy-
sis," that have guided a substantial amount of social science research on plea bargain-
ing). 
97 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 670 (describing how prosecutors will charge 
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concessions that prosecutors offer defendants during plea bargaining 
often depend less on penologically relevant factors, such as the gravity 
of the crime or the defendant's prior criminal record, than on factors 
related to bargaining. For instance, prosecutors typically offer the 
greatest concessions in the weakest cases.!18 In other words, the more 
likely it is that a defendant will be acquitted, the more attractive the 
plea offer that he will receive. Thus, for example, defendants with 
colorable claims for evidentiary exclusions will be offered greater con-
cessions than similarly situated defendants without such claims.99 
defendants with a higher charge than normally appropriate in order to encourage 
pleas to lesser crimes); Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 13, at 85-105 (providing 
an extensive discussion of the "problem of overcharging") ; Felstiner, supra note 15, at 
316 (characterizing overcharging as a troublesome aspect of American prosecution, 
particularly because defendants are normally charged before sufficient investigation 
may be completed and prosecutors are thereby given more leverage to encourage 
guilty pleas); Frase, supra note 81, at 621 (noting that American prosecutors "have an 
incentive to exaggerate initial charges so as to leave more room for later plea bargain-
ing concessions"). In particular, many prosecutors charge defendants with crimes 
bearing high mandatory-minimum sentences, even though the prosecutors do not ex-
pect to be able to prove those crimes at trial. The mandatory-minimums provide a use-
ful bargaining position for the prosecutor, who may then obtain a guilty plea for a 
lesser crime that, in fact, more accurately represents the defendant's conduct. See 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ. 1909, 
1963-66 (1992) (describing this practice and examining particular cases). 
98 Felstiner, supra note 15, at 319. Albert Alschuler's interviews with prosecutors 
across the United States revealed that: 
An overwhelming majority of prosecutors endorse the view that "half a loaf is 
better than none," and they respond to the prospect of defeat at trial by in-
creasing the concessions available in exchange for a plea of guilty. The 
weaker the prosecutor's case, the more substantial the "break" that a defen-
dant can secure by pleading guilty .... 
Alschuler, Trialjudge's Role, supra note 13, at 1126; see alsoAlschuler, Prosecutor's Role, 
supra note 13, at 58 ("The overwhelming majority of prosecutors view the strength or 
weakness of the state's case as the most important factor in the task of bargaining."); 
id. at 59 (quoting a Chicago prosecutor as saying, "[w)hen we have a weak case for any 
reason, we'll reduce to almost anything rather than lose"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 
97, at 1941-42 (noting that a prosecutor "must offer different prices to defendants who 
are fairly likely to win at trial than to defendants who are sure to lose"). 
99 Knowing this, some defense attorneys "advance every procedural claim that 
their ingenuity can devise-even claims that lack any chance for success, but which 
threaten to occupy the court's and the prosecutor's time." Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, 
supra note 13, at 80; see alsoAlschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, 
supra note 13, at 939 ("[P]lea bargaining has led defense attorneys to file absurd pre-
trial motions simply because 'it takes time to refute even a bad contention' and 'every 
motion added to the pile helps secure a better plea."'). At the same time, Alschuler 
notes that "[p]rosecutors are usually as anxious to threaten the defense attorneys' time 
as defense attorneys are to threaten theirs," and do so, among other ways, by filing 
multiple charges when the Jaw of double jeopardy or the canons of statutory construc-
tion preclude multiple convictions. Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 13, at 99. 
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Similarly, because factually innocent defendants tend to have stronger 
cases than those who are guilty, innocent defendants typically receive 
especially attractive plea offers. 100 Other bargaining decisions are 
driven by workload and political pressures. For instance, many prose-
cutors are particularly keen to plea bargain labor-intensive cases101 but 
may be unwilling to bargain with high-profile defendants102 or even 
with well-known defense attorneys, against whom prosecutors may 
wish the opportunity to try a case.103 
In sum, plea bargaining sustains the American criminal justice sys-
tem, and the American criminal justice system sustains plea bargain-
ing. Although plea bargaining has been the subject of widespread 
and trenchant criticism104-among other things, for encouraging inno-
100 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, at 1943. Critics thus claim that plea bargain-
ing coerces a significant percentage of innocent defendants to convict themselves in 
exchange for a certain , reduced penalty. See U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM 'N ON 
CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS 48 (1973) (noting that "the plea ne-
gotiation system creates a significant danger to the innocent"); Alschuler, Prosecutor's 
Rnle, supra note 13, at 60 (explaining that a serious Ciiticism of plea bargaining, that 
"the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be 
innocent");John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in 
England, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 287, 298 (1979) (describing research suggesting tha t 
some innocent defendants plead guilty and concluding that "innocent persons are fre-
quently placed at risk and that, on occasion, the weaker and less knowledgeable are 
wrongly persuaded to plead guilty"); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Jus-
tice", 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 509, 510 (1979) (noting critics' contention that plea bar-
gaining "operates to encourage, if not coerce, even innocent defendants to waive their 
right to trial by jury"); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 2000 
(reasoning that the innocent defendant may rationally choose to accept conviction 
and a small penalty rather than risk conviction on a more serious charge); Note, supra 
note 89, at 1059 (describing the pressures on innocent defendants to plead guilty). 
101 See Alschuler, Prosecutor's Rnle, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
102 See WEINREB, supra note 13, at 77 (observing that, in a highly publicized case, 
"the prosecutor may feel pressure to display a particularly firm or, more rarely, gentle 
hand"); Alschuler, Prosecutor's Rnle, supra note 13, at 107 (describing the political im-
portance of publicized cases, and the corresponding difficulty in arranging plea 
agreements) . As Jerome Skolnick put it, the prosecutor is: 
[I)nterested in making a favorable impression on a diffuse public-including 
courts, political authorities, and the man in the street. His specific task is to 
strike a balance between those cases which, for a variety of reasons-usually re-
lated to the public interest-he cannot deal out; and those which, in deference 
to his administrative responsibilities, he needs to settle before trial. In brief, 
he is required to keep the calendar moving, at the same time not appear to be 
"giving anything away" to the defense. 
Skolnick, supra note 72, at 55. 
103 Alschuler, Defense Attorneys Rnle, supra note 13, at 1187 (observing that "an at-
torney's reputation as a trial advocate could grow to the point that, paradoxically, it 
might diminish his ability to bargain successfully") . 
104 See supra note 13 (canvassing scholarship critical of plea bargaining, both in 
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cent defendants to self-convict, for undermining other legal doctrines 
that society wishes to further, for resulting in sentences that cannot be 
justified by any legitimate penological rationale, and for contributing 
to widespread cynicism about the criminal justice system 105-it has per-
severed and in recent decades has won the approval of the courts, 
which consider it a necessary feature of the American criminal justice 
lOG 
system. 
principle and as practiced in contemporary criminal justice systems). 
w .• See, e.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10, 16 ("When 
people who have murdered are said to be convicted of wounding, or when those 
caught stealing are nominally convicted of attempt or possession, cynicism about the 
processes of criminal justice is inevitably reinforced."). Alschuler, one of plea bargain-
ing's harshest critics, summarizes the "evils" the practice has wrought thus: 
Plea bargaining makes a substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, 
not upon what he did or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical deci-
sion irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings. In contested 
cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a judicial determination 
of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the re-
quirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This practice also deprecates the value of human liberty and the pur-
poses of the criminal sanction by treating these things as commodities to be 
traded for economic savings .... 
Plea bargaining leads lawyers to view themselves as judges and administra-
tors rather than as advocates; it subjects them to serious financial and other 
temptations to disregard their clients' interests; and it diminishes the confi-
dence in attorney-client relationships that can give dignity and purpose to the 
legal profession and that is essential to the defendant's sense of fair treatment. 
In addition, this practice makes figureheads of court officials who typically 
prepare elaborate presentence reports only after the effective determination 
of sentence through prosecutorial negotiations. Indeed, it tends to make fig-
ureheads of judges, whose power over the administration of criminal justice 
has largely been transferred to people of less experience . . . . Moreover, plea 
bargaining perverts both the initial prosecutorial formulation of criminal 
charges and, as defendants plead guilty to crimes less serious than those that 
they apparently committed, the final judicial labeling of offenses. 
The negotiation process encourages defendants to believe that they have 
"sold a commodity and that [they have], in a sense, gotten away with some-
thing." It sometimes promotes perceptions of corruption .... The practice of 
plea bargaining is inconsistent with the principle that a decent society should 
want to hear what an accused person might say in his defense-and with con-
stitutional guarantees that embody this principle and other professed ideals 
for the resolution of criminal disputes. Moreover, plea bargaining has under-
cut the goals of legal doctrines as diverse as the Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule, the insanity defense, the right of confrontation, the defendant's 
right to attend criminal proceedings, and the recently announced right of the 
press and public to observe the administration of criminal justice. 
Alschuler, ImfJlementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 932-34 
(citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
10
G See, e.g. , Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("Disposition of 
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but 
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C. The Functional Rnle of Bargaining in Continental Europe, 
the United Kingdom, and Israel 
29 
Having established the vital functional role that plea bargaining 
plays in the American adversarial system in Section B, this Section ex-
amines the incidence of bargaining in countries that utilize less adver-
sarial trial procedures. Subsection 1 describes criminal procedures in 
Continental European countries, 107 and is followed in Subsection 2 
with a discussion of bargaining and non-trial dispositions in those 
a highly desirable part for many reasons."). Efforts to restrict or eliminate plea bar-
gaining have been few and ill-fated. Arguably, the most comprehensive effort occurred 
in Alaska, where, in 1975, the state's Attorney General prohibited his prosecutors from 
plea bargaining. Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 367. Initial reports indicated 
that prosecutors largely complied with the ban. Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, 
Alaska's Ban on Pka Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 jUDICATURE 310, 311 (1992); see Ruben-
stein & White, supra note 84, at 369-71 (finding that four years into the ban, sentence 
bargaining had been virtually eliminated and charge bargaining had been reduced). 
At the same time, defendants convicted at trial received longer sentences than defen-
dants who pled guilty, Carns & Kruse, supra, at 311-12, so implicit plea bargaining re-
mained. Further, although the ban remained in effect as an official policy, by 1985 
widespread and explicit charge bargaining had returned to most of the state. See id. at 
317. 
For a discussion of unsuccessful efforts to eliminate plea bargaining in El Paso 
County, Texas, see Sam W. Callan, An l!.xperience injustice Without Pka Negotiation, 13 
LAW & Soc'v REV. 327 (1979); Weninger, supra note 11. Both courts and commenta-
tors have discussed more limited methods of restricting certain kinds of plea bargain-
ing. See People v. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66,72 & n.ll (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (describing 
a California statute prohibiting plea bargaining in certain classes of cases, and noting 
that "[d]espite the recent enactment of laws designed to limit 'plea bargaining,' the 
practice not only continues, but has apparently increased");joseph P. Busch, Guidelines 
Concerning Pka Bargaining, CAL. ATI'YS FOR CRIM. jUST. FORUM, May:June 1975, supp. 
(banning sentencing bargaining but not charge bargaining); Milton Heumann & 
Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Pka Bargaining: The Michigan Fel-
ony Firearm Statute, 13 LAw & Soc'v REv. 393, 395-98 (1979) (reporting that the Wayne 
County, Michigan, Prosecutor's office chose not to engage in plea bargaining with de-
fendants accused of violating a state firearms law that imposed a mandatory sentence); 
Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 
CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) (banning sentencing bargaining but not charge bargaining); 
Raymond I. Parnas & Riley J. Atkins, Abolishing Pka Bargaining: A Proposa~ 14 CRJM. L. 
BULL. 101, 109-10 (1978) (observing that while the United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of California prohibited sentence bargaining, charge bargaining may 
have continued); Note, supra note 89, at 1069-70 (summarizing the positive cost-
benefit effects of eliminating plea bargaining in one Iowa county). 
107 Any attempt to summarize the criminal procedures of Continental countries is 
a perilous enterprise because Continental systems of criminal procedure are diverse 
and constantly changing, primarily as a result of international law developments. See, 
e.g., Gordon van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial t"vi-
dence, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 799, 801-02 (1998) (recognizing the diversity of Continental 
procedures and the changes that have followed the development of international law) . 
My summary will address features common to most Continental countries. 
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countries. Subsection 3 examines the criminal procedures and bar-
gaining practices of some "intermediate countries," countries whose 
criminal procedures are more adversarial (and consequently more 
complex and time-consuming) than those of Continental countries 
but less adversarial than those of the United States. The Section as a 
whole confirms the relationship between trial practices and plea bar-
gaining discussed above: complex adversarial criminal procedures 
create a need for bargaining to avoid them. 
1. Continental Criminal Procedures 
Continental criminal procedures are typically described as inquisi-
torial108 or non-adversarial. Whereas proceedings in an adversary sys-
tem are structured in the form of a contest, featuring two opposing 
litigants who present their best evidence and arguments to a neutral 
and largely passive factfinder, 109 proceedings in a non-adversarial sys-
tem are structured more in the form of an inquiry, 110 directed by a 
judge''' on the basis of a dossier, a collection of written materials com-
piled by government officials who have investigated the case. 112 The 
dossier is made available in its entirety to the defendant or his counsel 
and is supposed to contain all the evidence relevant to the case, ex-
108 The term "inquisitorial" has, particularly in the past, "conjure[d] up the ex-
cesses of the Star Chamber or the haunting memories of the Spanish Inquisition." 
G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures-A Comparative Analysis, 55 
AUSTRALIAN LJ. 207, 208 (1981) (noting further that, while the term does not conjure 
such images today, it is still "viewed with suspicion by many common lawyers"); see also 
LUBAN, supra note 53, at 93-94 (remarking that the label "inquisitorial" "evokes images 
of the auto-da-fe and the Iron Maiden, the Pit and the Pendulum"); Damaska, supra 
note 52, at 556-58 (acknowledging the "aura of dread and mistrust" surrounding the 
term, and describing the inquisitorial type of criminal procedure). Consequently, I 
will use the term "non-adversarial." 
IO!l See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
110 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 3 ("The non-adversarial mode 
is structured as an official inquiry."). 
111 See Mary C. Daly, Some Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil and 
Common Law Legal Systems, 2]. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 65, 67-68 (1999); van Kessel, 
supra note 54, at 431 (contrasting the judge's role at trial in each type of system). 
112 See Daly, supra note 111, at 67-68 ("All the findings from [the pre-trial] investi-
gation are recorded in detail and kept in a file, the dossier."); Nico Jorg et al., Are In-
quisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 47 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995) (stating that in The Nether-
lands, the dossier "reporL~ every step in the procedure" and "not only forms the basis for 
the trial, but also a coherent system of supervision and control"); Bron McKillop, Anat-
omy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 544-46 (providing a detailed de-
scription of the dossier in a French murder case). 
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culpatory as well as inculpatory. 113 The role of defense counsel in 
many Continental countries is far more limited than in the United 
States,114 and Continental proceedings are in general more geared to-
ward establishing truth than their American counterparts. 115 For that 
reason and others, Continental procedures are also considerably more 
efficient and less time-consuming than their American counterparts. 
Whereas adversarial procedures are lawyer-dominated, non-
adversarial procedures are judge-dominated116 and, as a consequence, 
113 See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 52, at 533-34 (observing that, even in those Con-
tinental countries most restrictive regarding disclosure, "the defendant and his counsel 
acquire, before the case comes up for trial, an unlimited right to inspect the whole in-
vestigative [dossier]"); Frase, supra note 81, at 672 ("In France, counsel for the defen-
dant has an absolute right to inspect the full dossier of the case prior to trial and at cer-
tain stages of pretrial procedure."); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German 
Criminal justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 317, 341 (1995) (noting that in Germany, the defense 
counsel has "the right to inspect the entire prosecution file, including both favorable 
and unfavorable evidence"); Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining justice-A Bargain for Ger-
man Criminaljustice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 764 (1992) ("German defense counsel 
has a right prior to the trial to inspect and copy the official file."); Jorg eta!., supra 
note 112, at 47 (stating that in The Netherlands the dossier is "equally at the disposal of 
the ~rosecution and the defence"). 
14 See, e.g., AJ.H. Swart, The Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNilY 279, 291 (Christine Van den Wyngaert eta!. eds., 1993) (ex-
plaining that in The Netherlands, defense counsel does not have the right to be pres-
ent when his client is interrogated by the police and that other restrictions can be im-
posed on a defense lawyer's access to his client during the pre-trial stage when "serious 
suspicion has arisen that contacts between accused and counsel are being used in an 
attempt to hinder the investigation"); Christine Van den · Wyngaert, Belgium, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNilY, supra, at 1, 16 (noting 
that in Belgium "[d]uring the pre-trial stage, defence counsel has no right to be pres-
ent when investigations are made [and] may not be present during the interrogation 
of his client, or when witnesses are examined, nor may he attend searches and seizure 
[sic] at his client's house or premises"). 
115 See Damaska, supra note 52, at 579, 581-89; Jorg eta!., supra note 112, at 42-43 
(concluding that, in the inquisitorial system used on the Continent, "priority is given 
to truth-finding"). For instance, the German Code of Criminal Procedure imposes an 
express legal duty on judges to find the truth. RichardS. Frase, The Search for the lthole 
Truth About American and European Criminal justice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 820 
(2000). 
116 Philippe Bruno, The Common Law from a Civil Lawyer's Perspective, in 
INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 5 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise 
H. Bernal eds., 1994) (':Judges are at the center of the civil law system."); Daly, supra 
note 111, at 67-68 ("In the civil law system, the judges-not the parties-drive the 
criminal process."); Mirjan Damaska, 17ze Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: An-
glo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 841 (1997) (finding 
that "while the continental criminaljudge takes the lion's share offactfinding activity, 
in Anglo-American lands procedural action is to a much greater extent in the hands of 
the lawyers for the prosecution and the defense"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 431 ("A 
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are more streamlined. Criminal cases in Continental countries are ei-
ther tried to a panel of judges117 or to a "mixed court," composed of 
both lay jurors and professional judges. 118 Even where lay jurors are 
used, the professional judges, and in particular the presiding judge, 
dominate. 119 Prior to trial, the prosecutor presents the dossier to the 
central difference between the adversary and nonadversary systems is that in the latter 
the judge controls the process rather than the lawyers."). 
117 Alphonse Spielmann & Dean Spielmann, Luxembourg, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 261, 265 (noting that the 
use of lay jurors in criminal trials in Luxembourg was eliminated in 1987); Swart, supra 
note 114, at 288 (finding that the use of lay juries in criminal trials in The Netherlands 
was abolished in 1813). 
118 German mixed courts have been extensively described in the academic litera-
ture. For a survey of these courts, see GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GERMAN LAW 182-84 (1998); Dubber, supra note 13, at 561-67; John H. Langbein, 
Mixed Court and jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195. For a discussion of mixed courts in France, see Richard S. 
Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 143, 
172-73. For a general discussion of Continental mixed courts, see van Kessel, supra 
note 54, at 422, explaining that: "The Continental court usually consists of a single 
professional judge in minor cases and a mixed bench, usually one professional and two 
lay judges or, in more serious cases, three professional and two to nine lay judges." 
Discontent with the jury system in some countries has resulted in reduced use of mixed 
panels. See, e.g., jean Pradel, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 105, 105-14 (finding the French 'jury sys-
tem is currently the target of criticism" and "in considerable demise"); Vagn Greve, 
Denmark, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 
114, at 51, 57 ("For some time there has been rather widespread discontent with the 
jury system, and the applicable area has been reduced markedly."); Van den Wyngaert, 
supra note 114, at 11-12 (discussing the limited role of the jury in Belgian criminal 
proceedings). At the same time, Spain and Russia recently reintroduced jury trials; for 
a general discussion of this development, see Steven C. Thaman, The Jury Returns to 
Continental Europe: Russia and Spain Return to the Classic jury as a Catalyst in a Move to a 
More Adversary Form of Criminal Trial, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL jUSTICE SYsTEMS: 
FROM DIVERSITY TO RAPPROCHEMENT, supra note 52, at 343. 
119 See Brouwer, supra note 108, at 217 (describing the French presiding judge's 
extensive authority and noting, by contrast, that "[t]he role of the associate judges dur-
ing the trial is a rather passive one"); Dubber, supra note 13, at 561-67 (describing the 
very limited influence of lay jurors); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (finding that in 
France, "[t]he conduct of the trial itself is controlled and directed almost entirely by 
the presiding judge"); Frase, supra note 115, at 825 (" [S] tudies of the German mixed 
courts indicate that the lay judges have very little impact on guilt determinations 
.... "). While the presiding judge does dominate in the adjudicative function, espe-
cially in relation to the lay jurors, the role of the Continental judge itself has under-
gone something of a transformation in recent decades as the investigative functions 
previously carried out by the judge have largely been transferred to the police and 
prosecutor. See Serge Lasvignes & Marcel Lemon de, The Criminal Process in France, in 
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
23, 25 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & Mark A. Summers eds., 1995) ("In 1808 the role of a 
juge d'instruction was 90% that of an investigator; by 1958, it had become 80% that of a 
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presiding judge, but not the lay jurors. 120 Having read the dossier, the 
presiding judge typically carries out the bulk of the questioning, and 
only after she is finished do the lawyers have the opportunity to sug-
gest additional questions. 121 The presiding judge is also authorized to 
raise all issues relevant to the charge and can even hear evidence not 
formally put forward by the parties. 122 
Continental evidentiary rules123 are extremely relaxed and simple 
judge. This evolution continued thereafter and particularly since 1970. Today, we can 
assert that the role of a juge d'instruction is 90% that of a judge."); Fram;:oise Tulkens, 
Criminal Procedure: Main Comparable Features of the National Systems, in THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra, at 11-12 
(surveying recent reforms in European criminal justice systems in such countries as 
Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the former Soviet bloc countries and noting that 
the dominant reform trends have been demarcating the roles of police, prosecutor, 
and~udge, and streamlining the criminal process). 
20 
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; see also Gerhard Dannecker & Julian Roberts, 
The Law of Criminal Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 413, 420 (Werner F. 
Ebke & Matthew W. Fin kin eds., 1996) (explaining that, in Germany, lay jurors are not 
permitted to see the files). 
121 See LUBAN, supra note 53, at 94-95 (noting that in Germany lawyers rarely ask 
more than a couple of questions, both because the judge has typically asked all of the 
relevant questions and because intruding further might be taken as criticism of the 
judge's work); ROBBERS, sujJTa note 118, at 189 ("The examination of the accused is 
carried out primarily by the presiding judge."); Daly, supra note 111, at 70 ("The 
judges almost exclusively conduct the examination of witnesses, although the lawyers 
are free to suggest additional questions for the judges' consideration; and on occasion, 
they may even question a witness directly."); Damaska, supra note 52, at 525 ("The bulk 
of the questioning comes typically from the bench and it is the presiding judge who 
begins the examination of witnesses."); Langbein, supra note 36, at 447 (" [T] he proce-
dure is fundamentally nonadversarial. It is the presiding judge who interrogates the 
witness and the accused."); Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarialfustice: The French .ex-
perience, 42 MD. L. REv. 131, 143 (1983) (observing that in French trials in the assize 
courts, the "number of questions proposed by the other participants is usually quite 
limited, however, and the president plainly dominates the courtroom proceeding"). 
122 See Damaska, supra note 52, at 559 (describing the active role played by the 
judge in gathering evidence). As Joachim Herrmann states: "At the German trial, it is 
the judge who calls and interrogates the witnesses. On his own motion, he must take 
all evidence he considers necessary to determine the defendant's guilt and to set the 
appropriate punishment." Herrmann, supra note 113, at 760. 
12 There is a great deal of variation in the evidentiary rules of Continental coun-
tries. See DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 7 ("[S]ince the collapse of 
the Roman-canon proof Continental European nations no longer share a common 
evidentiary regime: the range of internal differences is in modern times quite consid-
erable."); Miijan Damaska, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative 
View, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 91, 94-98 (DavidS. Clark ed., 1990) 
[hereinafter Dama8ka, Atomisitic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence]. Yet the central 
tendencies of Continental evidence law are still shared, see DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW 
ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 7-8, and my summary will not become so detailed as to impli-
cate national differences. 
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by American standards. Because Continental criminal cases are heard 
either by professional judges or by a mixed panel in which the profes-
sional judges guide their lay colleagues, the complex evidentiary rules 
so prevalent in American proceedings are less frequently used. 124 
Consequently, Continental trials admit most hearsay125 and character 
evidence, among other categories of evidence typically excluded from 
American trials/20 and most Continental countries do not automati-
cally exclude illegally obtained evidence. 127 As a result of their liberal 
124 See Bradley & Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 1287-89 (comparing restrictive 
American evidentiary rules with the European rules); Langbein, supra note 118, at 214 
("[T]he device of integrating lay and professional judges spares the mixed court the 
need for evidentiary exclusions or other attempts at jury control."); cf Damaska, Ato-
mistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence, supra note 123, at 95 ("Even when a party is 
successful in alleging a violation of an evidence rule, the exclusion of information ob-
tained in judge-driven examination is an infrequent sanction in Continental courts."). 
125 See DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 15-16 (finding that, 
"[a]lthough countries outside of the common law's compass are not unaware of hear-
say dangers, their reaction to them seldom assumes the form of exclusionary rules"); 
Jorg et al., supra note 112, at 50 (stating that, in Continental systems, "[h]earsay evi-
dence, being not regarded as fundamentally unreliable, is generally accepted"); Lang-
bein, supra note 36, at 447 (observing that in Germany, where judgments are rendered 
by professional judges working together with laymen, "[m]ost of the common law ex-
clusionary rules, such as the prohibition of hearsay, are unknown"); Bert Swart & 
James Young, The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal justice in the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 
supra note 112, at 57, 71 (noting that "Dutch case law is characterized by a rather gen-
erous acceptance of hearsay evidence"). 
126 Cf DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 16 ("One also scans the 
legal map of Europe in vain for analogues to common law provisions that prohibit 
character evidence, evidence of collateral misdeeds, or similar information about a 
person's past life."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 464 (finding that, in Continental 
countries, "[t]here are no hearsay, character evidence, or other rules designed to pro-
tect the lay jury"). See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Pr&jlensity Evidence in Continental Le-
gal Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 64 (1994) (concluding that "Continental judges 
are exposed to propensity evidence much more so than common law jurors"). 
12 See DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 14 & n.19 (observing that 
although many countries have adopted provisions prohibiting the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence, "a vigorous exclusionary policy in all these countries is highly un-
likely"); Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure 
Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171, 205 (1993) (describing lenient French rules governing 
searches and interrogations and concluding that "(e]ven these lenient rules are often 
ignored because ... they are not generally backed up with an exclusionary sanction"); 
id. at 214 (finding that, while some commentators claim that the trend in Germany is 
to expand the use of exclusionary rules, "exclusionary decisions are still too rare to 
have a consistent impact on police behavior"); Stewart Field eta!., Prosecutors, t.xamin-
ing judges, and Control of Police Investigations, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 112, at 227, 228 (reporting that in The Netherlands, 
"[i]n general, cases go fonvard with damaging statements from the accused on file, 
with little concrete evidence of how they were obtained"); Frase & Weigend, supra note 
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evidentiary rules, Continental proceedings can also rely more heavily 
on the documentary evidence contained in the dossier instead of re-
quiring the more time-consuming presentation of oral testimony. 
Other features of Continental trials enhance their efficiency fur-
ther still. There is no voir dire in the selection of the lay jurors, and a 
panel of lay jurors might be called upon to hear more than one 
case. 
128 The questioning at trial is quite informal by American stan-
dards, with few, if any, objections by counsel;129 witnesses are usually 
permitted to testify in narrative form, 130 so the "questioning" largely 
takes the form of an informal conversation between the presiding 
judge and the witness or defendant. 131 Continental countries make far 
more use of the defendant as a testimonial resource, and, as Langbein 
has noted, the defendant is "almost always the most efficient testimo-
. 1 "132 Th d £ d h th . h . ·1 133 b ma resource. e e en ant as e ng t to remain SI ent ut 
virtually always agrees to speak134 since it is expected that adverse in-
113, at 336 ("[I]n many [German] cases, exclusion is not an inevitable consequence of 
prior breaches of the law."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 451 (noting that illegally ob-
tained evidence is usually admitted in Continental countries); Thomas Weigend, Ger-
many, in CRJMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 187, 195 (stat-
ing that in Germany "[t]here is no general exclusionary rule which would make 
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible") . 
128 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 460 (contrasting the Continental and American 
systems of jury selection); see also Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to 
Trial, supra note 13, at 991 (stating that voir dire did not exist in the former West Ger-
man{~· See Dama5ka, Atomisitic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence, supra note 123, at 95 
(observing that the Continental "manner of examining evidence is relatively informal, 
and avoids many of the complexities associated with a bilateral, lawyer-driven tech-
nique for eliciting information"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 424 ("In contrast to the 
formal, highly structured examinations which occur in American courtrooms, the typi-
cal Continental examination takes on the character of an informal discussion between 
the ~~esidingjudge and the accused or the witness."). 
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 433. 
131 See van Kessel, supra note 107, at 834 (contrasting our "formal direct and cross-
examination procedure" with the "informality of the proceedings and the discussion 
format of [the Continental] trial"). 
132 John Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. 
L. REV. 204, 208 (1979). 
133 
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; see also van Kessel, supra note 107, at 804 ("All 
countries recognize some form of the right to silence and privilege against self-
incrimination, which applies to both the pretrial and trial stages of a criminal case."). 
The defendant's right to remain silent is not identical to the American defendant's 
right not to take the stand, however. Questions can always be asked of the Continental 
defendant, but he has the right to refuse to answer at all or to refuse to answer specific 
questions. Damaska, supra note 52, at 527 (describing the Continental interrogation 
process). 
134 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Tria~ supra note 13, 
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ferences will be drawn from silence. 13'' As noted above, the dossier is 
made available to the defendant, who thus becomes aware of all the 
evidence previously collected. Because all the participants are familiar 
with the evidence, the proceedings can expeditiously focus on the 
relevant issues. Indeed, to American observers, the Continental trial 
looks less like a trial than like a summary administrative hearing 
whose goal is to review the dossier. 131; 
Given these efficient features, it is not surprising that Continental 
trials are, on average, much shorter than American trials. Whereas 
the OJ. Simpson case lasted 372 days, 137 the most complicated French 
trial rarely exceeds two weeks, 138 and many French jury trials last only a 
day. 1 ~9 A study of German trials indicated that, on average, the guilt 
at 1006 (finding that a defendant in a Continental trial "rarely remains silent"); van 
Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; van Kessel, supra note 107, at 833 (stating that "very few 
Continental defendants remain silent at trial"). 
"' See Daly, sufna note 111, at 71 ("Since silence does not make a good impression 
in France, the accused very rarely declines to respond."); Dama5ka, supra note 52, at 
534 ("The pressure to speak is, I believe, somewhat stronger than the parallel pressure 
in the common law trial on the defendant to take the stand, as more immediate infer-
ences can be drawn from refusal to answer specific questions than from the general 
refusal to submit to the questioning process."); McKillop, supra note 112, at 575 
("[T]he accused was expected, both during the investigation and at the hearing, to 
divulge what he knew about the relevant events to complement the version otherwise 
established."); van Kessel, supra note 107, at 833 (noting that "UJudges and other par-
ticipants expect the accused to speak," and that in France, for instance, a "defendant's 
complete silence will lead to adverse inferences by the judges"). Further, because the 
defendant testifies first, "the prosecutor may sit back and expect that leads or evidence 
damaging to the defendant will come out of his interrogation ." Damaska, supra note 
52, at 529-30. 
136 See Daly, supra note 111, at 71 (arguing that "the trial is essentially a review of 
the dossiei'); Mirjan Dama5ka, Models of Criminal Procedu1·e, 51 ZBORNIK PRAVNOG 
FAKULLETA u ZAGREBU 477, 491 (2001) (observing that "to lawyers expecting trials to 
proceed without an official file, a trial conducted against the background of a dossier as 
an organizing device can easily seem to represent not much more than a review in 
open court of previously performed factfinding activities"); Jorg et al., supra note 112, 
at 50 (explaining that "[b]ecause of the crucial importance of the dossier the public 
hearing is often much more a verification of its contents, the results of the pre-trial in-
vestigation, than the culmination of a contest"); McKillop, supra note 112, at 565 ("The 
hearing thus became essentially· a public review and confirmation of the contents of 
the [dossier], and hence of the conclusions that were reached in the investigation ."). 
137 Simpson Trials by the Numbers, USA Today, Jan. 28, 1997, at http:/ I 
www.usatoday.com/news/index/nnsl79.htm. 
138 Daly, supra note 111, at 69-70. 
139 See Frase, supra note 118, at 172 (stating that assize court trials "generally last 
from one to three days," in part because once commenced, trials "may only be recessed 
to allow the court to eat and sleep"); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 133 (noting that, in 
France, "the only trials likely to last longer than a day or two are those involving either 
multiple defendants or a crime victim's claim for substantial civil damages") . 
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phase of cases in which the defendant contests guilt lasts approxi-
mately three-quarters of a day for the ordinary felony and about one 
day for the gravest offense.140 American felony trials, which on average 
last two to three days/41 thus often consume double or triple the time 
of a typical French or German trial. 
2. Non-Trial Dispositions of Continental Cases 
Because Continental trials are generally much quicker and more 
efficient than American trials, Continental countries traditionally have 
had much less need to resort to non-trial alternative dispositions. 142 
Guilty pleas do not exist in most Continental countries; consequently, 
a trial is held even where a defendant has made a full confession.14:l 
140 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 474-75 (summarizing the result~ of a 1972 study 
by Casper and Zeisel on the German criminal courts);JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 77 (1977) (reporting that, according to the 1972 
Casper and Zeisel study, half of all German criminal trials last just two hours). 
141 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
142 See Bradley, supra note 72, at 472 (asserting that because the Continental system 
"works quite efficiently, plea bargaining is not necessary to reduce the caseload, and in 
[C]ontinental countries this practice is circumscribed"); Frase, supra note 81, at 627 
("French trials are simpler and quicker [than American trials], thus reducing the need 
to minimize trial adjudication."); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1562 ("Ger-
man trial procedure is relatively rapid, so the prosecutor has no particular incentive to 
try to avoid trial even if he could."). 
143 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of judge Cassese, para. 7 (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovic, Cassese Dis-
sent] (noting that the guilty plea does "not have a direct counterpart in the civil-law 
tradition, where an admission of guilt is simply part of the evidence to be considered 
and evaluated by the court"), available at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/ 
judgement/erd-adojcas971007e.htm; Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's 
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 977 ("In most of Continental Europe, even the institu-
tion of the guilty plea is unknown, except in minor cases."); Bohlander, supra note 27, 
at 151 ("Often the mere fact that the accused has made a confession does not relieve 
the court of the task of finding out whether this confession is credible and supported 
by corroborating material."); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (explaining that since "there 
are no defendant pleas in French criminal courts ... and no bargaining of charge or 
sentence leniency in return for such a plea; in principle, all cases are tried, and the 
accused's confession or admission of the charges has no formal effect on the method 
of adjudication"); Weigend, supra note 127, at 208 ("Even if the defendant admits his 
guilt, the court remains obliged to find the facts necessary for conviction."). 
At the same time, trials featuring confessions may be summary, even by Continen-
tal standards. See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra 
note 13, at 982 (discussing empirical studies reporting on the trial-time saved in Euro-
pean countries by a defendant's confession); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (finding that 
"trials in [the French] Correctional Court can be substantially shortened if the defen-
dant, before or during the trial, admits most of the alleged facts"); AbrahamS. Gold-
stein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: 
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Further, Continental prosecutors are accorded far less discretion than 
their American counterparts,144 and in some countries, "prosecutors 
are legally bound to prosecute all serious crimes that come to their at-
tention."14r. For these reasons, during the 1970s some commentators 
maintained that there was no bargaining over serious crime in some 
Continental countries. 146 
France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE LJ. 240, 264-69 (1977) (describing summary 
uncontested trials); Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763 (noting that in Germany, 
"(u]nlike a guilty plea, a confession does not replace a trial but rather causes a shorter 
trial" and that in the ordinary case "trials in which the accused fully confesses take 
about half as long as trials without such a confession"); Langbein & Weinreb, supra 
note 73, at 1566 ("Of course a trial is likely to be shorter if the accused has con-
fessed."). 
144 Frase, supra note 81, at 629; see id. at 611-13 (explaining that "prosecutorial 
charging discretion is significantly more restrained in France than in the United States" 
and that French prosecutors have limited discretion after charges have been filed); 
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Ger-
many, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 508 (1970) ("The prosecuting attorney in the Federal 
Republic of Germany has by no means the same degree of freedom in the exercise of 
his discretion as belongs to his American counterpart."); Thomas Lundmark, Book 
Review, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 686 (1999) ("Prosecutorial discretion as such is not 
recof.nized in Germany."). 
45 Mirjan Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German 
Monograph, 29 AM.j. COMP. L. ll9, 119 (1981); see also ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 184 
("As a general rule [the state prosecution service] does not have a discretion [sic] to 
decide whether to prosecute or not."); Frase, supra note 52, at 117 (noting that the 
'"[c]ompulsory prosecution' rule ... is a common feature of Civil Law and inquisito-
rial systems"); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 337 ("Germany, unlike the United 
States, does not give the prosecutor complete discretion to decline to file charges. In 
Germany, felony ( Verbrechen) charges must be filed if there is an adequate evidentiary 
basis."); Weigend, supra note 127, at 205 ("The [German] prosecutor is obliged by law 
to file charges whenever there is 'sufficient' suspicion that the suspect has committed a 
crime."). See generally Langbein, supra note 36, at 448-80 (describing the German prin-
ciple of compulsory prosecution). 
146 See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 143, at 269 (arguing that Continental jurists 
"deny the possibility of plea bargaining by simply noting that guilty pleas are legally 
impermissible"); Langbein, supra note 132, at 205 (noting that the former West Ger-
many had "avoided any form or analogue of plea bargaining in its procedures for cases of serious 
crime''); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1562-67. As the German scholar Hans-
Heinrich jescheck stated in 1970: 
The restriction on his discretion prohibits the prosecuting attorney from en-
tering into discussions with the accused and his counsel, whether perhaps 
only a portion of the alleged offenses might be charged, or whether the 
charges themselves might be reduced in severity in order to obtain in ex-
change a confession which would relieve the prosecutor of his obligation of 
producing proof. "Plea bargaining" of this sort is fundamentally prohibited in 
German law, and it would not make much sense anyway to insist upon a con-
fession at all costs, since objective proof must still be presented to the court in 
the case of a confession, even if perhaps within narrower limits. 
Jescheck, supra note 144, at 511. 
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Whether that claim was slightly exaggerated even at the time,147 it 
is clear now that the use of non-trial alternative procedures has in-
creased on the Continent in the last thirty years, particularly in cases 
involving petty crimes, and that many of those alternative procedures 
bear at least surface resemblance to American plea bargaining. The 
clearest example comes from Italy, which radically revised its criminal 
procedures in 1989 to include more adversarial features. 148 Because 
these adversarial elements greatly increased the length and cost of 
Italian trials, the new Italian Code also provided for "special forms of 
procedure" aimed at avoiding the ordinary, time-consuming proce-
dures.149 Most similar to American plea bargaining is the Italian pat-
teggiarnento sulla pena, or simply patteggiarnento, in which the defendant 
and the prosecution agree on a sentence which they request the judge 
to apply.1r.o This mechanism is available only to less serious crimes, 
and a prison sentence imposed pursuant to this procedure cannot ex-
ceed two years. 151 The procedure additionally differs from American 
plea bargaining in that the defendant is not required to admit guilt. 152 
Other Continental criminal justice systems have remained pre-
dominantly non-adversarial but have also seen the limited emergence 
of efficient non-trial alternatives. In The Netherlands, for instance, 
147 See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 143, at 264-79 (describing certain Continen-
tal practices as analogues of plea bargaining and the guilty plea). 148 See Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law 
Country: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (1989) 
(asserting that the new code of Italian criminal procedure "brought into existence the 
first instance of an accusatorial system ever known in a country in whose tradition and 
culture the [non-adversarial] approach to criminal justice had always been the rule"); 
Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 
23, at 245, 245 (describing Italy's process of transforming its non-adversarial system 
into one using a combination of non-adversarial and adversarial procedures). 149 Piermaria Corso, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 223, 251 (noting that Italy has shortened criminal trials 
by instituting procedures to bypass committal proceedings, waive trial, or waive pre-
liminary proceedings); VanCleave, supra note 148, at 245 (discussing procedural re-
forms set out in Book VI of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: judgment without 
trial, abbreviated trial, direct trial, immediate trial, and penal decree). 15
° Corso, supra note 149, at 252-53 (describing the elements of the patteggiamento 
process and noting its acceptance among practitioners). 151 /d. at 252; VanCleave, supra note 148, at 272. 152 VanCleave, supra note 148, at 272. The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 
also provides for summary trials, in which the case is judged on the basis of the prose-
cution's dossier instead of proceeding to a full trial. Sentences imposed following 
summary trials are reduced by one-third. !d. at 273. For a discussion of other full trial 
alternatives, including direct trials, immediate trials, and penal orders, see Corso, supra 
note 149, at 253-54; VanCleave, supra note 148, at 274-75. 
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prosecutors will engage in "conditional dismissals" and "transactions," 
wherein they will drop the charges if the defendant agrees to certain 
conditions, such as to compensate the victim or to undergo psychiatric 
treatment. 153 These practices do not result in the defendant's convic-
tion, and the conditions imposed do not include imprisonment; thus, 
their resemblance to American plea bargaining is limited. Indeed, 
American prosecutors utilize practices similar to Dutch "conditional 
dismissals" and "transactions" under the rubric "diversion,"154 yet still 
must plea bargain the vast majority of cases that are not diverted. An 
arguably closer Dutch analogue to plea bargaining is the practice of 
"taking offenses into consideration," wherein the prosecutor does not 
file additional charges that could be proved, but rather leaves them to 
the court to take into account in sentencing. By failing to file the ad-
ditional charges, the prosecutor saves time and paper work, and the 
defendant is widely believed to receive milder punishment than he 
would have received if the charges had been formally filed. 15'' 
In France, several procedures have developed, particularly in the 
courts hearing less serious crimes, 1:.G that are intended to save time 
and minimize litigation.m For instance, American commentators 
have analogized the French practice of "correctionalization" to 
American charge bargaining. In France, criminal offenses are classi-
fied as crimes, delits, or contraventions, with crimes the most serious and 
contraventions the least serious. 1''8 "Correctionalization" refers to the 
French practice of charging an offense as a delit when it could have 
"'
3 Bert Swart, Settling Criminal Cases Without a Tria~ 31 ISR. L. REV. 223, 225-27 
(I 997); see also Jorg et al., supra note 112, at 48 (finding that in The Netherlands, 
"modern tendencies have resulted in various ways of settling cases out of court with or 
without conditions like the payment of a legally fixed or negotiated sum of money"). 
154 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 670 ("Diversion is the disposition of a 
criminal complaint without a conviction, the noncriminal disposition being condi-
tioned on either the performance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his par-
ticipation in counseling or treatment."). 
1
'''' Swart, supra note 153, at 229-30. 
156 Interestingly, Bron McKillop conducted an empirical study of a French murder 
case involving a defendant accused of murdering his estranged wife's boyfriend. 
McKillop, supra note 112, at 529-30. The forensic and witness evidence against the de-
fendant was overwhelming, id. at 534-44, so it came as no surprise when the defendant 
was convicted, id. at 560. The trial took two days, id. at 548-60, and, given the over-
whelming evidence against the defendant, would likely have been seen by American 
lawyers as a waste of time and resources. 
1
''
7 See Frase, suj:rra note 81, at 626-47 (describing French analogues to plea bar-
gaining); Fmse, suj:rra note 118, at 416-17; Pradel, supra note 118, at 131-32 (describing 
French "transactions"). 
1
''" Frase, supra note 118, at 144; Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 141-42. 
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been charged as a crime. Crimes are heard in an assize court, which 
utilizes comparatively elaborate procedures and mixed panels of 
judges and lay jurors, while delits are heard in a correctional court, 
which features less formal procedural rules and panels consisting only 
of professional judges.159 The more formal procedures of the assize 
courts have proven sufficiently cumbersome that prosecutors often 
circumvent them by correctionalization.160 Although French correc-
tionalization does bear some resemblance to American charge bar-
gaining, the differences between the two are also manifest. Unlike an 
American defendant who pleads guilty, a French defendant charged 
with a delit still receives a trial, albeit one with fewer safeguards, and 
French prosecutors do not explicitly bargain over the charging deci-
• 161 
SlOn. 
In Germany, most misdemeanors and petty infractions are dis-
posed of by means of penal orders-written orders describing the de-
fendant's wrongful conduct and specifying a penalty that cannot in-
clude imprisonment. If the defendant does not object to the order 
within a certain period of time, the order becomes effective. 162 It used 
159 Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 143-44; see also Brouwer, supra note 108, at 216-19 
(describing proceedings in assize court). Further, before a prosecutor can bring a de-
fendant to trial for a crime, he must initiate a judicial investigation in which an examin-
ing magistrate investigates the facts alleged by the prosecutor and hears the defense. 
For the prosecution of delits and contraventions, a judicial investigation is optional, not 
mandatory. Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 150-53. 
160 See Frase, supra note 81, at 622-23 (stating that prosecutors use correctionaliza-
tion because "[t]he case is then sent directly to correction court, thereby avoiding ju-
dicial investigation"); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 153-54 (describing situations in 
which French prosecutors "avoid[] the necessity of a judicial investigation and ... 
brin?, the defendant to trial before a tribunal correctionnel'). 
61 Frase, supra note 81, at 630. Further, French prosecutors who engage in cor-
rectionalization may be motivated by a number of reasons that bear no relation to the 
defendant's cooperation: the prosecutor might believe a felony sentence would be 
excessive in light of the defendant's prior record, or he might fear that the assize court 
would view felony penalties as excessive and either acquit the defendant or impose no 
more than a delit sentence. !d. at 622-23. 
162 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Tria~ supra note 13, 
at 956-57 (providing details of German penal procedure); Dannecker & Roberts, supra 
note 120, at 445-46 (discussing German penal order procedure and noting that defen-
dants are not required to object); Felstiner, supra note 15, at 310 (explaining the Ger-
man penal order and its accompanying procedure); Hans-Heiner Kuhne, Germany, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8YsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNilY, supra note 114, at 137, 
158 (describing penal orders and noting that they are of greatest value in helping the 
criminal justice system cope with traffic cases). France's use of penal orders in crimi-
nal sentencing has also been the subject of scholarly attention. See Frase, supra note 
81, at 645-4 7 ("Another form of tacit sentence bargaining in France is the use of penal 
orders."); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 145 ("The overwhelming majority of cases in 
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to be thought that the execution of a penal order was an administra-
tive task that involved no bargaining, but in recent years the defense 
and prosecution have begun bargaining over the fine to be im-
posed.163 According to most commentators, however, a defendant's 
rejection of a penal order will not result in a higher penalty following 
conviction at trial. 164 Bargaining over confessions has also emerged 
recently in Germany to relieve the burden imposed by large-scale, 
complicated financial and drug cases. 165 As in most Continental coun-
tries, in Germany an admission of guilt does not obviate the need for a 
trial; the court must still find the facts necessary to convict. However, 
if the defendant makes a credible and detailed confession, and nei-
ther the prosecutor nor defense offers further evidence, the court will 
usually be satisfied that the defendant's confession provides a suffi-
cient basis for the judgment and will not call additional witnesses. 166 
Because complex economic crimes can "take months or even years to 
try if the defense makes use of all its procedural options, especially its 
the tribunaux de police, ... are disposed of through the simplified procedure of the or-
donnance jJenale."). 
163 See Dubber, supra note 13, at 559-60 ("In penal order bargains, the prosecutor 
may offer to initiate a penal order proceeding instead of filing the case in the single 
judge court, thereby limiting the defendant's maximum exposure to a suspended one 
year prison sentence .... "); Herrmann, supra note 113, at 761-62 ("A higher sentence 
at trial, however, is not an automatic rejection of a penal order."). 
164 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, 
at 956-57; Felstiner, supra note 15, at 314 ("West German defendants are, I believe, not 
penalized for rejecting a penal order and insisting upon a trial."); Herrmann, supra 
note 113, at 762 (explaining that "the accused ordinarily is not induced to accept a 
penal order by the prospect of a higher sentence should he elect to have a trial"); 
Langbein, supra note 132, at 214-15 ("[I]t would violate German law for prosecutors or 
judges to attempt to institute such sentencing differentials [in rejected penal order 
cases.]"); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1565 (maintaining that, "if the ac-
cused rt:jects disposition by a penal order in favor of a trial, the prosecutor virtually 
never recommends, nor does the court impose, a penalty higher than that contained 
in the penal order"). Some commentators question that view, however. See Abraham 
S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE LJ. 
1570, 1574-75 & n.l8 (1978). 
1
"'' See Frase & Weigend, sujJra note 113, at 345 (noting the increase in complex 
economic offenses). Joachim Herrmann has observed: 
Previously unknown problems in criminal justice administration are today 
posed by new kinds of cases involving white-collar crimes, which require the 
court to consider a great number of witnesses, thousands of pages of business 
records, expert testimony about fraudulent bookkeeping, and often involve 
the juggling of assets between different business enterprises. The same ap-
plies to drug cases involving international conspiracies, where witnesses tend 
either not to testify at all or not to tell the truth, or to keep disappearing. 
Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763. 
wn Weigend, sujJra note 127, at 208. 
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right to request further proof-taking,"167 a confession in these cases 
proves an especially welcome time-saving device. 168 Therefore, prior to 
formal charging, the defense and prosecution might negotiate over 
the charges that will be brought following the defendant's confession; 
alternatively, after charging but before or during trial, the judge and 
defendant might engage in discussions regarding the sentence that 
will be imposed following the defendant's confession.169 Joachim 
Herrmann estimated that in 1992, bargaining occurred in at least 20% 
to 30% of German cases, though he emphasized that it was largely re-
served to petty crimes and large, complex crimes, and was thus rarely 
used in cases involving violent or other very serious crimes.17° Further, 
in 1997 the Federal Court of Justice set strict guidelines as to when 
plea bargaining should be allowed 171 so bargaining may now be less 
prevalent as a result. 
The increased use of these and other non-trial and summary-trial 
alternatives on the Continent has resulted from a rise in crime, par-
167 Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 345. 
168 Indeed, confessions are generally thought to halve the trial time necessary for 
an ordinary case, and they offer far greater time savings in large-scale, complex cases. 
See Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763. Herrmann goes on to note that, unlike in the 
United States, bargaining over confessions does not "serve to process a great number 
of ordinary cases[,]" but rather "is a specific device reserved for handling big and diffi-
cult cases." !d. 
169 /d. at 756, 764-65; see also Kuhne, supra note 162, at 157 (noting that, although 
"[u]nder the principles of instruction and legality, there is no room for plea bargain-
ing in the strict sense of German criminal procedure," in complicated cases, counsel 
may "promise a confession by his client on some points of the indictment, and in re-
turn the court will pronounce a sentence not exceeding a certain limit"); Weigend, 
supra note 127, at 208 ("[1]n complex cases the defense sometimes intimates to the 
court that the defendant would be ready to make a statement and refrain demanding 
the taking of further evidence in exoneration if he could be certain that his sentence 
would not exceed a certain maximum."). 
170 Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763; see also Bohlander, supra note 27, at 159 
("German law finds the idea of bargaining for lesser charges unacceptable and allows 
sentencing bargain [sic] only in very limited circumstances."); Heike Jung, The Crimi-
nal Process in the Federal Republic of Germany-An Overview, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 119, at 59, 61-62 
(describing the 1975 reforms which "introduced 'bargaining' elements into the phase 
of preliminary investigations"). 
171 The Federal Court of Justice held, among other things, that (1) plea negotia-
tions must take place in an open session of the court in the presence of all the judges 
and parties; (2) the court is not permitted to indicate a certain sentence but can only 
state an upper limit in case of a confession; and (3) it is not permissible to negotiate a 
waiver of appeal before sentencing. See Bohlander, supra note 27, at 159-60 (summariz-
ing the court's holdings). 
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ticularly petty crime and complex financial crime/72 and from an in-
creasing convergence between adversarial and non-adversarial proce-
dural systems. 173 The convergence itself stems in part from increas-
ingly burdensome caseloads. As Abraham Goldstein put it: "There 
are simply too many offenses, too many offenders, and too few re-
sources to deal with them all. One result of this overload has been a 
steady movement towards a convergence of legal systems-towards 
borrowing from others those institutions and practices that offer some 
hope of relief." 174 Liberal reforms, some undertaken voluntarily175 and 
others imposed by decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, m have provided a second factor inspiring a convergence of sys-
tems and, in particular, have resulted in the importation of some ad-
versarial features into non-adversarial systems. 177 The European Court 
172 See Damaska, supra note 136, at 485 ("Everywhere, swelling dockets favored the 
replacement of methodically conducted official activities by flexible arrangements with 
the defense."); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 345 ("One reason for the growth of 
plea bargaining is the increase of complicated cases of economic crime."). 
173 See Daly, supra note 111, at 72-73. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic 
Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. LJ. 809 
(2000); Bradley, supra note 127 (detailing the emerging international consensus on 
international criminal procedure);Jorg eta!., supra note 112, at 45, 53-56 (describing 
the ~radual convergence between the adversarial and non-adversarial systems). 
74 Goldstein, supra note 31, at 159. 
175 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 190-91 ("Sooner or later, lib-
eral reforms were inaugurated in all Continental countries."). 
176 See Joachim Herrmann, Criminal justice Policy and Comparativism: A European Per-
spective, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEMS: FROM DIVERSI1Y TO 
RAPPROCHEMENT, supra note 52, at 129, 134-36 ("Published opinions ... of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights have demonstrated ... that there is a visible trend to-
wards humanizing the protection of individual rights in European countries."); Swart 
& Young, supra note 125, at 83-84 (describing the implementation of case law promul-
gated by the European Court of Human Rights). 
177 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 190 (discussing importation of 
adversarial features as a result of liberal reforms); Lasvignes & Lemonde, supra note 
119, at 29 (describing reforms in France that have "accentuate[d] the adversarial na-
ture of the proceedings"); Swart & Young, supra note 125, at 84-86 (explaining impor-
tation of adversarial procedures as a result of the European Court of Human Rights's 
judgments); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Foreword to CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI1Y, supra note 114, at i, ii (noting that "many of the 'conti-
nental' countries have recently imported features of the Anglo-American 'adversarial 
system"'); see also Bradley, supra note 72, at 474-75 (observing that "inquisitorial systems 
have become more adversarial"). Bradley goes on to maintain that the adversarial 
model "is the wave of the future" and contends that: 
As societies become more diverse (i.e., more like the United States), the no-
tion that government can be trusted to do right by minority groups seems 
anachronistic. The more informal approach of the continental system may be 
well suited to a society in which everyone is of the same or similar back-
ground. But it is not suitable where minority groups are mistrusted by, and 
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of Human Rights has, among other things, required Continental 
countries to permit defendants greater opportunity to question wit-
nesses appearing against them178 and required Continental judges to 
limit the roles they play in criminal cases in order to preserve the ap-
pearance of impartiality. 179 The importation of these and other safe-
guards that tend to lengthen trials and reduce the efficiency of trial 
procedures give additional impetus for the use and development of 
non-trial alternative dispositions. 
For the above reasons, Continental and Anglo-American criminal 
procedures differ less than they used to, but they still differ consid-
erably. Although the use of bargaining and non-trial dispositions has 
increased on the Continent in recent years, it remains quite limited by 
American standards. In many countries, such procedures are re-
stricted to petty crime and what bargaining occurs is often implicit or 
if express, more carefully regulated than in the United States. Plea 
bargaining thus does not play the essential role in Continental crimi-
nal justice systems that it does in the American criminal justice system. 
Continental trials, even those not featuring confessions, are still suffi-
ciently simple and efficient that they can be viably used to dispose of a 
large percentage of cases. At the same time, it is clear that growing 
caseloads and the introduction of more complex procedures result, 
both on the Continent and elsewhere, in the development and use of 
non-trial alternatives.180 The following section will briefly detail the 
procedures of England and Israel to confirm the functional correla-
mistrust, the majority and its police forces. In the absence of shared norms, 
formal delineation of rules by courts or legislatures, and their enforcement by 
counsel, are essential. 
Id. at482. 
178 SeeKostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 21 (1989) (holding 
that applicant has a right to challenge and question witnesses appearing against him). 
,See generally Annemarieke Beijer et al. , Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Conven· 
tion on Human Rights and the Principle of Dpen justice, in CRIMINAL jUSTICE IN EUROPE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 112, at 283, 288-89. 
179 See, e.g., Oberschlick v. Austria, 204 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) (finding a vio-
lation of the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial judge had par-
ticipated in a decision on a pre-trial request to order the prosecution of the defen-
dant); Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (finding a violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial judge had decided re-
quests for pre-trial detention); DeCubber v. Belgium, 86 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984) 
(finding a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial 
judge hadpreviously acted as the examiningjudge). 
180 See Herrmann, supra note 113, at 755 (arguing that German plea bargaining is 
"mainly a consequence of the over-burdened criminal justice system"). 
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tion between complicated, adversarial procedures and plea bargain-
ing. 
3. Criminal Procedures and Non-Trial Dispositions in the 
United Kingdom and Israel 
Although the adversary system originated in England, English 
procedures are now considerably less adversarial than American pro-
cedures; that is, English procedures are simpler and more efficient. 181 
England abolished the grand jury,182 voir dire is strictly limited, per-
emptory challenges were eliminated in 1998, and the grounds on 
which a challenge for cause can be based are quite restricted.183 Eng-
lish procedures also provide more information to the parties and to 
the court. Disclosure requirements are not as broad as on the Conti-
nent, but unlike most American jurisdictions, English law does require 
defendants to disclose before trial the na:ture of their defenses and the 
matters on which the defense intends to join issue with the prosecu-
tion.184 England also follows the Continental approach of using rules 
181 In july 2002, Britain announced sweeping changes to its criminal justice system, 
among other things, abolishing the double jeopardy rule and allowing for the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence. Warren Hoge, British Change Rules to Cut Crime, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., July 18, 2002, at 3. It will remain to be seen how these reforms will affect the 
prevalence of plea bargaining. 182 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 402-03 ("During the 1820s,Jeremy Bentham 
vigorously criticized the English grand jury, claiming that it was both unrepresentative 
and inefficient .... England ... finally heeded Bentham's advice and abolished the 
grand jury."); Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 
13, at 976 ("Although English trial and pretrial procedures are substantially more bur-
densome than those of many nations that sense no need to engage in plea bargaining, 
these procedures are also less elaborate than our own. The grand jury in England has 
been discarded .... "). In the United States, by comparison, eighteen states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the federal government grant defendants the right not to an-
swer a felony charge unless the charge has been issued by a grand jury through an in-
dictment or presentment. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 733. Four states require 
prosecution by an indictment screened by the grand jury only with respect to the most 
severely punished felonies, id. at 735, and the remaining states allow the prosecution to 
proceed either by an indictment screened by the grand jury or by an "information," id. 
at 737. If felony charges have not first been screened by a grand jury, most states re-
quire that a judicial otlicer approve the charges at a preliminary hearing, unless the 
defendant waives that protection. /d. at 669. 183 Grounds for challenge have been effectively restricted to "(a) ineligibility or 
disqualification and (b) reasonable suspicion of bias." David J. Feldman, England and 
Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 91, 123. See 
also A.T.H. Smith, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNilY, supra note 114, at 73, 78-79 (describing English jury selection 
procedures following recent reforms). 184 Feldman, supra note 183, at 121. 
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of procedure and evidence that encourage the defendant to testify. 185 
Further, in England, as in most countries, the products of unlawful 
searches and seizures are not automatically excluded from evidence. 186 
Turning to English judges, they do not exercise the same degree of 
control over the trial process as their Continental counterparts, but 
they do command more authority than an American trial judge. For 
instance, at the end of a trial, English judges are required to sum up 
the case; the judge will summarize the evidence and arguments on 
both sides and present the inferences that the jurors may draw from 
th . 1 . b . c. 187 e1r cone uswns a out pnmary 1acts. 
Because English trial procedures are more efficient than Ameri-
can procedures, it should come as no surprise. that there is less plea 
bargaining in England than in the United States. Indeed, less than 
three decades ago it was widely (but erroneously) believed that plea 
bargaining was not practiced at all in England.188 Since then, plea 
bargaining, and in particular, implicit plea bargaining, has come to 
light; English defendants are now understood· to routinely receive a 
sentence reduction upon a plea of guilty. 189 Still, plea bargaining in 
England is more limited than in the United States: only 50% or so of 
the defendants charged with a serious crime plead guilty. 190 
185 
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 481. By testifYing, the defendant is not automati-
cally subject to impeachment with prior felony convictions; further, if a defendant does 
not testify, the judge may comment on that fact to the jury. I d.; see also Alschuler, Im-
plementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 976 (arguing that the 
privilege against self-incrimination, as interpreted and applied in England, encourages 
defendants to testify). . 
186 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, 
at 976 ("[T]he products of unlawful searches and seizures are admitted into evidence 
in most cases."); Bradley, supra note 127, at 186-91 (describing the limited categories of 
evidence that are excluded); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1549, 1554-55 ("In 
England, where criminal procedure more closely resembles ours, the automatic appli-
cation of an exclusionary rule has consistently been rejected."). 
187 
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 433. van Kessel goes on: "Though the principal 
actors of the English trial are the lawyers, the fact that the English judge wields more 
authority than her American counterpart means that the English lawyers possess less 
authority, thereby rendering the powers of the lawyers and the judge more balanced 
than in our system." I d. at 481. 
188 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, 
at 973 ("The frequent denial that plea bargaining occurs in England is apparently 
based largely on semantics."); Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100, at 288 (noting 
the belief that plea bargaining does not exist in England). 
189 Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100, at 299. 
190 John Spencer, Criminal Procedure in England-A Summary of its Merits and Defects-
The Outlines of the System, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A 
EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 119, at 67, 69. According to Spencer, virtually 
all defendants charged with petty crimes plead guilty. Id. Baldwin and McConville es-
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Israeli criminal proceedings, like American criminal proceedings, 
are adversarial in character, 191 but they have remained more faithful to 
their English roots; 192 in addition, they have incorporated many Con-
tinental nonadversarial features19~ that make Israeli trials less compli-
cated and more efficient. For instance, Israeli trials are bench trials,194 
and Israeli judges, like Continental judges, play a substantial role in 
examining witnesses and can summon witnesses on their own initia-
tive.195 Further, resembling their Continental counterparts, Israeli 
prosecutors are under broad disclosure obligations and cannot intro-
duce any evidence that was not subject to discovery.196 Moreover, Is-
rael, like England and Continental countries, has no exclusionary 
rule 197 and makes more use of the defendant as a testimonial resource. 
Defendants are not required to testifY but failing to do is often con-
sidered circumstantial evidence of guilt.198 Owing in part to these and 
timated that in 1976, approximately two-thirds of defendants charged with serious 
crimes pled guilty, while about 90% of defendants charged with less serious crimes 
pled guilty. Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100, at 287 n.l. These guilty plea rates 
were estimated to be less than those in America. Id. at 287; see also Alschuler, Imple-
menting the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973 (arguing that Eng-
land, among other nations, is not "as dependent on plea bargaining as we are") . 
191 See Eliahu Hamon, Plea Bargaining in Israel-The Pr&fler Functions of the Prosecution 
and the Court and the Role of the Victim, 31 ISR. L. REV. 245, 24 7 (1997); Eliahu Hamon & 
Alex Stein, Israel, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 
217,240. 
192 Abraham Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime: joint Prosecutions of Israeli Organ-
ized Crime Figures by U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ 1903, 1912 
(1996). 
19
s Kenneth Mann, Criminal Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 
267, 267, 293 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995). 
194 Hamon, supra note 191, at 247; Hamon & Stein, supra note 191, at 239. 
195 Cf Mann, supra note 193, at 286-87 (explaining that the absence of a jury and 
widespread absence of representation of defendants in criminal trials forces judges to 
protect the defendant's interests). 
196 Hamon & Stein , supra note 191, at 238; see also Eliahu Hamon, Criminal Proce-
dure and Evidence, 24 ISR. L. REv. 592, 594-98 (1990) (describing the accused 's right to 
inspection and discovery of evidence); Mann, supra note 193, at 285 (explaining that 
the prosecution must disclose all "investigatory material," including "all factual materi-
als collected by or known to the police relevant in any way to the offence charged" 
immediately after issuing the indictment). 
197 Mann, supra note 193, at 274. 
198 SeeAbramovsky, supra note 192, at 1913-14 (observing that a defendant's "fail-
ure to take the stand may be commented upon by the prosecution and will 'add to the 
weight' of the prosecution's case in an Israeli court") ; Hamon, supra note 196, at 599 
("A defendant's silence in court may strengthen the prima facie evidence and add to its 
probative weight.") ; Hamon & Stein, supra note 191 , at 242; Mann, supra note 193, at 
287-88 (stating that "in many situations a suspect's refusal to make a statement at the 
police station may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilt" and that "if the suspect is 
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other, more efficient procedures, Israeli court calendars are not 
1 d th . Am . 199 c tl near y as congeste as e1r encan counterparts. onsequen y, 
while plea bargaining is practiced in Israel, it is not nearly so wide-
spread as in the United States. At least 30% to 35% of criminal cases 
go to trial, and a significant proportion of the 65% to 70% of the de-
fendants who plead guilty do so without prior negotiations or plea 
200 
agreements. 
D. Summary 
This Part has examined the functional role of plea bargaining in a 
variety of jurisdictions, and has shown a correlation between the com-
plexity and inefficiency of a country's trial procedures and its use of 
plea bargaining. Simply put, it has shown that the more complex and 
time-consuming the country's trial procedures, the more those proce-
dures will be avoided in favor of non-trial alternatives. Thus, Ameri-
can criminal trials, with their many safeguards and intensely adversar-
ial character, are among the least utilized in the world. As Lloyd 
Weinreb has noted: "No country relies so much as we on the defen-
dant's formal acknowledgement of his guilt."201 Plea bargaining and 
non-trial alternatives play a correspondingly lesser role in countries 
such as England and Israel that utilize more moderate adversarial 
procedures, and they play a lesser role still in Continental countries 
that utilize relatively quick and efficient non-adversarial procedures. 
presented with a document that incriminates him, his silence ... may be used as evi-
dence against him"). 
199 SeeAbramovsky, supra note 192, at 1913. 
200 Mann, supra note 193, at 284. About twenty years ago, Albert Alschuler inter-
viewed David Libai, a former Israeli prosecutor and defense attorney, who opined that 
guilty plea rates in Israel were substantially lower than those in the United States. He 
described plea bargaining in Israel as "neither very widespread nor very unusual," be-
cause Israeli trials are not to a jury: 
[T]here is no feeling that the great mass of defendants must be induced to 
plead guilty. Two or three ordinary trials, involving neither terribly simple 
nor terribly complex cases, can usually be conducted in a single morning. It is 
a rare case that cannot be proven with two or three witnesses, and prosecutors 
know that they may very well spend more time bargaining a case than they 
would spend at trial. Accordingly they do not regard plea bargaining as a 
great administrative boon. 
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973 
n.207. 
201 LLOYD WEINREB, DENIAL OF jUSTICE 148 (1977). 
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II. THE IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
PLEA BARGAINING 
Part I described plea bargaining's functional role in various 
criminal justice systems. This part examines plea bargaining as a 
theoretical construct. It explores certain ideological and structural 
features of Anglo-American and Continental jurisdictions, and it 
shows how these features can facilitate or impede the use of plea bar-
gammg. In particular, it shows that the non-hierarchical structure 
and laissez-faire ideology of the American criminal justice system pro-
vides a perfect setting for plea bargaining to flourish, whereas the 
more hierarchical structure and managerial tendencies of most Con-
tinental criminal justice systems inhibit the development and use of 
plea bargaining. 
Mirjan Dama8ka, arguably the foremost comparative law scholar in 
the United States, has linked many of the features commonly associ-
ated with Anglo-American and Continental procedural systems to the 
structures of authority202 and political ideologies of the states utilizing 
those systems.203 Using the structure of procedural authority and the 
purposes of adjudication as classificatory principles, Damaska devel-
oped four models: two types of officialdom-the hierarchical and the 
paritary-and two types of procedural purpose-the policy-
implementing, characteristic of interventionist states, and the conflict-
solving, characteristic of laissez-faire states.204 All four models were 
conceived as ideal types; no actual procedural system bears all of their 
traits yet, as a general matter, Continental criminal justice systems are 
more hierarchical in structure205 and manifest a greater disposition to 
202 
"Structures of authority" refers to the organization of governmental authority, 
in particular, into hierarchical or non-hierarchical models. Mirjan Damaska, Structures 
of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE LJ. 480, 481 (1975). 
203 Damaska, supra note 136, at 495-97; see DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 
53, at 9 (asserting that "even such intangibles" as the tone of proceedings, attitudes 
toward documents and deadlines, and the division of the tribunal into judge and jury 
"may be influenced by a particular character of authority"). 
204 Damaska, supra note 136, at 495-96. 
205 The hierarchical nature of the judiciary and the prosecuting authority in most 
Continental countries has been discussed frequently in comparative law scholarship. 
See, e.g., Dannecker & Roberts, supra note 120, at 422 ("The state attorney's offices [in 
Germany] are hierarchically structured and subordinated to the ministry of justice."); 
Frase, supra note 81, at 559-61, 564-66 (depicting the hierarchical authority of the 
French prosecuting authority and judiciary); jorg et al., supra note 112, at 44 ("[The] 
criminal justice system in the Netherlands conforms closely to th[e] model of hierar-
chical/pyramidal organization, the underlying assumption being that the state ... 
[can] be trusted to 'police' itself as long as authority is organized in a way that will al-
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pursue governmental ends than their Anglo-American counterparts.206 
These structural and ideological features find ready expression in 
the adversarial and non-adversarial criminal procedures discussed 
above.207 Legal proceedings in a hierarchical setting tend to be held 
in a methodical succession of stages that need a mechanism to inte-
grate their segments into a meaningful whole, and that function is 
performed by the dossier. 208 Officials in a hierarchy are professional-
ized, organized into strict echelons, and inclined to jealously guard 
their bailiwick against outsiders.209 Legal proceedings in Continental 
countries, then, are not controlled by the parties but are largely 
driven by hierarchically ordered bureaucrats.210 As for ideology, the 
greater disposition to manage society results in a legal process organ-
ized around a central idea of an official inquiry,211 which places great 
emphasis on reaching accurate, or "correct," substantive results.212 
The managerial disposition also combines with the hierarchical struc-
ture to result in substantial official control over the process and, in 
particular, a significant substantive role for the decisionmaker,213 thus 
reducing party and lawyer involvement.214 
low it to do so."); Kuhne, supra note 162, at 140-41 (describing the hierarchical nature 
of the German police and prosecutorial authority); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 
73, at 1555-56 (describing the hierarchical nature of French police); id. at 1560-64 
(noting the hierarchical nature of German police forces and prosecutors' offices); 
Pradel, supra note 118, at 111 ("The public prosecutor [in France] forms part of a 
body known as the ministere public (or parquet)[.] the dominant characteristic of which 
is its hierarchical nature."); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 114, at 7-8 (explaining the 
hierarchical nature of the Belgian prosecuting authority). 
206 See Damaska, supra note 136, at 499; Tulkens, supra note 119, at 8 ("An inquisi-
tory sl,stem is mostly directed towards maintaining public order."). 
2 7 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 47-66, 77-80, 189-93 (investi-
gating procedural implications and conflict resolution approaches of various justice 
systems);Jorg eta!., supra note 112, at 43-44. 
208 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE supra note 53, at 47-48, 51-53. 
209 See id. at 18-19 (observing that permanently placed officials develop a view of 
the world as divided between "insiders" and "outsiders"); see also Damaska, supra note 
136, at 495 ("[O]fficials are professionals, organized in a hierarchy, who base their de-
cisions on abstract, technical norms."). 
210 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 56. 
211 See id. at 147; see also Damaska, supra note 52, at 525, 564; Tomlinson, supra 
note 121, at 134. 
212 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 160 (asserting that the activist 
state attempts to get "the facts right" as a pre-condition to realizing the goal of the le-
gal process). 
213 See id. at 154, 168. 
214 See id. at 172-78 (describing the diminished role of the bar); Bruno, supra note 
116, at 5 ("The civil lawyer looks very frail and weak compared to his almighty and 
powerful common law colleague."). 
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By contrast, Anglo-American jurisdictions generally, and the 
United States specifically, are less hierarchical in structure and less in-
terventionist in disposition. In a non-hierarchical setting, power is 
widely distributed among roughly equal non-bureaucratic officials 
who each command broad discretion over the realm in which they 
operate.m The laissez-faire disposition of these states means that they 
envision the task of government primarily as providing a supporting 
framework within which citizens can pursue their autonomous goals.216 
Because the state is considered to have no interests apart from private 
interests, adjudication is conceived of primarily as a means of conflict 
1 . 217 h h f h' " " 2 18 reso utwn rat er t an as a means o reac mg correct outcomes. 
Instead of structuring criminal proceedings in the form of an official 
inquiry, then, Anglo-American states structure them in the form of a 
contest.~ 1 ~ Because the state is not considered hierarchically superior 
to the individual,220 adjudication, even criminal adjudication, can be 
215 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 25-26 (calling this phenome-
non a "horizontal distribution of authority"); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 
675 ("The prosecution function [in the United States] has traditionally been decen-
tralized, so that state attorneys-general exercise no effective control over local prosecu-
tors."). 
~w See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 73; Jorg et al., supra note 112, 
at 45 ("Common law ways of thinking about accountability and state derive initially 
from a negative image of the state and a minimalist view of its functions."). 
21 7 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 73 (u[G]enuine extremes of 
reactive ideology tend to collapse the protection of order into dispute resolution."); 
Dama5ka, supra note 123, at 103 ("On the Anglo-American side, the absence of an offi-
cial investigating apparatus combined with forms of private prosecution to impart even 
to the criminal justice system a pronounced conflict-solving flavor."); Damaska, supra 
note 52, at 563 (explaining that in the adversary model the "procedural aim is to settle 
the conflict"); id. at 581 ("It is openly stated by some common law lawyers that the aim 
of criminal procedure is not so much the ascertainment of the real truth as the just 
settlement of a dispute."). 
218 That is not to say that the American criminal justice system is unconcerned 
with truth-seeking. Indeed, many commentators argue that an adversarial presenta-
tion of facts and arguments is most likely to reveal truth. See, e.g., United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) ("Truth .. . is best discovered by powerful statements 
on both sides of a question."(citation omitted)); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYsTEM 9 ( 1975) (" [T] he adversary system assumes that the 
most efficient and fair way of determining the truth is by presenting the strongest pos-
sible case for each side of the controversy before an impartial judge or jury."); Frase, 
supra note 115, at 818 (presenting the arguments that adversarial presentation is most 
effective at determining truth). 
219 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 88 (linking American process 
with "the key image of contest"); Swart & Young, supra note 125, at 71 ("[I]n common 
law countries a trial is seen as a legal contest between two parties . .. . "). 
220 LAFAVE ET AL. , supra note 12, at 33 ("Consistent with the premise that the indi-
vidual is the source of the government's sovereignty, the adversary system treats the 
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conceived of as a contest between two formally equal parties without 
violating any perceived sense of order.221 The non-hierarchical nature 
of state authority also affords prosecutors the broad discretion to con-
duct the case as they see fit: to determine, among other things, who 
to prosecute, what charges to bring, and the manner in which to con-
duct the investigation.222 The non-bureaucratic officials of a non-
hierarchical state draw no rigid lines between official and private do-
mains, so many functions that are the exclusive province of bureau-
crats in a hierarchical system can be entrusted to private lawyers. The 
preparation of the case and the presentation of evidence, for instance, 
is not the responsibility of state officials but of the parties them-
223 
selves. . 
The laissez-faire political ideology accords a high value to individ-
ual autonomy and participation and thereby reinforces some of these 
procedural arrangements. For instance, the substantial control that 
the parties exert over the preparation and presentation of the case re-
flects not only the willingness of non-bureaucratic officials to relin-
quish control but the state's disinclination to intervene and the af-
firmative value that the system places on autonomy and party 
participation.224 The parties do not search for truth to be presented in 
defendant as an equal to the prosecution."). 
221 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 184, 223-24; Tomlinson, supra 
note 121, at 134 ("The common-law trial is the main act of a dispute between two theo-
retically equal parties who enjoy considerable leeway to determine themselves, through 
pleadings and stipulations, the limits and outcome of their dispute."); see also Church, 
supra note 100, at 523 (noting that the American judicial system "is based on the 
proposition that just resolution of disputes will flow from the clash of interests of liti-
gants whose legal fates are committed almost entirely to the hands of professional 
counsel"). 
222 See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 65 ("[The trial's] preparation 
is not the responsibility of a specialized branch of the judiciary or of other specialized 
state officials, but is relegated to the parties involved in the case."); LAFAVE ET AL., su-
pra note 12, at 670 ("The notion that the prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad 
range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is firmly en-
trenched in American law."); id. at 669 (noting that "discretionary enforcement of the 
criminal law has traditionally been an important part of the American prosecutor's 
function"). 
223 DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 63, 65; see Tulkens, supra note 
119, at 8 (explaining "the accusatory system is litigant-driven; the state's intervention is 
relatively limited"). 
224 See Sward, supra note 53, at 318 (observing that party control is understood to 
preserve individual autonomy and dignity because it gives litigants the "fullest voice 
possible" in their cases). Lon Fuller believed, for instance, that "[t]he essence of the 
adversary system is that each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is 
reached, a participation that takes the form of presenting proofs and arguments." Lon 
Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30,41 (H. Berman ed., 1961). 
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a neutral, unbiased way; they search for favorable evidence and pres-
ent it in the manner most advantageous to their position. In a crimi-
nal case, even though the prosecutor is a representative of the state, 
he is not considered a neutral official, as in some Continental coun-
tries,225 but rather a partisan who operates under some constraints but 
whose primary aim is to convict those brought to trial. 226 A further re-
flection of the high value accorded individual autonomy is that 
American defendants are provided numerous rights applicable at 
various stages of the proceedings, including the right to silence,227 the 
Enhancing litigant autonomy does not necessarily mean advancing the best inter-
ests of the litigant, however. For instance, in the United States, a criminal defendant 
has the right to defend himself, even if his interests would clearly be better served by 
the assistance of appointed counsel. SeeFaretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,807 (1975) 
(deciding that it is unconstitutional for a state to "hale a person into its criminal courts 
and then force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his 
own defense"). By contrast, many Continental countries appoint counsel for defen-
dants regardless of the defendants' desires in order to serve the interests of the defen-
dants and the criminal justice system. See ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 190 ("In some 
cases, legal representation is mandatory."); Corso, supra note 149, at 231 ("[In Italy, 
the] presence of defence counsel is compulsory.");jorge de Figueiredo Dias & Maria 
joao Antunes, Portuga~ in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 317, 321 (noting that in Portugal, defense counsel "can 
be nominated to be present at certain acts without or even against the wishes of the 
accused"); Frase, supra note 118, at 177 (finding that defendants must be represented 
in French assize court); Greve, supra note 118, at 59 (reporting that in Denmark "it is 
not within the free discretion of the accused whether he wants legal assistance or not" 
because it is mandatory "in any case where the court regards defence counsel as desir-
able"). 
225 See ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 184 (arguing that "in contrast to some other 
legal systems, the German state prosecution service is not a party to the case in a 
criminal trial," but "[i]nstead it is a strictly neutral institution"); Jescheck, supra note 
144, at 510 (observing that, while the American prosecutor is "one of two 'suitors' in 
the trial," the German prosecutor "is supposed to be an objective 'guardian of the 
law"'). 
226 See Damaska, supra note 52, at 563 (noting that "the prosecutor's role is to ob-
tain a conviction"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 439 (contending that prosecutorial 
zeal to convict is sometimes excessive). Although prosecutors in most Anglo-American 
jurisdictions are under certain ethical constraints, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001) (requiring prosecutors to "refrain from prosecuting a charge 
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L 
RESPONSIBILITYEC 7-13 (2002) (obliging prosecutors "to seekjustice [and] not merely 
to convict"), the ethical obligations are subjective and amorphous and are not apt to 
be enforced, see Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of 
Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987, 1006 (1995) 
(observing that no New York prosecutor has ever received a disciplinary sanction for 
violating the ethical obligation to "seek justice"). 
227 In the United States, for example, the right to silence is guaranteed in the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and it has been interpreted as prohibiting a court 
from making an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. E.g., Mitchell v. 
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right to confront witnesses,22H the right to exclude evidence from un-
reasonable searches,229 and the right to refuse counsel.230 To Conti-
nental observers, the broad scope of some of these rights may seem 
almost perverse in their ability to impede the government in its le-
gitimate goal of investigating and prosecuting crime. But in the 
rhetoric of the adversary system, these rights protect individual auton-
omy and dignity and prevent governmental overreaching into private 
spheres. 
The same structural and philosophical features that underlie 
American adversarial procedures and Continental non-adversarial 
procedures make plea bargaining the fitting alternative method of 
case disposition in the former but an uncomfortable anomaly in the 
latter. As a structural matter, plea bargaining can more readily flour-
ish in non-hierarchical criminal justice systems: while it would violate 
the proper sense of order in a hierarchical environment to place a 
prosecutor-the representative of the state-in a bargaining position 
parallel to that of a criminal defendant,231 a non-hierarchical system 
can accommodate plea bargaining's assumption of two formally equal 
parties capable of reaching a mutually beneficial outcome. Further, a 
non-hierarchical system can afford the prosecutor the wide discretion 
necessary to bargain effectively, discretion not typically bestowed on 
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) ("The rule against adverse inferences is a vital 
instrument for teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defen-
dant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether the Govern-
ment has carried its burden [of proof) while respecting the individual's rights."). 
Most, if not all, Continental countries also guarantee the right to silence, but courts 
may draw adverse inferences from such silence, thus motivating defendants to testify. 
See sura text accompanying note 135. 
2 8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). 
:.!29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting "against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures" and forming the basis of the American exclusionary rule). Continental coun-
tries also prohibit certain searches and seizures but may enforce those prohibitions 
without excluding the evidence gained from them. See supra text accompanying note 
127. 
230 SeeFaretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,807 (1975) (holding that it is unconstitu-
tional for a state to "hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer 
upon him"). 
m See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 184. Dama5ka notes further 
that "notions of negotiation and bargaining between the state prosecutor and the de-
fendant are out of place. Where an official close to the center of government begins 
to negotiate state interests with a private individual, in the perspective of hierarchical 
authority this practice approximates an abdication of state sovereignty." /d.; see also 
Jorg eta!., supra note 112, at 50 ("An inquisitorial trial is a procedure between two es-
sentially unequal parties."). 
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Continental prosecutors, who are hierarchically ordered and strictly 
accountable to their superiors.232 Indeed, by allowing prosecutors to 
settle cases for agreed-upon sentences, plea bargaining sharply en-
hances the power of prosecutors at the expense of judges. Even in a 
lawyer-dominated criminal justice system like that of the United 
States, this transfer of judicial power to prosecutors can be controver-
sial;233 in judge-dominated Continental systems, it is apt to prove un-
tenable. Finally, a non-hierarchical structure allows the actors in an 
adversarial criminal justice system to step outside their roles, which 
are based on norms of conflict, to pursue their individual interests in 
. 234 
cooperat.IOn. 
As an ideological matter, plea bargaining advances the goal of 
conflict resolution that underlies the non-interventionist governmen-
tal disposition.235 Indeed, by allowing the parties to resolve a criminal 
prosecution in a way that best meets their needs, plea bargaining ex-
emplifies the American commitment to conflict resolution over the 
Continental emphasis on reaching accurate outcomes.236 Dama5ka has 
noted that in the United States, "the criminal justice system often 
seems satisfied with establishing merely a rough basis for punishment-
sometimes a mere torso of actual wrongdoing-leaving the more pre-
cise delineation of factual parameters to the initiative of the parties."237 
Consequently, as a result of plea bargaining, the defendant might 
232 
. See DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 223. 
233 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, 
at 933 (lamenting the way in which plea bargaining makes "figureheads of judges"). 234 As Feeley describes it: 
What emerges from the analysis of the operations of the criminal justice sys-
tem is a clear picture of an organization which has highly specified rules and 
goals, but has virtually no instruments by which to enforce them. Rather than 
the highly rationalized, rule-bound and bureaucratically structured system 
that Weber depicted the process to be, one finds a highly decentralized and 
decidedly non-hierarchical system of exchange in which there are virtually no 
instruments to supervise practices and secure compliance to the formal goals 
of the organization. 
Feele,&,, supra note 95, at 422. 
u Interestingly, one of the most ardent defenders of plea bargaining as an inher-
ent feature of the adversarial system is Judge Mazza of Israel's Supreme Court. Judge 
Mazza has maintained that plea bargaining "satisfies the methodological and concep-
tual justifications that underpin the adversarial system" because that system does not 
just dictate a contest between two parties but also encourages dialogue to reduce the 
controversy. Hamon, supra note 191, at 259. 236 See Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 684 (arguing 
that certain approaches to plea bargaining envisage "the process primarily as a form of 
dispute resolution rather than as a sentencing device"). 237 DAMASKA, FACES OF jUSTICE, supra note 53, at 112. 
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plead guilty to a lesser crime that he clearly did not commit,238 or even 
plead guilty to a hypothetical crime that does not exist.239 Such resolu-
tions would be impossible in legal systems more fully committed to 
reaching accurate outcomes. 
Turning to party autonomy and participation, plea bargaining not 
only reflects those values but can be understood to enhance them.240 
By allowing defendants to opt for certain but less severe punishment, 
plea bargaining is said to expand a defendant's choices and to afford 
him a measure of control over his fate. 241 Indeed, while critics cite the 
tendency of innocent defendants to self-convict as one of plea bar-
gaining's gravest flaws, defenders of the practice trumpet this choice 
as one of plea bargaining's greatest advantages. Proponents of plea 
bargaining note that under any system of criminal justice, innocent 
defendants run the risk of conviction at trial.242 Plea bargaining allows 
238 See Alschuler, Trial judge's Role, supra note 13, at 1141 (observing that charge 
bargaining frequently mislabels the conduct that it punishes so that "[g]uns are 'swal-
lowed' as armed robberies become unarmed robberies; burglaries committed at night 
are transformed through prosecutorial wizardry to burglaries during the day; and de-
fendants solemnly affirm that they have driven the wrong way on one-way streets in 
towns without one-way streets"); Colquitt, supra note 13, at 740-41 (discussing People v. 
West, 477 P.2d 409, 410 (Cal. 1970), in which no facts stated in the appellate opinion 
support the charge to which the defendant was allowed to plead); Langbein, Torture 
and Plea Bargaining, supra note 13, at 16 ("In the plea bargaining that takes the form of 
charge bargaining (as opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is convicted not for 
what he did, but for something less opprobrious."). 
239 See Alschuler, Trial judge's Role, supra note 13, at 1142 (noting that "[s]ome 
courts permit defendants to plead guilty even to offenses whose commission would be 
legally impossible"); Colquitt, supra note 13, at 741 (lamenting that some parties 
"agree to a settlement based on a plea to a nonexistent crime"). 
240 See Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1978 (asserting that "autonomy and efficiency 
support" plea bargaining). Not all commentators agree, however. See Alschuler, 
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 695-703 (noting that restrictions on 
contractual autonomy are widely accepted and should be applicable to plea bargain-
ing). 
241 See Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, En-
trapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE LJ. 683, 685 (1975) (contend-
ing that the rules governing plea bargaining "are rooted in a basic commitment of the 
legal system to respect human dignity by protecting the right of every adult to deter-
mine what he shall do and what may be done to him"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, 
at 1933 (asserting that defendants who refuse to bargain, go to trial, and are convicted 
"at least have the option, ex ante, of taking a different course of action" when plea 
bargaining is allowed); Fred C. Zacharias, justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1121, 1136 (1998) (relating that "some commentators suggest that a plea-
bargaining system empowers defendants by giving them choices regarding the out-
come over which they have no control in the trial process"). 
242 See Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1970 (attributing the incorrect separation of 
the guilty from the innocent not to a "flaw in the bargaining process but [to] a flaw at 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 58 2002-2003
58 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1 
innocent defendants to assess this risk and to opt for less severe pun-
ishment if it seems in their best interests to do so. Prohibiting plea 
bargaining, in the guise of concern for innocent defendants, amounts, 
on this view, to a paternalistic restriction on the defendants' legitimate 
choices. 243 
Plea bargaining, then, has flourished in the United States not only 
because it fills a functional need but also because it reflects and rein-
forces fundamental features of American structures of authority and 
ideology. Indeed, it is this ideological consistency that has caused 
many American scholars, judges, and practitioners to embrace plea 
bargaining not as a necessary evil but as a desirable feature of the 
American criminal justice system.244 The very fact that so few efforts 
have been made to restrict, or even to regulate, plea bargaining in the 
United States is in part a testament to plea bargaining's ideological 
"fit."245 Bargaining on the Continent, by contrast, is a different story. 
For many years, what little bargaining took place was shrouded in se-
trial"); id. at 1978 (asserting that the imperfections in plea bargaining "reflect the im-
perfections of an anticipated trial"). 
243 See id. at 1976-77 (arguing that liberty is too important to be left solely to the 
government and its agents, rather than to the criminal defendant); Scott & Stuntz, su-
pra note 97, at 1925 (noting that "legal regulation is often motivated by paternalism"). 
244 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("Disposition of 
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but 
a highly desirable part for many reasons."); People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d. 784, 788-89 
(N.Y. 1974) (asserting that "plea negotiation serves the ends of justice" and describing 
its many advantages); Church, supra note 100, at 513 ("[P)lea bargaining in its broad-
est sense-the implicit exchange of sentencing consideration for a defendant's admis-
sion of guilt-need not be unfair to either the defendant or the public."); Easterbrook, 
supra note 76, at 309, 308-22("[P]lea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if the 
system attempts to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources."); 
Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1978 ("Plea bargains are compromises. Autonomy and 
efficiency support them."); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, at 1911 (arguing that con-
tract theory supports plea bargaining). Of course, as noted above, see supra note 13, 
plea bargaining does have many foes. 
245 It is notable that American efforts to restrict plea bargaining have been more 
successful in jurisdictions that, relatively speaking, were more bureaucratic and hierar-
chically organized. See Heumann & Loftin, supra note 106, at 401-02 (describing how, 
long before a plea-bargaining restriction was adopted, the Wayne County prosecutor 
had taken steps to bureaucratize the disposition process, so that "the probability of 
compliance with the ban on plea bargaining ... was higher in Detroit than it would be 
in other large jurisdictions that are frequently unaccustomed to stringent organiza-
tional constraints"); Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 367-68 (observing that the 
Alaska Attorney General had been able to virtually eliminate widespread, explicit plea 
bargaining in part because "Alaska is a very unified jurisdiction from an administrative 
standpoint" with "all state prosecution personnel" answerable to the Attorney Gen-
eral). 
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crecy.246 Now plea bargaining analogues have come to light, but they 
remain extremely controversial.247 In a 1983 article, for instance, Al-
bert Alschuler reported on interviews he had conducted with numer-
ous Continental lawyers, academics, andjudges, and noted that "these 
sources generally bridled at any suggestion that European sentencing 
practices might serve the same function as American plea bargaining; 
they used words like 'ridiculous' and 'unthinkable."'248 The hierarchi-
cal structure of Continental criminal justice systems also enables them 
to better regulate any bargaining that is permitted, and they have 
largely restricted bargaining to specific spheres that generally do not 
include violent crimes. In contrast, as George Fisher has shown, when 
bargaining emerged in the United States, it did so not in an organ-
ized, intentional manner, but rather sprung up in particular realms in 
which the legislature's sentencing scheme enabled prosecutors to ex-
ercise control over the ultimate sentence via their charging deci-
• 249 
s10ns. 
In sum, the prevalence of plea bargaining in any given jurisdiction 
is a function of the jurisdiction's practical need for alternative disposi-
tions and of various structural and ideological features of the jurisdic-
tion that can inhibit or facilitate the practice. The foregoing analysis 
246 E.g., Herrmann, supra note 113, at 755 & n.2 (describing secrecy of German 
plea bargaining). As noted above, supra text accompanying note 188, plea bargaining 
was not publicly acknowledged even in England until the 1970s. 
247 See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 136, at 483 (arguing that, although "various kinds 
of 'deals' with the defense have lately been legitimated in some continental jurisdic-
tions, objections that these deals 'ontologically' belong in the sphere of civil litigation 
still resonate ... and continue to make the extension of the polarization between party 
contest and official inquest controversial"); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 344-45 
(remarking that the legality and desirability of plea bargaining are still hotly debated 
in Germany); Herrmann, supra note 113, at 756 (maintaining that plea bargaining "has 
given rise to much criticism and heated controversy in German legal publications and 
in the media");Jung, supra note 170, at 61-62 (describing the controversy in Germany). 
Hans-Heiner Kuhne, for instance, complains that the "problem with these arrange-
ments [reached through bargaining] is that they are reached quasi privately, outside 
the formal proceedings. Therefore, all procedural guarantees inherent in the formal-
ized and public trial are nmning idle." Kuhne, supra note 162, at 157; see also Alfredo 
Etcheberry, The Impact of the Nature and Volume of Crime and Administrative Processes on 
Criminal justice Systems: New Trends in Combating Organized Crime, in COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL jUSTICE SYSTEMS: FROM DIVERSI1Y TO RAPPROCHEMENT, supra note 52, at 
333, 341-42 (asserting that plea bargaining within "certain limits is not to be rejected 
altogether ... [b]ut if the prevailing result is one in which plea bargaining is the 
method used to handle a large majority of criminal cases, ... it would amount to 
abandoning of the social function of a public trial and oflegal punishment"). 
248 Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 
987. 
249 Fisher, supra note 24, at 868-916. 
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suggests a close relationship between the use of plea bargaining and 
the functional needs and theoretical underpinnings of adversary sys-
tems of procedure and, in particular, of the especially adversarial 
American criminal justice system. Efficiently circumventing elaborate 
and lengthy trial practices, satisfying the human need to cooperate, 
and advancing the goal of conflict resolution and the value of individ-
ual autonomy, plea bargaining has become a pervasive and en-
trenched feature of the American criminal justice system. By contrast, 
plea bargaining is of considerably less importance to Continental 
criminal justice systems. The greater efficiency of Continental proce-
dures renders plea bargaining of lesser functional value to Continen-
tal countries, and the practice is theoretically less consistent with vari-
ous structural and ideological features of Continental criminal justice 
systems. This background sets the stage for the following Part, which 
describes the structural and procedural features of the international 
criminal tribunals. 
Ill. THE PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
A. Introduction to the Tribunals: Organization and Key Players 
War broke out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(former Yugoslavia) in 1991 when many of its constituent republics 
sought independence.250 The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina saw 
particularly brutal fighting following its declaration of independence, 
and international observers soon began to document widespread vio-
lations of international humanitarian law. 251 In 1993, the United Na-
250 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 25-63 (1996) (de-
scribing the war in the former Yugoslavia); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 
Judgement, paras. 9-10 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Krstic,Judgement] (surveying po-
litical conditions in Yugoslavia from the late 1980s to 1992), at http:/ /www.un.org/ 
icty /krstic/TrialCl /judgement/krs-gOI 0802e.pdf. 
251 Following reports of "widespread violations of international humanitarian law," 
the United Nations in 1992 established a Commission of Experts to examine and analyze 
the information received. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 
(1992). The Commission of Experts confirmed that grave breaches, including "ethnic 
cleansing," mass killings, torture, and rape, were occurring. See Letter from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council (Feb. 10, 1993) (on file with author); see 
also Kelly Dawn Askin, 17ze IC1Y: An Introduction to its Origins, Rules and jurisprudence, in 
ESSAYS ON IClY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, 
supra note 27, at 13, 15-16. For a description of the difficulties involved in establishing 
the Commission and in the Commission's carrying out its mandate, see MICHAEL P. 
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tions Security Council (Security Council), determining that the situa-
tion constituted a "threat to international peace and security," estab-
lished the IC1Y to prosecute those accused of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and violations of the laws and customs of war on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.252 
A little more than a year later, brutal ethnic violence erupted in 
Rwanda, a small country in the Great Lakes Region of Mrica, whose 
population has historically been divided into two predominant 
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.253 Mter an airplane carrying the 
country's Hutu president was shot down, extremist Hutu immediately 
began killing large numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu,254 massa-
cring between 500,000 and one million people in one hundred days.2r'5 
Heeding calls for an international tribunal similar to the IC1Y,256 the 
Security Council established the ICTR257 and accorded it jurisdiction 
similar to that of the IC1Y.258 The seat of the IC1Y is in The Hague, 
The Netherlands, and the seat of the ICTR is in Arusha, Tanzania. 
SCHARF, BALKAN jUSTICE 37-49 (1997). 
252 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); 
see also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993) [hereinafter ICIY Statute]. The ICIY has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and the laws or customs of war pursuant to articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
ICIY Statute. /d. 
253 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALFORRWANDA48 (1998). 
254 /d. at 53; Morris, supra note 21, at 351. 
255 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 58. 
256 On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations 
reported on the gravity of the Rwandan situation. Report on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Rwanda, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess. at 5-8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994). 
Two days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935 requesting the establish-
ment of an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyze further evidence 
of grave violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994). The Commission recommended ei-
ther the creation of a new international criminal tribunal or the expansion of the 
IClY's jurisdiction to cover crimes in Rwanda. Preliminary Report of the Independent 
Commission of Exptrrts &tablished in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935, Com-
mission of Experts on Rwanda, 49th Sess., Annex to the Letter, at 31-32, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/1125 (1994). 
257 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 & Annex (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
258 Like the IC1Y, the ICTR has jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, although the definition of crimes against humanity differs between the IC1Y 
and ICTR statutes. Compare id. at art. 3, with IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 5. As 
for war crimes, the IC1Y has jurisdiction generally over "[v]iolations of the laws or cus-
toms of war" and specifically over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, id. 
at arts. 2-3, while the ICTR has jurisdiction over violations of article 3 common to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 4. 
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The Tribunals have adopted virtually identical procedural rules 
and are similarly organized.259 The Tribunals are comprised of three 
organs: the Chambers, consisting of three Trial Chambers and an 
Appeals Chamber; the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP); and the Regis-
try, which assists both the Chambers and the OTP.260 The IC1Y's Ap-
peals Chamber and Prosecutor also serve the ICTR.261 The Tribunals 
began with two Trial Chambers but soon added a third,262 and the 
ICTY's Trial Chambers have recently been expanded by the addition 
of twenty-seven ad litem judges.263 The Tribunals have two official 
languages-English and French.264 Courtroom proceedings are typi-
259 See STEVENS. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILilY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 176 (1997) 
(noting that "the Rwanda Tribunal's judges adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, with only minor changes"); Gabrielle Kirk McDon-
ald, Trial Procedures and Practices, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at 552 n.6. 
260 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 11. The Registry has been described as 
both the "administrative arm of the Tribunal" as well as the ·~udicial lung" in terms of 
the management of facilities and of the administration of cases. ICTY Bulletin, No. 2, 
Jan. 22, 1996, at 2. The Registry provides the Tribunals' security and translation serv-
ices both to investigators and the chambers. !d. It manages the system of legal aid to 
indigent defendants, runs the Victims and Witnesses Unit, and manages the Detention 
Center, which houses defendants. !d. For a more detailed description of Registry de-
cisions and their appealability, see Christian Rohde, Are Administrative Decisions from the 
Registry Appealable, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF 
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 509. 
261 ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at arts. 12(2), 15(3). 
262 See S.C. Res. ll66, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ll66 (1998) (adding third Trial 
Chamber to ICTY); S.C. Res. ll65, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1165 (1998) (adding 
third Trial Chamber to ICTR). 
263 Press Release, ICTY, Pool of 27 Ad Litem Judges Elected by U.N. General As-
sembly (June 13, 2001), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p596-e.htm. The ad li-
tem judges do not participate in pre-trial matters but are appointed to participate in 
trials. Press Briefing, ICTY (Dec. 6, 2000), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/briefing/ 
PB061200.htm. With the addition of the ad litem judges, each Trial Chamber can be 
divided into three sections containing both permanent and ad litem judges. ICTY 
Statute, supra note 252, at art. 12(1). The ICTR has recently asked the Security Coun-
cil for ad litem judges. Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 
31 December 1994, U.N. ICTY, 56th Sess. at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/56/351-S/2001/863 
(2001) [hereinafter /C7R 2001 Annual Report]. These changes in the composition of 
the Trial and Appeals Chambers required the Security Council to amend the ICTY 
Statute. See U.N. Doc. S/Res/1329 (2000). 
264 ICTY R.P. & EVID. 3(A) (2001), http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/ 
IT32_rev24.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; ICTR R.P. & 
EVID. 3(A) (2001), http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/rules/index.htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter ICTR RPE]. 
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cally conducted in one of these two languages, or in Bosnian/ 
Croatian/Serbian at the IC1Y and Kinyarwanda at the ICTR and si-
multaneously translated into the other languages.265 
1. The Prosecutor's Office 
Carla Del Ponte, the Tribunals' current Prosecutor, heads the 
OTP and is assisted at each Tribunal by a Deputy Prosecutor. The 
bulk of the OTP's work is conducted in two divisions: the Investiga-
tions Division and the Prosecution Division, which are headed by a 
Chief of Investigations and Chief of Prosecution, respectively. The In-
vestigations Divisions are themselves divided into numerous investiga-
tions teams; the IC1Y's investigations teams are assigned to particular 
geographical areas,266 while the ICTR's investigations teams typically 
concentrate on prominent figures in the command structures of the 
government, the military, and other walks of life, such as the media, 
the clergy, and the business world.267 Each IC1Y investigations team is 
headed by a team leader and a team trial attorney. Team leaders re-
port to one of five Investigations Commanders, who themselves report 
to the Chief oflnvestigations.268 
The Prosecutor and other high-level OTP officials exercise a fair 
degree of control both over the general scope of the investigations 
and over their particulars. Unlike a domestic police force, which 
normally investigates all serious crimes as they are brought to its atten-
tion, the Tribunals carefully select their targets of investigation,269 tak-
265 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 3; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 3. 
266 The IC1Y Prosecutor, for example, initially launched thirteen investigations, 
focusing on atrocities that occurred at 
five concentration camps (the Susica camp in eastern Bosnia, the Omarska 
camp, the Trnopolje camp, the Keraterm camp, and the Luka camp in 
northwestern Bosnia); six Bosnian and Croat cities (Bosanski Samac in 
northeastern Bosnia, Sarajevo and Stupni Do in central Bosnia, Srebrenica in 
eastern Bosnia, and Zagreb and Vukovar in Croatia); and two areas (the Pri-
jedor district in northwestern Bosnia and the Lasva Valley in central Bosnia). 
SCHARF, supra note 251, at 85. 
267 Carla Del Ponte, Address to the United Nations Security Council by the Prose-
cutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(Nov. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council] (on 
file with author). 
268 Post Summary, 2001 (Office of the Prosecutor: Investigations Division) (on file 
with author). 
269 Payam Akhavan, justice in The Hague, Peace in the Farmer Yugoslavia? A Commen-
tary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 774-77 (1998) (de-
scribing the issues facing the Prosecutor in the selection of investigations). 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 64 2002-2003
64 UNNERSITY OFPl!.'NNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1 
ing account of various factual, legal, and political considerations,270 in-
cluding the number of victims and scale of criminal activity,271 the 
availability of evidence and witness testimony, the desire to focus at-
tention on certain types of crime, including those involving sexual vio-
lence, the desire to develop and expand certain theories of criminal 
liability, such as command responsibility, and, particularly at the ICTY, 
the desire to prosecute some members of all the ethnic groups in-
volved in the conflict.272 The investigations, once selected, are care-
fully managed. 
A successful investigation leads to an indictment. Once an in-
dicted defendant is in custody, the case is assigned to a Senior Trial 
Attorney from the Prosecution Division who is assisted by a Legal Offi-
cer. The team trial attorney of the investigation also joins the trial 
team. The Senior Trial Attorneys typically have considerable trial ex-
perience, and the team trial attorneys, because they were involved in 
the investigations, bring considerable factual knowledge; thus, they 
make a formidable team. Nonetheless, in comparison to American 
prosecutors, their authority is fairly limited. The Prosecutor must ap-
prove each indictment and each amendment to an indictment. AI-
270 The ICIY's first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, not surprisingly, denied that 
political considerations in any way influenced the Tribunals' prosecutorial strategy. See 
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 172; SCHARF, supra note 251, at 86 (describing 
and doubting Goldstone's denial). 
271 Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council, supra note 267 (noting that 
"we have not investigated all crimes" and that "[w]e have concentrated on the areas in 
which the worst massacres occurred"). Del Ponte explained: 
!d. 
[C]hoice of cases to pursue is not at all simple. . . . [Although vital to prose-
cute the architects of the atrocities, for] the local people, the victims and the 
survivors, it was [the organizers at the district or local level] who brought 
their world to an end, not the remote Governmental architects of the overall 
policy of genocide. Unless these local leaders are brought to justice in both 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the ordinary population will not come to 
terms with the past, and the process of reconciliation and building a stable 
peace will suffer accordingly. 
272 See Akhavan, supra note 269, at 781-82 (discussing ethnic parity in prosecu-
tions); Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadii: Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
2031, 2039 (1998); Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International 
Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 440, 448-49 (1999). There were no Muslims 
among the first fifty-two people indicted by the IC1Y, but in response to criticism, the 
ICIY's Prosecutor "announced that he would make a concerted effort to indict a Muslim, 
to show the parties that the Tribunal was not one-sided." Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, 
The International Trial of the Century? A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugtr 
slavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 635, 645 (1996). The ICIR OTP has 
also recently begun investigating allegations of crimes committed by Tutsi armed forces. 
See Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council, supra note 267. 
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though the Senior Trial Attorneys are afforded considerable discre-
tion over trial strategy and the theory of the case, most regularly con-
sult with their superiors about any significant decisions, particularly 
any which might reflect on the repvtation of the Tribunals or impact 
other cases. Specifically, the Prosecutor is kept informed of plea ne-
gotiations; she provides guidelines for the concessions that can be of-
fered in a particular case and must approve the plea agreement.273 
It is not surprising that the discretion of the Senior Trial Attorneys 
is comparatively limited given the small number of Tribunal cases and 
the gravity of the crimes prosecuted. An American prosecutor might 
dispose of dozens of cases in a given month, and he will usually plea 
bargain them or otherwise dispose of them in accordance with well-
established practices that have been developed over a number of 
years. Few of these domestic cases will be related to one another and 
fewer still will generate any significant publicity. Under these circum-
stances, the prosecutor can be afforded considerable discretion over 
virtually all decisions, including plea bargaining. By contrast, Tribu-
nal cases are few, highly publicized, and often interrelated. The Tri-
bunals together have fewer than fifty cases currently in pre-trial or trial 
proceedings, so the Tribunals' Prosecutor has the practical ability to 
supervise their progress. Most of the cases generate considerable pub-
licity,274 and many of them are interrelated in that they feature defen-
273 Interview with Daryl Mundis, Legal Officer, Legal Advisory Section, IClY OTP 
(Au~. 19, 2001). 
74 The Tribunals' activities are widely publicized both in the news media and in the 
legal literature. See, e.g., judge Releases Serb from Custody, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 30, 
2001, at 5 (reporting on the provisional release of Biljana Plav~ic); Steven Lee Myers, The 
Warld; Wanted but how Badly?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 2000 (reporting on arrests of Tri-
bunal indictees); Tina Rosenberg, Defending the Indefensible, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 19, 
1998 (describing defense of Dr. Milan Kovacevic, charged with genocide); Marlise 
Simons, An Unexpected Revmal of War-Crimes Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at A7 
("[IClY] judges quashed the conviction of three Croatian fighters . .. and reduced the 
sentences of two others in the same case."); Marlise Simons, 5 Bosnian Serbs Guilty of War 
Crimes at lnjamiJus Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at A5 (reporting on the IClY convic-
tion of five Bosnian Serbs for their knowledge of and participation in the "rape, torture 
and killing of Muslim and Croat men and women under their control"); Marlise Simons, 
Serb Charged in Massacre Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, june 30, 1998, at A6 (reporting the 
suicide of Slavko Dokmanovic, who had been indicted for aiding the massacre of several 
hundred people who had taken refuge in a civilian hospital); Marlise Simons, Tap Bos-
nian Serb Officer Arrested for U.N. Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at A10 (covering the 
arrest of General Momir Talic); Marlise Simons, War Crimes Trial Seeks to Define the Balkan 
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at A8 (describing prosecution strategy of defining what 
happened in Yugoslavia as an international conflict, not just a local civil war, for the pur-
pose of trying the defendants on charges of "grave breaches of the laws of war"); Marlise 
Simons & Carlotta Gall, The HandoverofMilosevii:, N.Y. TIMES,June 29,2001, atA1; see also 
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dants who were the leaders of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda and 
275 0 
who collaborated to pursue common ends. Under these circum-
stances, there is an especially strong need for consistency in approach, 
including in the conduct of plea negotiations, and considerable in-
volvement by the Prosecutor is to be expected. 
2. The International Community and the Cooperation of States 
Because the Security Council established the Tribunals as Chapter 
VII enforcement measures, their decisions and orders are binding on 
all states.276 States are required to cooperate with the Tribunals in 
Patricia M. Wald, judging War Crimes, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 191 (2000) (noting that the 
ICIY and the ICfR have "spawned over 300 articles in the international journals, more 
than any other topic in international law in the last decade"). 
275 For instance, Blaskil:, Kordil:, and Aleksovski all concerned Bosnian Croatian de-
fendants charged with committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against 
Muslims in the Lasva Valley area of Central Bosnia. Blaskic was the commander of the 
Croatian Defense Council armed forces headquarters during the relevant period, Prose-
cutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-94-14-T, judgement, para. 9 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter 
Bla5kic, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/judgement/ 
bla-g000303e.pdf, Cerkez was commander of a brigade of the Croatian Defense Coun-
cil, Kordic was the most important Bosnian Croatian political figure in the area, Prose-
cutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,Judgement, para. 1 (Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Kordic, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/ 
kor-g010226e.pdf, and Aleksovski was the commander of the Kaonik prison, which de-
tained Muslim men captured during the conflicts involving Blaskic, Kordic, and 
Cerkez, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, judgement, paras. 23, 90 
Qune 25, 1999) [hereinafter Aleksovski, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/ 
icty I aleksovski/ trialc/judgement/ ale-g990625e. pdf. Similarly, the indictments against 
Biljana Plav~ic and Momcilo Krajisnik note their association with indictee Radovan 
Karadzic, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-1, Amended Indictment, para. 2 
(Mar. 21, 2000), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kra-lai00032le.htm; 
Prosecutor v. Plav§ic, Case No. IT-00-40-1, Indictment, para. 2 (Apr. 7, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pla-ii000407e.htm, and their high-
ranking positions, as members of the collective Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will 
likely mean that the cases against all three will also be intertwined with that of Slobo-
dan Milosevic for crimes committed in Bosnia. 
As for the ICTR, the Prosecutor has endeavored to join related cases, see infra text 
accompanying note 377, but she has not always been successful, and some related cases 
will be tried separately. See Alison Campbell, Rwandan War Crimes Trials-Appeal Court 
Decision a Setback for Collective Trials, INTERNEWS Qune 8, 1998) (stating that the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber "rejected an appeal from the Prosecutor which could have opened 
the way for twenty-nine people to be indicted together"), available at http:/ I 
www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ICTRNewsjun98.html. 
270 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. The United Nations considered establishing the 
IC1Y by means of a treaty but determined that concluding a treaty would take too 
much time, and the resulting entity might be undermined if ratifications were notre-
ceived from "those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effec-
tive." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
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their investigations and prosecutions,277 and in particular must "com-
ply without undue delay" with any request to identify and locate per-
sons, to take testimony and produce evidence, and to arrest or detain 
persons, among other things.278 State cooperation, or the lack thereof, 
has proven a contentious issue at the ICTY in particular.279 During its 
at para. 20, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993); see also SCHARF, supra note 251, at 54-55 ("[I]t 
would take time to negotiate a treaty and possibly years before enough governments rati-
fied it."). The defendant in the ICTY's first trial maintained that the Tribunal was "inva-
lid under the Charter of the United Nations" or "not duly established by law," conten-
tions that the Tribunal rejected. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on 
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 1-44 (Oct. 2, 1995), 
reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998, at 33 
(Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 1999) (hereinafter 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS]. 
277 IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 29(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
28(1). One IC1Y official has described state cooperation, and particularly the coop-
eration of the States of the former Yugoslavia, as "one of the most delicate areas in the 
work of the Tribunal." Nikolaus Toufar, State Request for Review, in ESSAYS ON IC1Y 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 
525,525. 
278 IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 29(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
28(2). The U.N. Secretary-General's Report, appended to Security Council Resolution 
827, establishing the IC1Y, states that an "order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender 
or transfer of persons to the custody of the International Tribunal shall be considered 
to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 808, supra note 276, at para. 126. 
279 The countries to which ICTR defendants fled have typically been more coop-
erative regarding their arrest and transfer than the states of the former Yugoslavia. In 
January 1995, the leaders of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and 
Zambia agreed to transfer defendants to the ICTR. Stuart Beresford, In Pursuit of In-
ternational justice: The First .Four-Year Term of the International Criminal· Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 8 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 99, 109 (2000); see also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, 
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, para. 8 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Bagilishema, 
Judgement] (stating that the defendant was arrested in South Mrica), at 
http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Bagilishema/judgement/index.htm; 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, paras. 14-15 (May 21, 
1999) (noting that defendant Kayishema was arrested in Zambia and defendant Ruz-
indana was arrested in Kenya), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/ 
KayRuz/judgement/index.htm; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judge-
ment, para. 9 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Judgement] (explaining that the 
defendant was arrested in Zambia), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ 
cases/ Akayesu/judgement/akayOOl.htm; Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INF0-9-2-277.EN 
(July 12, 2001), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/277.htm (report-
ing on the arrests of three defendants in Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Belgium); 
Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INF0-9-2-254.EN (Nov. 25, 2000), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ 
wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/25l.htm (reporting the arrest of defendant 
Sagahutu in Denmark); Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INF0-9-2-247.EN (Oct. 30, 2000), 
at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/24 7.htm (announcing 
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first two years of existence, the ICTY had no defendants in custody. 
Dusko Tadic was not transferred to the ICTY until 1995, and another 
year passed before any other indictees were transferred. 280 The NATO 
peace-keeping force stationed in Bosnia initially was not instructed to 
arrest Tribunal indictees;281 it was not until mid-1997 that the U.N. 
force in Croatia and then NATO in Bosnia began detaining indict-
ees.282 Cooperation has improved in recent years, particularly follow-
that defendant Muvunyi was arrested, detained, and transferred by the United King-
dom). But some Mrican states have refused to cooperate. Eg., Press Release, ICTR, 
ICTR/INF0-9-2-254.EN (Dec. 13, 2000), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ 
PRESSREL/2000/254.htm (reporting the Prosecutor's observation that the "arrests of 
some indicted individuals was being hampered by two Mrican countries which were 
harbouring them") . 
280 Askin, supra note 251, at 16-17. The President of the ICIY has made eleven re-
ports to the Security Council regarding lack of state cooperation , with the majority of 
these complaining about the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia's refusal to arrest persons 
indicted by the Tribunal. Daryl A. Mundis, Reporting Non-Compliance: Rule 7bis, in 
EssAYS ON ICIY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, 
supra note 27, at 421 , 424-36 (describing these reports). In response, the Security 
Council has typically issued Presidential Statements which might, for instance, "de-
plor[e] the failure . . . of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute arrest warrants 
issued by the Tribunal" Statement by the President of the Security Counci~ U.N. SCOR, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/1996/ 23 (1996). These Statements seemed to have little, if any, effect. 
State cooperation in the gathering of evidence was a problem in the Tribunal's 
first trial in the Tadic case. On appeal, Tadic maintained that the Republika Srpska 
intimidated certain defense witnesses into not appearing at uial , thus violating the 
principle of equality of arms and prejudicing his right to a fair trial. Prosecutor v. Ta-
dic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Opinion and judgement, paras. 29, 34 (July 15, 1999) , at http:/ I 
www.un.org/ icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/ index.htm. Mter canvassing the precedents 
of the European Court of Human Rights addressing domestic proceedings, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that domestic courts have the capacity to control matters that could ma-
terially affect the fairness of a trial. The ICTY, by contrast, must rely on the cooperation 
of States but has no power to compel them to cooperate. /d. at para. 51. Consequently, 
the Appeals Chamber held that the principle of equality of arms must be given a more 
liberal interpretation than applicable in domestic courts, and it specified various practical 
measures that the Trial Chambers could adopt in seeking to assist a party in presenting 
its case, including taking evidence by video link, summoning witnesses and ordering their 
attendance, and issuing binding orders to States for the taking and production of evi-
dence. /d. at para. 52. 
281 See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 281 (1998); Akhavan, 
supra note 269, at 795-96 (discussing the international community's "unwilling[ness] to 
make the sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons"); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
Reflections on the Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the ~Former Yugosla-
via, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2001); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest 
We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 321, 358 (1999) ; Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assess-
ment, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 22 (1997) (arguing that NATO's failure 
to arrest Karadzic and Mladic "is accurately seen as a symptom of the international 
community's ambivalence towards the Tribunal") . 
282 McDonald, sufrra note 281, at 161. 
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ing the October 2000 ouster of former Yugoslav President Slobodan 
Milosevic.283 In June 2001, the new Yugoslav government succumbed 
to Western pressure and transferred Milosevic to the IC1Y to stand 
trial on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Kosovo.284 MiloseviC's appearance increased the ICTY's authority and 
motivated further cooperation by the Balkan states.285 Still, problems 
persist. Former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his mili-
tary commander Ratko Mladic remain at large although they were in-
dicted six years ago, and the IC1Y continues to have difficulty obtain-
. d h" d 0 286 1ng access to ocuments, arc IVes, an Witnesses. 
283 Press Release, IC1Y, Milomir Stakic Transferred to the IC1Y (Mar. 23, 200I) 
(reporting on Yugoslavia's arrest and transfer of Milomir Stakic), at http:/ I 
www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p58Ie.htm; Press Release, IC1Y, Dragen Obrenovic Trans-
ferred Into the Custody of the International Tribunal (Apr. 16, 200I) (reporting on 
the arrest and transfer of Dragen Obrenovic by the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p586e.htm; see also Judge Claude 
Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Ad-
dress to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 27, 2001) (noting that "the num-
ber of people who have been arrested or who have voluntarily surrendered has multi-
plied in the last few months"), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ 
speeches/jorda271I Oisce.htm. 
284 See Marlise Simons & Carlotta Gall, Milosevii: is Given to the U.N. for Trial in War-
Crimes Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at A1 ("Milosevic ... was the first former head 
of state delivered by a government to face an international war crimes court."). 
Milosevic was arrested by Yugoslav authorities in April 200I, Steven Erlanger & Carlotta 
Gall, Milos evil: Arrest Came with Pledge for a Fair Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 200 I, at AI, an 
arrest which largely resulted from American legislation that conditioned further aid to 
Yugoslavia on its cooperation with the IC1Y, Richard Holbrooke, Risking a New War in 
the Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 200I, §4, at I5. 
285 For instance, soon after Milosevic was transferred, the Bosnian Serb govern-
ment of the Republika Srpska indicated that it would be willing to arrest indicted sus-
pects. Marlise Simons, Bosnian Serbs Are Ready to Seize Men for Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2001, at A7. Croatia, also under intense Western pressure to cooperate with the Tri-
bunal, decided in July 2001 to send two indictees to the Tribunal, Carlotta Gall & 
Marlise Simons, Croatia in Turmoil After Agreeing to Send 2 to Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2001, at A3, and in August 2001, the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina for the first time arrested Bosnian Muslim indictees, Press Release, IC1Y, 
Arrest of General Enver Hadzihasanovic, General Mehmed Alagic and Colonel Amir 
Kubura (Aug. 3, 200I), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p610-e.htm; 3 Bosnian 
Muslim Officers Charged: Hague Court Indictments Cite Atrocities Against Serbs and Croats, 
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4-5, 2001, at 4. 
286 E.g., Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council, supra note 267; IC1Y, 
Weekly Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 200I), at http:/ /un.org/icty/briefing/ 
PB03IOOl.htm; IC1Y, Weekly Press Briefing (Nov. 8, 2000), at http:/ /www.un.org/ 
icty /briefing/PB08IIOO.htm. 
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B. The Tribunals' Procedural and Evidentiary Systems 
The Statutes of the IC1Y and ICTR authorize the Tribunals' 
judges to adopt Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE or rules). 287 
Although the Tribunals' initial set of rules contained both adversarial 
and non-adversarial features, many commentators viewed the amal-
gam as a whole to bear more affinity to adversarial systems.288 Recent 
amendments to the rules, however, have tilted the balance in the 
other direction. For reasons that will be developed in Part IV, Tribu-
nal trials are extremely lengthy and costly, and recent rule amend-
2R7 IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 14. 
288 See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TwENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 142 (1999) (stating the Tribunal's RPE, as adopted in 1994 and 
amended in 1996, "tilt toward the common-law, adversarial mode because so many of 
the judges come from that system"); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 169 (stating 
in 1997 that "[a]lthough something of a hybrid, the [IC1Y's] procedure more closely 
resembles an adversarial model, rather than the inquisitorial system characteristic of 
civil law countries"); SCHARF, supra note 251, at 67 ("The judges [initially] decided to 
embrace a largely adversarial approach to their Rules of Procedure, rather than the 
inquisitorial system prevailing in continental Europe."); MarkS. Ellis, Achieving justice 
Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 519,524 (1997) ("[T]he Tribunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
are based largely on an adversarial model and do not follow the inquisitorial approach 
used in civil law systems."); Daryl A. Mundis, From "Common Law" Towards "Civil Law": 
The Evolution of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 367, 368 
(2001) (reporting that "the first few trials at the [IC1Y] closely resembled common law 
criminal trials"); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Interna-
tional Tribunal Jar the Farmer Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994) (finding that, in 
1994, "the rules tend[ed] to lean more toward the common law adversarial system than 
toward the civil law inquisitorial system, in keeping with the Statute's preference for a 
modified adversarial model"); Patricia M. Wald, To "£stablish Incredible Events by Credible 
Evidence": The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 
HARV. INT'L LJ. 535, 537 (2001) ("In their original form as adopted in 1994, the ad-
versarial mode of trial predominated in the Rules."). But see Robinson, supra note 52, 
at 588 (describing the "legal system established by the [IC1Y] Statute and Rules [as] 
neither common law accusatorial, nor civil law inquisitorial, nor even an amalgam of 
both; it is sui generis"). 
Tribunal judges are elected for a four-year term by the General Assembly from a 
list of nominees submitted by states. IClY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 13bis. The 
IClY's first judges came from countries with a variety of legal backgrounds, with no 
one procedural system clearly dominating. Specifically, the IGIY's first judges were 
Adolphus Godwin Karibi-White of Nigeria, Rustam Sidhwa of Pakistan, Elisabeth Odio-
Benito of Costa Rica, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald of the United States,Jules Deschenes of 
Canada, Antonio Cassese of Italy, George Michel Abi-Saab of Egypt, Li Haopei of 
China, Claudejorda of France, La! Chand Vohrah of Malaysia, and Sir Ninian Stephen 
of Australia. Press Release, IClY, International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Opened on 17 November 1993 in The Hague (Nov. 15, 1993) (on file with 
author). 
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ments have introduced more non-adversarial features in an effort to 
simplifY and expedite proceedings.289 
1. Pre-trial Procedures 
As in Anglo-American countries, the Statutes of the Tribunals vest 
in the Prosecutor, rather than the judges, the responsibility for inves-
tigating and prosecuting the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdic-
tion.290 Once formally charged, Tribunal defendants may plead guilty 
or not guilty to each count in the indictment.291 If the defendant 
pleads guilty, no trial is held, and the parties proceed directly to a pre-
sentencing hearing.292 If the defendant pleads not guilty, the parties 
prepare for trial. As part of this preparation, the Tribunals require 
substantial disclosure by both parties. The prosecution must disclose, 
among other things, a witness list which must summarize each wit-
ness's testimony, an exhibits lise93 all material which accompanied the 
indictment when confirmation was sought; copies of all statements of 
witnesses that the prosecution intends to call at trial;294 and any excul-
patory evidence.295 Upon request, the prosecution must allow the de-
fense to inspect certain books, documents, photographs, and tangible 
289 See generally McDonald, supra note 281, at 161-62; Mundis, supra note 288, at 
382; Daryl A. Mundis, The Legal Character and Status of the Rules of Procedure and E.vidence 
of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 1 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 205 (2002). 
290 IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 16(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
15(1). In some Continental countries, judges bear at least some of this responsibility, 
see Brouwer, supra note 108, at 212-13 (describing tasks undertaken by the French juge 
d'instruction); Pradel, supra note 118, at 110, 125-26 (describing French juge 
d'instruction); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 114, at 6-7 (describing the Belgian juge 
d'instruction), although even in these countries many of the investigative functions pre-
viously carried out by the judge have been transferred to the police and prosecutor, see 
supra note 119. 291 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(iii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 
62(A) (iii). 
292 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(8). 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the plea (1) 
has been made voluntarily; (2) is informed; (3) is not equivocal; and (4) is supported 
by a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the defendant's participation in it. IC1Y 
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(B); see also Prosecu-
tor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and 
Judge Vohrah, para. 8 (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovic, Joint Opinion of Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/ 
erd-asojmcd971 007 e .h tm. 
293 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(E). 
294 !d. at R. 66(A) (i)-(ii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 66(A) (i)-(ii). 
2
gr, IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 68; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 68. 
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objects.296 As for the defense, it must notify the prosecution if it in-
tends to raise an alibi defense or any special defenses, such as lack of 
mental responsibility, and must provide certain information regarding 
the defenses.297 It must also provide the prosecution with a witness list, 
a summary of witness testimony, and an exhibits list,298 and if the de-
fense exercises its right to inspect tangible objects within the custody 
or control of the prosecution, it must make available those same kinds 
of objects within its custody or control.2!l!> The Tribunals' disclosure 
provisions thus steer a middle course between those typically found in 
adversarial and non-adversarial systems. The Tribunals do not require 
as much disclosure from the prosecution as most Continental coun-
tries, which make the prosecutor's entire file available to the defen-
dant.300 However, they do require more disclosure than that typically 
required of American defendants301 and prosecutors, since some of 
the latter are required only to disclose exculpatory evidence and 
statements of the defendant in their possession .302 
296 The objects must be "in the Prosecutor's custody or control" and "material to 
the preparation of the defence," or "intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at 
trial or were obtained from or belonged to the accused." ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at 
R. 66(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 66(B). 
297 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67 (A) (ii) (a)-(b) ; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at 
R. 67(A) (ii)(a)-(b). With respect to an alibi defense, the defendant must inform the 
prosecution of the places where they claim to have been, and with respect both to ali-
bis and special defenses, the defendant must disclose the names and addresses of the 
witnesses and any other evidence on which they intend to rely. ICTY RPE, supra note 
264, at R. 67(A) (ii) (a)-(b); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67(A) (ii) (a)-(b) . 
298 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(G) . 
299 I d. at R. 67 (C); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67 (C). For a discussion of the 
many unresolved questions regarding these disclosure provisions, see generally Renee 
Pruitt, Discovny: Mutual Disclosure, Unilateral Disclosure and Non-Disclosure Under the Rules 
of Procedure and Evid_ence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF 
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 305. 
300 Supra text accompanying note 113. 
301 Only about one dozen American states require defendants to provide witness 
statements or give notice of defenses other than alibi and insanity, and only about half 
the states require disclosure of witness lists. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 943-44. 
302 See Craig Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, 
supra note 23, at 395, 416-17; van Kessel, supra note 54, at 414 (noting "the American 
system's aversion to unlimited pretrial discovery in criminal cases"). In recent years, 
American jurisdictions have begun granting criminal defendants greater discovery 
rights, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 913-14, but those rights are still compara-
tively limited. Only slightly more than one-third of American jurisdictions require 
prosecutors to disclose the statements of co-defendants and witnesses, but a majority of 
American jurisdictions now require the disclosure of scientific reports relating to the 
case, the defendant's criminal record, and documents and tangible items which will be 
used at trial. Id. at 922-26. For a discussion of the disclosure obligations placed on 
British and Irish prosecutors, see Feldman, supra note 183, at 119-21; Finbau McAuley 
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Initially, the Tribunals left the parties to prepare for trial without 
significant interference or oversight. Early Tribunal trials were la-
beled excessively lengthy and inefficient, however, so the Tribunals, 
and especially the IC1Y, have amended their rules to allow the judges 
to exercise greater control over both the pre-trial phase and the trial 
itself. The IC1Y assigns a pre-trial judge soon after the defendant's 
initial appearance and directs the judge to "ensure that the proceed-
ings are not unduly delayed and ... [to] take any measure necessary 
to prepare the case for a fair and expeditious trial."303 The pre-trial 
judge carries out this directive by, among other things, establishing a 
work plan, which sets forth the parties' obligations and the dates upon 
which they must be met.304 The pre-trial judge also conducts status 
conferences, which, among other things, "organize exchanges be-
tween the parties."305 Mter preliminary motions are disposed of, the 
pre-trial judge orders the parties to file a series of documents, includ-
ing pre-trial briefs, witness lists, and exhibits lists.306 With this informa-
tion, the pre-trial judge records the points of agreement and dis-
agreement over facts and law, and presents to the Trial Chamber, 
among other things, all of the parties' filings and the transcripts of the 
status conferences.307 Both Tribunals now require the Trial Chambers 
. I c 3os d . h to convene pre-tna con~erences an permit t em to convene pre-
defense conferences.309 The Trial Chambers are authorized during 
these conferences to set the number of witnesses that the prosecution 
and defense may call and to determine the time available to both par-
& John O'Dowd, Ireland, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYsTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNI1Y, supra note 114, at 185. 
303 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(A)-(B). To further expedite proceedings, 
the IC1Y has recently begun to grant legal officers greater responsibility over the pre-
trial stage in order to give the judges more time to try the cases. See Judge Claude 
Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Ad-
dress to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 283 (endorsing reforms that 
give Judges "a more active role both during the pre-trial phase and the trial itself'). 
04 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(D). 
305 Id. at R. 65bis(A). The ICTR permits a Trial Chamber or judge to convene a 
status conference. ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65bis. 
306 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(E)-(G); see also id. at R. 90(G) (authoriz-
ing a Trial Chamber to "refuse to hear a witness whose name does not appear" on the 
witness list). The ICTR permits, but does not require, a Trial Chamber or pre-trial 
judge-if one is designated-to order the filing of the above-mentioned documents. 
ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis. 
307 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter (H), (L). 
308 !d. at R. 73bis(A); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(A). 
309 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73ter(A); ICTR RPE, sufrra note 264, at R. 
73ter(A). 
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ties for presenting their evidence.310 These pre-trial procedures re-
semble the procedures of many Continental countries, which typically 
grant judges considerable authority to gather information and man-
age the case prior to trial.g11 Such management typically results in a 
more efficient, streamlined trial. 
2. Trial Procedures 
The Tribunals' trial procedures are generally adversarial in na-
ture, but again, recent amendments to the rules have introduced 
more non-adversarial elements in the hopes of shortening the trials. 
Tribunal trials, like those in Anglo-American countries, are divided 
into a prosecution "case," in which the prosecution presents evidence 
and calls witnesses who will testify on its behalf, and a defense "case," 
in which the defense team does the same.312 The presentation of evi-
310 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(C), (E) and R. 73ter(C), (E); see also ICfR 
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(C)-(D) and R. 73ter (C)-(D) (outlining judicial author-
ity over the introduction and examination of witnesses); Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of 
the Accused to an i:xpeditious Trial, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN 
HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD, supra note 27, at 197, 211 (noting that R. 65ter 
was adopted to codifY a practice by which "UJudges had started taking a more active 
role in trials by questioning counsel and wiLnesses, cutting off irrelevant or repetitive 
testimony and excluding witnesses whose testimony is cumulative or of no material assis-
tance with respect to disputed issues"); Mundis, supra note 288, at 374-75 (describing 
the pre-trial conference in the Krnojelac case, conducted under a previous version of 
the rules which did not authorize the Trial Chambers to set the number of witnesses, . 
and in which judge Hunt, among other things, encouraged the prosecution to reduce 
the number of witnesses; encouraged the prosecution to withdraw counts under Arti-
cle 2 of the IClY Statute because they would be too time-consuming to prove and simi-
lar counts were charged under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute; and elicited several ad-
missions from the defense that the prosecution had previously attempted to elicit 
without success) . 
311 See Brouwer, supra note 108, at 209 (explaining that French criminal law re-
gards the pre-trial and trial phases "as one continuum and has to a considerable extent 
judicialized the pre-trial phase"); Almira Rodrigues & Cecile Tournaye, Hearsay Evi-
dence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK 
MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 291, 293 (describing the non-adversarial judge's active 
participation in the search for evidence); see also supra text accompanying notes 119-
122. 
312 IClY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(A); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(A). 
After the prosecution's case closes, the Trial Chamber may enter a judgment of acquit-
tal if it finds that the evidence is insuflicient to sustain a conviction on the charges. 
IClY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98bis. The Trial 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Jelisi!: , for example , propio motu, acquitted the defendant of 
genocide at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-
95-10-T, judgement, paras. 15-16 (Dec. 14, 1999) (hereinafter jelisic, judgement]. at 
http: / / www.un.org/icty/ brcko/trialcl / judgement/jel-g991214e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
jelisic, Case No. IT-95-1 0-A, Appeal, paras. 30-40 Uuly 5, 2001) (hereinafter J elisic, Ap-
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dence and witness testimony also follows the adversarial model; the 
parties examine the witnesses they call, and opposing parties can 
cross-examine those witnesses.313 At the same time, the rules authorize 
Tribunal judges to "exercise control over the mode and order of in-
terrogating the witnesses and presenting evidence so as to make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the 
truth and avoid needless consumption of time."314 Tribunal judges 
may also order the submission of evidence; they may summon wit-
peal] (reversing Trial Chamber's acquittal), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/ 
brcko/appeal/judgement/jel-aj010705.pdf. In most cases, however, the Trial Cham-
ber acts in response to a defendant's motion. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-
30/1-T, Decision on Defence Motions for Acquittal, paras. 16, 25 (Dec. 15, 2000) (ac-
quitting defendants on charges relating to crimes committed in the Keraterm and 
Trnopolje camps) (on file with author); Prosecution v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, 
Decision on Motion for Acquittal, para. 28 (July 3, 2000) (acquitting defendant Ku-
narac of plunder and holding that defendant Vukovic had "no case to answer" in rela-
tion to charges of rape and torture), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/ 
decision-e/00703DC213246.htm; Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-
PT, Decision on Defence Motions for Judgement of Acquittal, paras. 35-36 (Apr. 6, 
2000) (holding that Kordic and Cerkez had "no case to answer" with respect to plunder 
at twelve locations but rejecting the remainder of the defendants' claims), at 
http://www. un.org/icty /kordic/ trialc/ decision-e/00406DC512861.htm. 
In Continental countries, there is no division of evidence into one or the other 
side's "case"; rather the "trial is in the nature of an official inquiry presided over by the 
judge: whatever evidence he decides to examine becomes hi:r--or, rather, the court~ 
evidence. Accordingly, there is strictly speaking no 'prosecutor's case' and there are 
no 'witnesses for the prosecution."' Dama5ka, supra note 52, at 525; see also Langbein, 
supra note 118, at 201 (observing that in Germany, "there is no occasion to think of the 
'prosecution case"'); cf van Kessel, supra note 54, at 442-43 ("[W]itnesses technically 
do not belong to the parties, but are called by the court."). 
313 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(B); 
see also IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 21 (4) (e) (granting a defendant the right to 
"examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him"); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 20(4)(e) (same). See generally Rod-
rigues & Tournaye, supra note 311, at 295-96 (observing that the "presentation of evi-
dence is more akin to the adversarial system than that in the inquisitorial system" be-
cause "[t]he parties control the evidence adduced and they can agree on the issues 
they want to debate at trial"). 
314 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90(F). This provision was added to Rule 90 in 
April 2001 seemingly in response to the suggestions of an expert group that examined 
the operation and functioning of the Tribunals. The expert group encouraged the 
judges to take more control over the examination of witnesses because it found the 
parties' examination to be "characterized by the absence of crisp, focused questions 
and by long, rambling answers tending to be ... vague, repetitive and irrelevant." 
Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the operation and Functioning of the International Criminal Tri-
bunals, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 764 (2000). 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 76 2002-2003
76 UNTVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW m<;VJEW [Vol. 151: 1 
nesses,
315 
and they may question those witnesses316-judicial tasks com-
mon in Continental countries.317 Although Tribunal judges have al-
ways had the authority to perform these functions, they have recently 
made greater use of that authority in order to expedite proceedings.m 
The Tribunals' evidentiary rules are primarily Continental in 
character in that they are few and relatively simple.3w In contrast to 
the voluminous and complicated evidentiary codes found in American 
jurisdictions, the Tribunals address the bulk of evidentiary matters in 
one rule, which provides, among other things, that a Chamber "may 
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."320 
3
" ' ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98; ICfR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98; see also 
Robinson, supra note 52, at 583-84 (noting that in 8laskic, the Trial Chamber called 
nine witnesses); Blaskic, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 56 & nn .114-19 (describ-
ing the Trial Chamber's summoning of various witnesses) . 
316 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(8); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(8) . 
317 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
318 See Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 
283 (explaining that judges ought to have a more active role in expediting proceed-
ings); Judge Navanethem Pillay, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Address to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 27, 2001) (reporting 
the consensus among Tribunal judges "that there was a need for greater control over 
the presentation of evidence by the parties"), at http:/ / www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ 
ENGLISH/ speeches/ pillay271101sc.htm. For instance, in Prosecutor v. KordiC, the 
prosecution planned to call twenty-seven rebuttal witnesses. In order to expedite the 
trial, the Trial Chamber refused to allow that many witnesses, ordering that "only 
highly probative evidence on a significant issue in response to Defence evidence and 
not merely reinforcing the Prosecution case-in-chief' would be permitted. Mundis, 
supra note 288, at 376; see alsoJelisic, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 16 (observing that 
"in long and complicated cases, such as most of those which come to the Tribunal, it is 
necessary for the Trial Chamber to exercise control over the proceedings" and further 
noting that "control may well need to be vigorous, provided of course that it does not 
encroach on the right of a party to a fair hearing"). 
The judges are also active as factfinders; in a recent ICfR trial, the judges visited 
the sites of the alleged massacres, 8agilishema,Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 10, 
and in a recent ICIY trial, the judges made plans for an on-site visit but cancelled 
them due to security concerns, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judge-
ment, para. 19 Qan. 14, 2000), at http:/ / www.un .org/icty/kupreskic/ trialc2/ 
judgement/ kup-g000114e .pdf. 
311
' See Gideon Boas, Admissibility of Evidence Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the ICTY: Development of the R.exibility Principle, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 263, 265 ("It is 
clear that the principle of 'Ia liberte de Ia preuve' understood in the French criminal 
law system, allowing the court to rule any form of evidence admissible, is to an extent 
present in the Rules and practice of the ICIY."); Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra note 
311, at 296 (explaining that "the ICIY Rules have adopted a free system of evidence, 
both with regard to admissibility and evaluation, characteristic of the civil law model") . 
320 ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89(C) ; ICfR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89(C) . 
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Hearsay is in principle admissible, and the Tribunal evaluates its ad-
missibility in the same way it does any other evidence.321 These liberal 
evidentiary rules are seen as appropriate to enable the Tribunals to 
create a historical record322 and to combat the difficulties that parties 
in the Tribunals necessarily encounter in gathering evidence.323 
As noted above, recent amendments to the rules have sought to 
shorten Tribunal trials. Following Continental procedures, defen-
dants are now permitted to make an opening statement which pre-
cedes the prosecution's presentation of evidence.324 Such statements 
can provide the prosecution with information that enables it to re-
duce the evidence presented (in the event the defendant concedes 
certain points) or to tailor its case to the defenses likely to be pre-
Rule 89 reads in full: 
(A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section, and 
shall not be bound by national rules of evidence. 
(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply 
rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter be-
fore it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general princi-
ples of law. 
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have pro-
bative value. 
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. 
(E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence ob-
tained out of court. 
(F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the in-
terests of justice allow, in written form. 
IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89. 
321 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on 
Hearsay, paras. 7, 15-19 (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Tadic, Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Hearsay] (explaining that hearsay is admissible where it is relevant and has 
probative value), reprinted in INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
JUDICIAL REPORTS 111, 115-17, U.N. Sales No. E/F.02.1II.P.2 (2002). 
322 See Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON IC1Y 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, 
at 249, 252-53 (discussing the trial record's role in preventing historical revisionism). 
323 See Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra note 311, at 296. 
324 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 84bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 84; see 
also Dama5ka, supra note 52, at 529 ("[I] n all continental systems the defendant is used 
as an evidentiary source before any other evidence has been examined at trial."); La-
hiouel, supra note 310, at 210 (observing that the procedures providing for a defen-
dant's voluntary statement "draw from the civil law inquisitorial system in which it is 
common for the accused to make whatever statement he wishes about the case"); 
Mundis, supra note 288, at 373 (explaining that Rule 84bis "has its origins in the civil 
law tradition, in which the accused is often called upon, at the outset of the trial, to 
provide the examining magistrate or prosecutor with his or her version of the events in 
question"). 
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sented.325 Further, because hearsay is admissible, the Tribunals have 
begun to rely on alternative means of presenting evidence in an effort 
to reduce the number of live witnesses.326 The Tribunals, and espe-
cially the ICTY, are increasingly relying on documentary evidence, in-
cluding transcripts from related trials,327 affidavits, depositions, and 
compilations of evidence by experts,328 and they have begun making 
greater use of judicial notice as a means of reducing the time devoted 
to establishing background facts that have already been established in 
other cases. 329 . 
325 See Damaska, supra note 52, at 529-30 ("At the beginning of the case the [Con-
tinental] prosecutor may sit back and expect that leads or [incriminating] evidence . .. 
will come out of [the defendant's] interrogation. Also, the prosecutor may hope that 
the concocted story of a guilty defendant will crumble in the light of testimony of sub-
sequent witnesses."); Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 210 n .61 {stating that time would 
have been saved in Blaskii: if the accused had made a statement at the beginning of the 
trial); Mundis, supra note 288, at 373-74 (arguing that considerable time might have 
been saved in Blaskii: had Rule 84bis been in existence) . An expert group that recently 
assessed the Tribunals' functioning recommended that the defendant be required to 
describe in general terms the nature of his defense so that if the defendant asserted a 
different theory at trial, the Trial Chamber could "draw the appropriate conclusions." 
Mundis, supra note 314, at 766-67. 
326 Previous versions of the ICIY's rules had provided that "witnesses shall, in 
principle, be heard directly by the Chambers," but that provision was deleted in De-
cember 2000. Compare IClY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90(A) , Revision 18 (amended 
July 14, 2000) , http:/ / www.un.org/ icty/ basic/ rpe/ IT32_revl8.htm#Rule 90, with IC1Y 
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90, Revision 19 (amended Dec. 1 & 13, 2000), at http: / I 
www.un.org/ icty/ basic/rpe/ IT32_rev19con.htm. The ICTR RPE still contain the pro-
vision. See ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90(A) . 
327 See IClY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 92bis(D) (authorizing the admission of a 
transcript); see also Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Decision on Prosecution's 
Application to Admit Transcripts Under Rule 92bis (May 23, 2001) (admitting transcripts 
of several witnesses but requiring cross-examination with respect to some), at http: / I 
www.un.org/icty/sikirica/ trialc/decision-e/10523AE515806.htm; Prosecutor v. Kordic & 
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/ 2-T, Decision on the Prosecution Application to Admit the 
Tulica Report and Dossier into Evidence Ouly 29, 1999) (admitting transcripts from 
the Blaskic case and documentary evidence, including photographs and video footage), 
at http:/ / www.un.org/ icty/ kordic/ trialc/ decision-e/ 90729EV58864.htm; Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/ 1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibil-
ity of Evidence, paras. 14-21 (Feb. 16, 1999) (affirming the Trial Chamber's decision to 
admit the transcript and video-recording of a witness's testimony in the Blaskic case) , 
reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, 
245-47 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 1999) [hereinafter 3 ANNOTATED LEADING 
CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS]. 
328 See IClY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 92bis(A) {authorizing the admission of a 
written statement of a witness in lieu of oral testimony under certain conditions); see 
also Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 209 (discussing the use of exhibits, affidavits, and 
depositions); May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 256-61. 
329 See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30-1, Decision on judicial Notice Oune 
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3. Sentencing 
The Tribunals are limited in their selection of penalties to terms 
of imprisonment; they cannot impose fines or issue death sentences.sso 
In determining the length of the imprisonment, the Tribunals' Stat-
utes and rules instruct them to take into account various factors, in-
cluding the gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances of 
the defendant,m the general practice regarding prison sentences in 
the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (for the IC1Y and 
ICTR, respectively) as well as any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances.m That is the extent of the guidance provided to-or the con-
straints imposed upon-the Trial Chambers. The Tribunals' Statutes 
and rules delineate no aggravating circumstances and only one miti-
gating circumstance: "substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by 
the convicted person before or after conviction."s3s Further, the Stat-
utes and the rules do not provide any guidance as to the comparative 
"gravity" of the various offenses within the Tribunals' jurisdiction; nor 
do they indicate which "individual circumstances" might be relevant 
to sentencing or how they might be relevant. 
8, 2000) (taking judicial notice of facts contained in a previous judgment), at 
http: / / www.un.org/ icty/ kvocka/ trialc/ decision-e/ 00608AFII2963.htm; Prosecutor v. 
Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Pre-Trial Motion by the Prosecution Re-
questing the Trial Chamber to Take Judicial Notice of the International Character of 
the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mar. 25, 1999) (refusing to take judicial notice of 
the international character of the armed conflict but taking judicial notice of Bosnia-
Herzegovina's proclamation of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia on March 6, 1992 and of the subsequent recognition of the new State by the 
European Community and the United States), at http: / / www.un.org/icty/simic/ 
trialc3/decision-e/90325PT56373.htm; Lahiouel, supra note 310; at 210 n.60 (observ-
ing that the Trial Chamber in Kvoeka took judicial notice of facts in previous cases 
which relieved the Prosecutor of proving those items). 
330 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, a t art. 
23(1). The Tribunals can impose terms up to and including the remainder of the 
convicted person's life. ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (A) ; ICTR RPE, supra note 
264, at R. 101 (A); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing 
Judgement, para. 25 (Nov. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judge-
ment] (noting that death sentences are not available in sentencing) , reJninted in INT'L 
CRJM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSlAVIA, JUDICIAL REPORTS, supra note 321, at 
1593. The Tribunals can, however, . "order the return of any property and proceeds 
acquired by criminal conduct, including duress, to their rightful owners." ICTY Stat-
ute, supra note 252, at art. 24(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 23(3). 
331 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 24(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
23(2) . 
332 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (B) (i)-(iii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, a t R. 
101(B)(i)-(iii) . 
333 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (B) (ii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 
101(B)(ii) . 
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The Trial Chambers consequently have broad discretion in sen-
tencing, discretion that they have not, through their case law, at-
tempted to limit in any significant way. In Furundiija, the Appeals 
Chamber denied a prosecution request to delineate sentencing guide-
lines on the ground that it would be "inappropriate to establish a de-
finitive list of sentencing guidelines for future reference, when only 
certain matters relating to sentencing are at issue before it now."334 
With respect to the gravity of the offense, an IC1Y Trial Chamber in 
Tadii: attempted to impose some structure on the sentencing process 
by holding that, all things being equal, a punishable offense, if 
charged and proven as a crime against humanity, is more serious and 
should ordinarily entail a heavier penalty than if it were proceeded 
upon as a war crime.335 However, the Appeals Chamber rejected this 
hierarchy, holding that in law there is "no distinction between the se-
riousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime."336 Fi-
334 Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17 /1-A, Judgement, para. 238 Quly 21, 
2000), at http://www. un.org/icty /furundzija/ appeal/judgement/ fur-aj000721e. pdf. 
335 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgement, para. 73 Quly 
14, 1997) [hereinafter Tadic, Sentencing Judgement], reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED 
LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 498; see also 
Erdemovic, Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at paras. 
20-26. 
336 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgement in Sentenc-
ing Appeals, para. 69 Qan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Tadic, Appeals Sentencing Judge-
ment], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-asj000126e.pdf; see 
also Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17 /1-A, Judgement, paras. 240-43 Quly 21, 
2000) [hereinafter FurundZija, Judgement] (echoing the Tadii: Appeals Sentencing 
Judgement); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3,Judgement and Sentence, 
para. 449 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Rutaganda,Judgement and Sentence] ("Whereas 
in most national systems [penalties track] the gravity of the offence, [the ICTR] Statute 
does not rank the various crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal . . . . In 
theory, the sentences are the same for each of the three crimes, namely a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment."), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 709, 781. In two recent cases, 
however, ICTY Trial Chambers indicated that defendants convicted of persecution as a 
crime against humanity deserve a more severe penalty than defendants convicted of 
other crimes against humanity, because persecution, unlike other crimes against hu-
manity, requires a showing of discriminatory intent. Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. 
IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgement, paras. 32, 113 Quly 31, 2001) [hereinafter To-
dorovic, Sentencing Judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/todorovic/judgement/ 
tod-g010731e.pdf; Blaskic,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 785. Further, an ICTR 
Trial Chamber stated that violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol II thereto are "lesser crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity." 
Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 14. The ICTR has not ex-
pressly ranked genocide and crimes against humanity, id., but it has, at times, called 
genocide "the crime of crimes," Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21, at para. 8; Prosecu-
tor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 15 (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 
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nally, although the Chambers must consider the general sentencing 
practices of the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they 
have held themselves not to be bound by those practices.337 
In some cases, the Trial Chambers provide a detailed discussion of 
various sentencing objectives,338 but these considerations rarely seem 
to play any significant role in the ultimate sentence imposed. The 
Chambers have also delineated various aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, but their treatment of these factors has not always been 
consistent or cogent. For instance, the ICTR has repeatedly treated as 
an aggravating circumstance the fact that the offenses for which the 
defendant stands convicted are "extremely serious."339 The ICTR has 
Serushago, Sentence], reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 823, 826, suggesting that it may be the most seri-
ous of the crimes falling within the ICTR's jurisdiction. Such distinctions are of less 
import in the ICTR, however, because the Chambers have repeatedly held that a geno-
cide took place in Rwanda during the period over which the ICTR has jurisdiction, see, 
e.g., Akayesu,Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 129; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. 
ICTR-96-l3,Judgement and Sentence, para. 931 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema, 
Judgement and Sentence], at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/ 
Musema/judgement/6.htm; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-
1-T,Judgement, para. 528 (May 21, 1999), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 555, 657, and all of the ICTR 
defendants convicted thus far have been convicted of genocide, either alone, or in 
combination with crimes against humanity. 
337 See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, judgement, para. 813 (Feb. 20, 
2001) [hereinafter Delalic, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/ 
judgement/ cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons 
for judgement, para. 30 (Apr. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Serushago, Appeal] (observing 
that the Trial Chamber is obliged only to take account of the sentencing practices in 
Rwanda), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ cases/serushago/ decisions/ 
app20000406.htm; Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 23 (de-
termining that the sentence applicable in Rwanda "is but one of the factors to take into 
account in determining sentences"). 
338 See, e.g., Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 28-30 (dis-
cussing general considerations for sentencing); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-
96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T,judgement, paras. 836-44 (Feb. 22, 2001) (describing general 
sentencing factors), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-g010 
222e.pdf; Blaskic,Judgement, supra note 275, at paras. 761-64 (explaining the purposes 
served by the defendant's sentence); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Judgement, paras. 1230-34 (Nov. 16, 1998) (considering sentencing objectives), re-
printed in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 327, at 363, 629-30. 
339 Rutaganda, judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 468; Musema, 
judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 1001. In Ruggiu, an ICTR Trial 
Chamber made the cryptic and not very helpful remark that "[g]enocide and crimes 
against humanity are inherently aggravating offences because they are heinous in na-
ture and shock the collective conscience of mankind." Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. 
ICTR-97-32-1, judgement and Sentence, para. 48 (June I, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu, 
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also deemed aggravating other facts that would seem incorporated in 
the crimes themselves.340 Equally inappropriately, the IC1Y has ·con-
sidered a defendant's failure to cooperate with the prosecution an ag-
gravating circumstance341 even though a defendant is under no obliga-
tion to cooperate. The Tribunals have done a bit better at identifying 
relevant mitigating circumstances, but their application has not always 
been consistent. For instance, some Trial Chambers have considered 
as mitigating the fact that the defendant has no prior convictions342 or 
has young children,343 while others have noted that many, if not most, 
Judgement and . Sentence], at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/ 
Rug§iu/judgement/ rugOl 0600.htm. 
4
° For instance, in Musema, after the Trial Chamber held the defendant criminally 
responsible under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute as the superior of certain employ-
ees who committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because the defen-
dant "failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission" 
of those crimes, Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 889-926, 
the Trial Chamber went on to consider as an aggravating factor the fact that "Musema 
did nothing to prevent the commission of the crimes and that he took no steps to pun-
ish the perpetrators over whom he had control," id. at para. 1004. See also id. at para. 
1002 (considering as an aggravating factor the fact that Musema "took no steps to pre-
vent tea factory employees or vehicles from taking part in the attacks"). In Kayishema, 
the T1ial Chamber considered as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the defen-
dants "voluntarily committed and participated in the offences," Prosecutor v. Kay-
ishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,Judgement, at Sentence para. 13 (May 21, 1999) [here-
inafter Kayishema, Judgement]. reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 555. One would expect volun-
tary commission to be the norm and that any showing of involuntariness would consti-
tute a mitigating factor. See Erdemovic,Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, 
supra note 292, at paras. 81, 88 (holding that duress is not a complete defense for charges 
of crimes against humanity or war crimes which involve the killing of innocent people 
but that it can be used in mitigation of punishment). 
Although it is inappropriate to consider these facts aggravating circumstances, one 
must sympathize with the ICTR Trial Chambers in that they are directed to consider 
aggravating circumstances for crimes, like genocide, that are so heinous that it is diffi-
cult to envisage their aggravation. In Erdemovic, an ICIY Trial Chamber took a more 
sensible approach, holding that "when crimes against humanity are involved, the issue 
of the existence of any aggravating circumstances does not warrant consideration." Er-
demovic, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330, at para. 45. 
341 Blaskic,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 774 ("[The] Trial Chambers have, 
on several occasions, ruled that failure to co-operate constitutes an aggravating circum-
stance."). 
342 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 59-60; Jelisic, 
Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 124; Aleksovski, Judgement, supra note 275, at 
para. 236; Prosecutor v. Furundfija, Case No. IT-95-17 /1-T, Judgement, para. 284 (Dec. 
10, 1998) [hereinafter Furundfija,Judgement], reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 327, at 685; Akayesu, Sentence, su-
pra note 21. 
343 SeeProsecutorv. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, SentencingJudgement, para. 
16(i) (Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Erdemovic, Second Sentencing Judgement] (listing 
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persons convicted of international crimes will be in similar circum-
stances so that little weight can be accorded to such considerations.~44 
In addition, while both Tribunals appear to consider the young age of 
a defendant as a mitigating circumstance, there is no consensus re-
garding the definition of "young": the IC1Y considers defendants 
aged nineteen to twenty-three to be young, while the ICTR appears to 
define youth in the thirty-two to thirty-seven-year-old range.~45 
The one mitigating circumstance that the rules expressly identify-
"substantial cooperation with the prosecutor by the convicted person 
before or after conviction"~46-is most often invoked in cases in which 
the defendant has pled guilty. The Tribunals have considered a de-
fendant to have substantially cooperated with the Prosecutor347 when 
the fact that the defendant has a three-year-old child under "mitigating factorsfl) , re-
fninted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 276, at 685. 
344 See FurundZija,Judgement, supra note 342, at para. 284 (refusing to give "signifi-
cant weight" to "the fact that the accused has no previous convictions and is the father of 
a young child" because these same factors apply to many defendants) ;Jelisic,Judgement, 
supra note 312, at para. 124 (referring to the Trial Chamber's admonition in Fu-
rundiija, that such considerations cannot be given too much weight). The Yugoslavian 
Tribunal rejected the notion that the Trial Chamber should consider the goal of inca-
pacitation as a general sentencing factor on the basis that 
[i]n many, if not most cases before the International Tribunal, the convicted 
persons would have no record of previous criminal conduct relevant to those 
committed during the armed conflict. In practically all cases before the Interna-
tional Tribunal, the convicted persons would be first time offenders in relation 
to international crimes. 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, judgement, para. 843 
(Feb. 22, 2001), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-g010222e 
.pdf. 
345 Blaskic,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 778 (summarizing ICTY and ICTR 
sentencing decisions). Interestingly, in Krnojelac, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that it 
"had regard in sentencing" to the fact that the defendant was, at the time of sentenc-
ing, sixty-two years old, but it did not explicitly pronounce that fact to be a mitigating 
circumstance. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25,Judgement, para. 533 (Mar. 
15, 2002) [hereinafter Krnojelac, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/ 
trialc2/judgement/krn-g020315e.pdf. Other mitigating circumstances include a de-
fendant's voluntary surrender, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
23/1-T, Judgement, para. 868 (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Kunarac, judgement], at 
http://www. un.org/icty /foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-g01 0222e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T,Judgement, paras. 843, 850, 853 (Jan. 14, 2000) [herein-
after Kupreskic, judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/ 
kup-g000114e.pdf; Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 34, and poor health, 
Krstic,judgement, supra note 250, at para. 716. 
~46 E.g., ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (B)(ii). 
347 The Appeals Chamber has held that it is for the Tribunal, not the Prosecutor, 
to decide whether the defendant has provided the Prosecutor substantial cooperation. 
SeeJelisic, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 126 (explaining the responsibility of the 
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he has testified for the prosecution in other trials or has promised to 
do so,348 and even when he has admitted certain facts at trial. 349 In one 
case, a defendant's substantial cooperation after his conviction pro-
vided grounds for the Appeals Chamber to reduce his sentence on 
appeal.350 While one might consider that a guilty plea, in and of itself, 
constitutes substantial cooperation with the prosecution, the Cham-
bers have typically treated it as an independent mitigating factor. 351 
Similarly, they have considered expressions of remorse, which also are 
most likely to appear in cases in which the defendants have pled 
guilty, to be an independent mitigating circumstance.352 
The Tribunals' Trial Chambers have acquitted three defendants353 
Trial Chamber to determine "whether the cooperation should be considered substan-
tial and therefore whether it constitutes a mitigating factor"). 
348 See Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, sufJTa note 336, at para. 84 (taking note 
of defendant's plea agreement, in which the defendant agreed to assist prosecutors in 
ongoing and future investigations); Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 31-
33 (terming the defendant's cooperation "substantial and ongoing" and pointing out 
that defendant had agreed to testify in other pending trials); Kambanda, Judgement 
and Sentence, supra note 1, at paras. 46-47 (relying on Prosecutor's confirmation of 
defendant's "substantial co-operation," both by providing information to prosecutors 
and agreeing to testify in future trials); Erdemovic, Second Sentencing Judgement, su-
pra note 343, at para. 16(iv) (noting that the defendant's testimony provided investiga-
tors with new information). 
349 See Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 1007 (finding 
that these admissions "facilitated an expeditious trial") . 
350 Prosecution v. Kuprdkic, Case No. IT-95-l&.A, Appeal Judgement, paras. 461-
463 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Kuprdkic, Appeal Judgement], at http://www. 
un.or~/icty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/kup-aj011023e.pdf. 
35 See Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 74-88 (setting 
out four mitigating factors: "[t]he accused's guilty plea, his substantial cooperation 
with the [p]rosecution, his expressed remorse for his crime, and the question of his 
diminished mental capacity"); Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at 
paras. 53-58 (looking first at the defendant's level of remorse, as expressed through his 
guilty plea, and then at his cooperation with the Prosecutor as an independent mitigat-
ing circumstance) ; Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 31-35 (dealing with 
the cooperation factor separately from the guilty plea factor); Kambanda,Judgement 
and Sentence, supra note 1, at paras. 46, 61 (assessing defense counsel's claims of co-
operation and "plea of guilty" as "[separate] factors in mitigation"); Erdemovic, Sec-
ond Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 16 (enumerating four mitigating 
factors and dealing separately with defendant's cooperation and his admission of 
guilt). 
352 See, e.g., Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 52-80; Er-
demovic, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 16(iii); see also Akay-
esu, Sentence, supra note 21, at paras. 31-32. 
353 See Bagilishema,Judgement, supra note 279 (acquitting Ignace Bagilishema); Ku-
pre5kic, Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 769 (acquitting Dragan Papic) ; Delalic, 
Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 721 , 1285 (acquitting Zejnil Delalic) . 
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and convicted thirty-eight,354 nine of whom pled guilty.355 The Trial 
Chambers have sentenced the thirty-eight convicted to terms of im-
prisonment ranging from two-and-one-half years' to life imprison-
ment.356 The Appeals Chamber has also been heavily involved in sen-
354 For a list-of these cases, see infra note 356. 355 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Sentencing Judgement, paras. I7-39 
(Nov. I3, 200I) [hereinafter Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/ 
icty /sikirica/judgement/sik-tsj011113e.pdf; Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, sujJTa 
note 336, at para. 17; Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. I 0; 
Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 11; Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at 
para. 6; Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note I, at para. 5; Erdemovic, Sec-
ond Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 5. 
356 An IC1Y Trial Chamber imposed the two-and-one-half-year sentence on Zlatko 
Aleksovski, see AJeksovski, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 244, and ICTR Trial 
Chambers have sentenced five defendants to life imprisonment for genocide and 
crimes against humanity, see Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336 (sen-
tencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide and for extermination and rape 
as crimes against humanity), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/ 
Musema/judgement/8.htm; Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at 
785 (sentencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide and for extermination 
and murder as crimes against humanity); Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21, at 817 
(sentencing Akayesu to life imprisonment for genocide, incitement to commit geno-
cide, and extermination as a crime against humanity); Kambanda,Judgement and Sen-
tence, supra note I, at 807 (sentencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide); 
Kayishema, Judgement, supra note 340, at para. 32 (sentencing Kayishema to life im-
prisonment for genocide). 
In between those extremes, IC1Y Trial Chambers sentenced Milorad Krnojelac to 
seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment for persecution and inhumane acts as crimes 
against humanity and cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and customs of war, 
Krnojelac,Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 536, sentenced Stevan Todorovic to ten 
years' imprisonment for persecution as a crime against humanity, Todorovic, Sentenc-
ing Judgement, supra note 336, at para. 115, sentenced Dl!Sko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, 
and Dragan KolundZija to fifteen years', five years', and three years' imprisonment, re-
spectively, for persecution as a crime against humanity, Sikirica, Sentencing Judge-
ment, supra note 355, at para. 245, sentenced Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado 
Radic, Zoran Zigic, and Dragoljub Prcac to seven years', six years', twenty years', twenty-
five years', and five years' imprisonment, respectively, for persecution as a crime 
against humanity and murder, torture, and cruel treatment, Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case 
No. IT-98-30/1-T,Judgement, paras. 754, 757, 760, 763, 766 (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Kvocka, Judgement], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/judgement/ 
kvo-g011002e.pdf, sentenced Radislav Krstic to forty-six years' imprisonment for geno-
cide, Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at para. 727, sentenced Dario Kordic and 
Mario Cerkez to twenty-five years' and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, for 
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of 
the laws and customs of war, Kordic, Judgement, supra note 275, at 310, sentenced 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic to twenty-eight years', twenty 
years' and twelve years' imprisonment, respectively, for crimes against humanity and 
violations of the laws and customs of war, Kunarac, Judgement, supra note 345, at 
paras. 885, 887, 890, sentenced Tihomir Blaskic to forty-five years' imprisonment for 
persecution as a crime against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war, 
Blaskic, Judgement, supra note 275, at 270, sentenced Zoran Kupreskic, Miijan Ku-
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tencing, hearing appeals to virtually every sentence that the Trial 
Chambers have issued. The Appeals Chamber has held that it will not 
substitute its sentence for that of a Trial Chamber unless it believes 
that the Trial Chamber has committed a discernible error in exercis-
ing its discretion or has failed to follow applicable law.357 Despite that 
deferential-sounding standard of review, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
has revised four of the six sentences on which it has passed judgment, 
increasing the sentences in two of the cases and decreasing them in 
the other two.358 One notable fact about all the sentences, whether 
preskic, and Vlatko Kuprdkic to ten years', eight years', and six years' imprisonment, 
respectively, for persecution as a crime against humanity, and it sentenced Vladimir San-
tic and Drago Josipovic to twenty-five years' and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, 
for murder as a crime against humanity, Kupreskic,Judgement, supra note 345, at 324-27, 
sentenced Go ran Jelisic to forty years' imprisonment for crimes against humanity and 
violations of the laws and customs of war, Jelisic, Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 
139, sentenced Dusko Tadic to twenty-five years' imprisonment for murder as a crime 
against humanity, Tadic, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 335, at para. 32, sentenced 
Anto Furundzija to ten years' imprisonment for torture as a violation of the laws and 
customs of war, Furundzija, Judgement, supra note 342, at 748, sentenced Hazim Delic, 
Esad Landzo, and Zdravko Mucic to twenty years', fifteen years', and seven years' impris-
onment, respectively, for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 
laws and customs of war, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, para. 
1285 (Nov. 16, 1998), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 339, at 640-45, and sentenced Drazen Erdemovic to 
five years' imprisonment for violations of the laws and customs of war, Erdemovic, Sec-
ond Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at 670. The ICTR sentenced Georges 
Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment for persecution as a crime against humanity and 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, 
supra note 339, at Verdict, sentenced Obed Ruzindana to twenty-five years' imprison-
ment for genocide, Kayishema,Judgement, supra note 340, at para. 32, and sentenced 
Omar Serushago to fifteen years' imprisonment for genocide and crimes against hu-
mani~, Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at 833-34. 
35 Delalic,Judgement, supra note 337, at para. 725. 
358 See id. at paras. 851, 853 (holding that in sentencing Mucic to seven years' im-
prisonment, the Trial Chamber "did not have sufficient regard to the gravity of the of-
fences committed by Mucic in exercising its sentencing discretion, and as a result it 
imposed a sentence which did not adequately reflect the totality of Mucic's criminal 
conduct," and suggesting that a sentence of approximately ten years' imprisonment 
would be more appropriate); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,Judge-
ment, paras. 186, 191 (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement] 
(increasing defendant's sentence from two-and-one-half years' imprisonment to seven 
years' imprisonment), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgement/ale-
asj000324e.pdf; Tadic, Appeals Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 55-58 
(reducing defendant's sentence from twenty-five years' imprisonment to twenty years' 
imprisonment). 
In Delalit:, Aleksovski, and Tadit:, the Appeals Chamber effectively reversed the Trial 
Chambers' sentencing analysis; by contrast, in Kupreskit:, the Appeals Chamber re-
versed certain of the Trial Chambers' factual findings that were relevant to the sen-
tences the Trial Chamber had imposed, and primarily for that reason the Appeals 
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imposed by a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, is that they 
have never exceeded the sentence recommended by the prosecu-
tion.359 
Chamber reduced the defendants' sentences. Kupreskic, Appeal judgement, supra 
note 350, at paras. 438, 465. 359 In the first round of sentencing in Erdemovii:, the prosecution recommended a 
sentence not exceeding ten years, Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 
330, at text accompanying n.140, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovic to ten 
years' imprisonment, id. at text accompanying n.l41. In the second round of sentenc-
ing, the parties agreed in a plea agreement "that seven years' imprisonment would be 
an appropriate sentence," Erdemovic, Second Sentencing judgement, supra note 343, 
at para. 18, but the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovic to five years' imprisonment, 
id. at para. 23. 
In the initial Tadii: sentencing judgment, the prosecution asked for a sentence of 
life imprisonment, Tactic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 335, at para. 5, and the 
Trial Chamber sentenced Tactic to twenty years' imprisonment, id. at para. 74. In the 
second round of sentencing, following an appeal in which Tactic was convicted of addi-
tional counts, the prosecution asked for a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment for 
the additional counts to be served in addition to the original twenty-year sentence. 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing judgement, para. 4 (Nov. 11, 
1999), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tsojrob991 111e.pdf. 
The Trial Chamber imposed a total sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. !d. at 
para. 32. 
The prosecution in Aleksovski asked the Trial Chamber to impose a ten year sen-
tence, Aleksovski, judgement, supra note 275, at para. 232, and it imposed a sentence 
of two-and-one-half years, id. at para. 244. On appeal, the prosecution asked for a sen-
tence of not less than seven years, Aleksovski, Appeals judgement, supra note 358, at 
para. 179, and the Appeals Chamber sentenced Aleksovski to seven years' imprison-
ment, id. at para. 191. 
The prosecution in Kordic submitted "that a sentence of life imprisonment for 
both accused is appropriate in this case, with a recommendation that Kordic serve a 
minimum of 30 years and Cerkez a minimum of 25 years." Kordic, judgement, supra 
note 275, at para. 844. The Trial Chamber sentenced Kordic to twenty-five years' im-
prisonment and Cerkez to ftfteen years' imprisonment. !d. at paras. 854, 856. In Krstic, 
the prosecution recommended that General Krstic receive consecutive life sentences 
for each of his convictions. Krstic, judgement, supra note 250, at para. 690. The Trial 
Chamber sentenced Krstic to forty-six years' imprisonment. !d. at para. 726. 
In jelisii:, the prosecution asked for a sentence of life imprisonment, Jelisic, 
judgement, supra note 312, at para. 119, and the Trial Chamber sentencedjelisic to 
forty years' imprisonment, id. at para. 139. In TodoroviC, the parties entered into a plea 
agreement prohibiting the prosecution from recommending a sentence in excess of 
twelve years' imprisonment. Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 
11. The prosecution recommended a sentence of twelve years' imprisonment, id., at 
para. 22, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Todorovic to ten years' imprisonment, id. 
at para. 115. 
In Sikirica, the parties entered into plea agreements in which the prosecution 
agreed not to recommend sentences exceeding seventeen years', seven years', and five 
years' imprisonment for Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundfija, respectively. Sikirica, Sen-
tencing judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recom-
mended the maximum sentences for each defendant, id. at para. 42, and the Trial 
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4. Appeals 
Tribunal defendants can appeal their convictions,360 and, as m 
C . tal . th . al I 361 I many ontmen countnes, e prosecution can so appea . n 
Chamber sentenced Sikirica, Dosen, and KolundZija to fifteen years', five years', and 
three years' imprisonment, respectively, id. at para. 245. 
In Kvoi:ka, the prosecution recommended sentences of life imprisonment for 
Radicand Zigic, Kvocka,Judgement, supra note 356, at para. 695, and the Trial Cham-
ber sentenced them to twenty- and twenty-five year terms of imprisonment, respec-
tively, id. at paras. 745, 750. In that same case, the prosecution recommended that Kos 
be sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment and that Kvocka and Prcac each be 
sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Id. at para. 695. The Trial Chamber sen-
tenced Kos to six years' imprisonment, id. at para. 735, Kvocka to seven years' impris-
onment, id. at para. 718, and Prcac to five years' imprisonment, id. at para. 726. 
In Musema, Rutaganda, and Kambanda, the prosecution recommended sentences 
of life imprisonment, and those are the sentences that the Trial Chambers imposed. 
Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 994; Rutaganda, Judge-
ment and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 464; Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, 
supra note 1, at para. 60. 
In Akayesu, the prosecution recommended a series of sentences, ranging from fif-
teen years' to life imprisonment, for the nine crimes of which Akayesu was convicted, 
and the Trial Chamber imposed life imprisonment for several of the crimes for which 
the prosecution sought it and, for the remainder, shorter terms of imprisonment than 
the prosecution had recommended. Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21. In Kayishema, 
the prosecution sought life sentences for both defendants, Kayishema, Judgement, su-
pra note 340, at Sentence para. 25, and the Trial Chamber imposed a life sentence on 
Kayishema and a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment on Ruzindana, id. at Sen-
tence paras. 27-28. In Ruggiu, the prosecution asked that a twenty year term of impris-
onment be imposed, Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 81, 
and the Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment, id. at Verdict. 
In Kunarac and Kupreskii:, the Trial Chamber indicated that the prosecution sub-
mitted sentencing recommendations, but it did not state what those recommendations 
were. Kunarac, Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 824; Kupreskic, Judgement, supra 
note 345, at para. 835. In Furundiija, the Trial Chamber noted that the prosecution had 
not made a "specific recommendation for the length of sentence." FurundZija, Judge-
ment, supra note 342, at para. 279. 
In Bla5kii:, Delalii:, and Serushago, the Trial Chambers gave no indication that the 
prosecution had made sentencing recommendations. Delalii: came before the Trial 
Chamber for a re-sentencing following an appeal, and at that time the prosecution 
sought a ten year sentence for Mucic. Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21-Tbi.r 
Rll7, SentencingJudgement, para. 23 (Oct. 9, 2001) (on file with author). The Trial 
Chamber sentenced Mucic to nine years' imprisonment. !d. at para. 27. 
360 IC1Y Statute, supra note 252, at art. 25 (1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
24(1). 
361 IClY Statute, sujJra note 252, at art. 25(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 
24(1). Appeals must allege "a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; 
or b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice." !d. Prosecutors 
can appeal acquittals in most Continental countries. See, e.g., Dannecker & Roberts, 
supra note 120, at 442-43 (summarizing German criminal appellate procedure); Rich-
ardS. Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1, 36 (Gerald 
L. Kock & RichardS. Frase trans., 1988); Swart, sujrra note 114, at 314 (describing ap-
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 89 2002-2003
2002] PU'A BARGAINING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 89 
virtually all Tribunal cases to date, one or both of the parties have 
taken advantage of this right.362 Indeed, so many appeals were filed363 
that changes had to be made. Specifically, the Tribunals recently 
added two judges to the Appeals Chamber364 and amended their rules 
to restrict interlocutory appeals.365 Appeals are attractive to both par-
ties because of their likelihood for success. The Appeals Chamber, 
particularly of the IC1Y, regularly reverses Trial Chamber decisions. 
In only one of seven IC1Y appeals did the Appeals Chamber affirm 
the Trial Chamber's judgment in all respects.366 
IV. PLEA BARGAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
Parts I and II analyzed plea bargaining's functional and ideologi-
cal role in various domestic jurisdictions, while Part III described the 
Tribunals' structure and procedural system. Parts I through III, then, 
lay the necessary foundation for this Part's examination of plea bar-
gaining in the Tribunals. Section A will apply the functional, ideo-
logical, and structural frameworks developed with respect to domestic 
criminal justice systems to the international tribunals. In doing so, it 
pellate procedures in The Netherlands); Van den Wyngaert, sufrra note 114, at 47 (de-
scribing appellate procedures in Belgium); Weigend, sufrra note 127, at 201 (describ-
ing aepellate procedures in Germany). 
~2 For instance, the only ICIY defendants who failed to appeal were precluded 
from doing so; they had entered into plea agreements with the prosecution wherein 
both parties agreed not to appeal any sentences that fell within the range that they had 
agreed upon, and they were sentenced within that range. Todorovic, Sentencing 
Judgement, sufrra note 336, at paras. 11, 115; Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, sufrra 
note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37, 235, 239, 243. As for the ICTR, seven of nine convicted 
defendants have appealed. ICTR 2001 Annual Report, sufrra note 263, at para. 34. 
363 See McDonald, sufrra note 281, at 162 ("By March 2000 ... the appellate judges 
had a docket of over forty ICTY and ICTR matters. . . . While this figure represents a 
normal, or even light workload for a national court, it swamped the Tribunal."). 
364 ICTR 2001 Annual Report, sufrra note 263, at para. 46; Press Release, ICTR, The 
Security Council Enlarges the Appeals Chamber (Dec. 5, 2000), http: / / www.ictr.org/ 
wwwroot/ENGLISH/ PRESSREL/ 2000/ 253.htm. 
365 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at para. 207, U.N. Doc. A/ 56/ 1 (2001). Further, to manage appel-
late proceedings, the ICIY has appointed pre-appeals judges in a number of cases. See 
Prosecutor v. Bla.Skic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision on Appellant's Request for an Ex-
tension of Time and Authorization to Exceed the Page Limit on his Reply to the 
Prosecutor's Response to Appellant's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence on Appeal 
Pursuant to Rule 115 (Apr. 20, 2001) (referring to June 8, 2000 order appointing pre-
appeals judge); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-9&.21-A, Order Appointing a Pre-
Appeal Judge (Oct. 12, 1999), described in ICIY Judicial Supplement, No. 8 (Nov. 15, 
1999), at 3. 
366 Furund:Zija,Judgement, sufrra note 336, at Disposition . 
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will set forth certain hypotheses concerning the importance of plea 
bargaining and the role that it is apt to play in the international tribu-
nals. Section B will test those hypotheses against Tribunal practice to 
date by describing the IC1Y and ICTR cases that have been resolved 
by guilty plea. Section C summarizes the evolution that plea bargain-
ing has undergone in the Tribunals and explains the particular forms 
of plea bargaining that have emerged as products of the Tribunals' 
unique structural and ideological features. 
A. Plea Bargaining in Comparative Perspective 
1. The Tribunals' Functional Need for Plea Bargaining 
Part I developed the correlation in the domestic setting between 
time-consuming, complex procedures and the use of plea bargaining. 
As a result of a variety of factors that do not arise in the domestic set-
ting, Tribunal trials are exceptionally lengthy, costly, and complicated; 
thus, plea bargaining has the potential to play a vital functional role in 
the administration of international criminal justice in the Tribunals. 
The average IC1Y pre-trial period lasts a little over ten months, 
and the average IC1Y trial takes a little over a year.367 The IC1Y's first 
trial, Tadi/:, was relatively short, lasting only 6 months and featuring 
126 witnesses, 461 exhibits, and a 7015-page transcript.368 The IC1Y's 
Kordi/: trial was more. typical, however, lasting 20 months and featuring 
241 witnesses, 4665 exhibits, and a transcript of more than 28,000 
pages.369 Fewer witnesses typically appear at ICTR trials,370 but the tri-
367 Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via Presented by fudge Claude Jorda on Behalf of the judges of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/382-S/2000/865 (2000) [hereinafter Jorda Report], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/ 
pressreal/RAP000620e.htm. 
368 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, paras. 27-34 
(May 7, 1997), reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 299-301; May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250. 
369 Kordic, Judgement, sujJTa note 275, at para. 3. The Blaskic trial lasted more 
than two years and featured 158 witnesses and more than 1300 exhibits. Blaskic, 
Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 19. The Celebii:i trial covered a period of nineteen 
months and featured over 1500 exhibits and a transcript of more than 16,000 pages. 
Delalic, Judgement, supra note 337, at para. 33. The Kupreskii: trial featured 157 wit-
nesses and 700 exhibits. Prosecutor v. Kupre8kic, sujJTa note 318, at para. 29; see also 
May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250 (reporting the number of witnesses and exhibits 
and stating that such figures "led President McDonald to say that 'these are not trials 
involving ordinary crimes"'). 
370 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 24 (reporting that 41 wit-
nesses were heard and 155 exhibits introduced); see also RejJort of the International Crimi-
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als themselves can take just as long to complete.371 The lengthy peri-
ods during which defendants have been held in pre-trial detention 
have led some to question whether the Tribunals are observing the 
defendants' right to an expeditious trial. 372 Defendants have been de-
nal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of R:wanda and R:wandan Citi-
zens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neigh-
bouring States Between 1 january and 31 December 1994, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 53, at 
paras. 145-46, U.N. Doc. A/55/435-5/2000/927 (2000) [hereinafter ICTR 2000 Annual 
Report] (noting that thirty witnesses appeared in Musema and that thirty-three witnesses 
appeared in Bagilishema). 
371 One of the ICTR's first trials, Akayesu, was tried in sixty days of hearings that fell 
within a nearly fifteen-month period. Akayesu,Judgement, supra note 279, at paras. 9-
28; see also ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at paras. 145-46 (noting that the 
Musema trial lasted five months and that the Bagilishema trial lasted eleven months). 
372 See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with 
the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L LJ. 163, 184, 193 (2000) (remarking that 
"[e]arly procedural errors and delays may be leading to due process violations"); La-
hiouel, supra note 310, at 197; see also Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72, Decision, para. 106 (Nov. 3, 1999) (dismissing charges against defendant andre-
leasing him due to pre-indictment delay), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 169; ICTR 2000 Annual Report, m-
pra note 370, at annex III, para. 8 (noting that several defendants in the Butare cases have 
been detained for more than three years before trial). 
These delays occur despite the fact that various treaties protect the right to be tried 
without unreasonable delay. E.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, art. 7(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entitling any person detained "to trial within a 
reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceed-
ings"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9(3), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (providing that "[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge ... shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release"); European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226 (providing that "[e]veryone arrested or de-
tained ... shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to relea~e pending trial") .. 
Recently, however, the IC1Y has begun making greater use of provisional release 
to reduce pre-trial detention. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Deci-
sion on Milan Simic's Application for Provisional Release (May 29, 2000) (granting de-
fendant's motion for provisional release), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/ 
decision-e/00529PR512846.htm; judge Releases Bosnian Serb from Custody, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., Aug. 30, 2001, at 5 (reporting on the provisional release ofBiljana Plavsic); Press 
Release, IC1Y, Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Alagic and Amir Kubura Granted Pro-
visional Release (Dec. 13, 2001) (announcing the provisional release of three defen-
dants justified by, among other things, the fact that they voluntarily surrendered to the 
Tribunal), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p649-e.htm. At their outsets, the Tri-
bunals' RPE provided that "[r]elease may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only in ex-
ceptional circumstances," a requirement that has since been eliminated. Compare 
IC1Y, R.P. & EVID. 65(B) (as amended july 2, 1999), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/ 
rpe/IT32_rev16.htm, with IC1Y, R.P. & EVID. 65(B) (as amended Nov. 17, 1999), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev17.htm. Many motions for provisional 
release, however, continue to be denied. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-
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tained for up to four years during pre-trial, trial, and appellate pro-
ceedings,373 and the length of detention might well increase as the 
Tribunals experience greater success in obtaining custody over indict-
ees who must then join the queue. 
The considerable length and cost of Tribunal trials has generated 
much criticism374 and consequently spurred reform. The Tribunals 
99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release, paras. 38, 46 
(Mar. 28, 2001) (denying a motion for provisional release because the tribunal was not 
satisfied that Talic would appear for his trial), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/ 
trialc/decision-e/10328PR215226.htm; Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29, Order 
on the Defence Motion for Provisional Release (July 27, 2000) (denying the defen-
dant's motion for provisional release and describing the length of pre-trial detention 
as acceptable), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/order-e/00727PR113247.htm; 
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release 
of Miroslav Kvocka (Feb. 2, 2000) (denying motion for provisional release and noting 
both the likelihood that the accused would pose a danger to victims and witnesses, and 
that the Trial Chamber anticipates an early trial commencement date), at http:/ I 
www. un.org/icty /kvoca/ trialc/ decision-e/00202PR512949.htm. 
373 Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 201. 
374 See, e.g., John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS 
ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra 
note 27, at 167, 170 ("One of the major criticisms levelled at the Tribunal is the length 
of trials."); Carroll, supra note 372, at 181 ("The ICTR has been criticized for not 
achieving its mandate swiftly enough."); Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: 
Counseling the Accused in Rwanda s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 545, 623 (1998) (noting that the ICTR's "slowness is perceived as foot-dragging by 
many Rwandans"); Patricia McNerney, 17!e International Criminal Court: Issues for Con-
sideration by the United States Senate, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 188-89 (2001) 
(questioning the efficacy of the Tribunals and noting that in 2000, the United States 
was assessed $58 million for its 25% share of the expenses of the two tribunals); Mun-
dis, supra note 314, at 759 (describing the justified criticism of the Tribunals' "inordi-
nately long trials"); Penrose, supra note 281, at 364-69 (criticizing the pace of the Tri-
bunals' proceedings); Robinson, supra note 52, at 584 (noting that the IC1Y's record 
of completed cases "on its face ... would seem to be poor"); Wald, supra note 288, at 
536 ("The Tribunal has been criticized widely for not moving its docket faster."); James 
Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of International Criminal 
Tribunals, 34 VAND. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 432 (2001) (describing the ICTR as "too 
slow for the demands of justice"); Press Release, International Crisis Group, The In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed (June 7, 2001) (describing 
the number of ICTR trials completed as "lamentable" and noting that the group's re-
port-Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda: L 'urgence de juger-"calls on the UN 
Security Council to review the performance of the (ICTR] and its judges, demand a 
trial schedule giving priority to suspects already in custody, and importantly set a final 
date for the completion of investigations"), at http:/ /www.intl-crisis-group.org/ 
projects/showpress.cfm?reportid=305. But see Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the 
Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the Report of the International Crisis Group (June 11, 
2001) (responding to the criticisms of the International Crisis Group), at http:/ I 
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/9-3-0l.htm. Some of the most 
trenchant criticism of the ICTY's slow pace has come from victims of the Yugoslavian 
conflict. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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have sought to enhance general productivity by making more efficient 
f 375 d . d' . I 376 Th p use o courtroom space an JU ICia resources. e rosecutor, 
particularly in the ICTR, has made efforts to combine related cases: 
she has filed joint indictments and motions for joinder of defendants 
to consolidate several indictments into a single trial.377 Also, recogniz-
Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 309, 329 (2001) (reporting the results of 
studies examining war victims' perceptions of the IC1Y and noting that one of the 
most frequent objections was the Tribunals' slow pace). 
375 See Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 207 (describing the effort by the IC1Y to con-
duct trials "for no more than some hours per day, in order to make the courtrooms 
available for other cases"). 
376 For instance, the Tribunals amended Rule 62 of their RPE to provide that the 
initial appearance of the defendant could be conducted before a single judge rather 
than the full Trial Chamber. Compare IC1Y, R.P. & EVID. 62 (as amended July 2, 1999) 
(requiring that "[u]pon transfer of an accused to the seat of the Tribunal ... [t]he 
accused shall be brought before that Trial Chamber without delay"), at http:/ I 
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev16.htm, with IC1Y, R.P. & Evm. 62 (as amended 
Nov. 17, 1999) (providing that" [ u] pon transfer of an accused to the seat of the Tribu-
nal ... [t]he accused shall be brought before that Trial Chamber or a Judge thereof'), 
at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev17.htm. Rule 15 was amended so that 
it no longer disqualifies a judge who confirmed an indictment against a defendant 
from sitting at that defendant's trial. Compare IC1Y, R.P. & Evm. 15 (as amended July 
2, 1999) (disqualifying the judge who "reviews an indictment against an accused, pur-
suant to Article 19 of the Statute and Rules 47 or 61"), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/ 
basic/rpe/IT32_rev16.htm, with IC1Y, R.P. & Evm. 15 (as amended Nov. 17, 1999) 
(stating explicitly that the review of an indictment does not disqualify the judge), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev17.htm. In the July, 2001 amendments to 
the IClY's RPE, Rule 65ter was amended to authorize a Senior Legal Officer to per-
form some of the functions previously assigned to the pre-trial judge. Compare IC1Y, 
R.P. & Evm. 65ter (as amended Dec. 1 & 13, 2000) (designating a pre-trial judge alone 
to be responsible for the pre-trial hearings), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/ 
IT32_rev19.htm, with IC1Y, R.P. & Evm. 65ter (as amended July 12, 2001) (allowing 
the Senior Legal Officer to oversee implementation of the work plan developed during 
the ~re-trial phase), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev2l.htm. 
77 See Beresford, supra note 279, at 129-30; ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 
370, at paras. 138-39 (noting that such actions have been taken and that their "objec-
tive is to maximize efficiency in the use of judicial resources, to spare victims and wit-
nesses the inconvenience, exposure and emotional burden of having to repeat their 
testimony in several trials, and to facilitate proof of the conspiracy to commit genocide, 
the theory that undergirds the prosecution"); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Joinder and Decision 
on Barayagwiza's Extremely Urgent Motions for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Waiver of 
Time Limits Under Rule 72(A) and (F) of the Rules (June 6, 2000) (granting the 
Prosecutor's motion for joinder of cases), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ 
ENGLISH/ cases/Barayagwiza/ decisions/ dcs060600.htm. The Prosecutor has not 
been able to pursue that strategy as effectively at the IC1Y because that Tribunal has 
had such difficulty obtaining custody over some defendants whose cases might other-
wise be joined to those of defendants already in custody. For instance, in November 
1995, the Prosecutor brought an indictment against six Croatians alleged to have 
committed atrocities in the La5va Valley area of Central Bosnia. One of these defen-
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ing that scarce Tribunal resources are best spent prosecuting the po-
litical and military leaders who planned and instigated the atrocities 
rather than their subordinates who carried out their plans, the Prose-
cutor has withdrawn indictments against several lower-level officials.378 
Finally, as described above,379 recent amendments to the RPE (and es-
pecially to the IC1Y RPE) have introduced procedural elements 
found in continental systems in an effort to reduce the length and 
cost of Tribunal trials. 
These efforts will no doubt expedite proceedings considerably, 
but there are a variety of reasons why Tribunal proceedings are apt to 
remain relatively lengthy, complicated, and costly. The fact that Tri-
dants, Tihomir Bla5kic, voluntarily surrendered himself to the Tribunal in April 1996; 
the prosecution then prepared an amended indictment charging only him, and he was 
tried separately. Bla5kic,Judgement, supra note 275, at paras. 2, 18. Two other defen-
dants, Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, did not surrender to the ICTY until October 
1997, and the prosecution prepared a separate indictment for these two and tried 
them together. Kordic, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 2. The Trial Chamber 
granted the fourth defendant's motion to separate his trial from the others, Prosecutor 
v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT, Decision of Trial Chamber 1 in Respect of the 
Motion of 19 June 1997 Requesting Separation of Trials (Sept. 25, 1997) (on file with 
author), and the prosecution withdrew the charges against the remaining two defen-
dants, Prosecutor v. Skopljak, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Order on Prosecutor's Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw the Indictment Against Pero Skopljak (Dec. 19, 1997), at 
http://www. un.org/icty /kordic/trialc/ order-e/kor-worder2-971219e. pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Santic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Order on Prosecutor's Motion for Leave to With-
draw the Indictment Against Ivan Santic (Dec. 19, 1997), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty /kordic/trialc/ order-e/kor-worder1-971219e.pdf. In Kvoeka, 
however, the Trial Chamber began a trial involving four defendants; when a fifth co-
indictee was subsequently arrested, the Trial Chamber adjourned the trial, ordered the 
joinder of trials, and recommenced against the five defendants. Prosecution v. Kvocka, 
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, para. 768 (Nov. 2, 2001), at http:/ I 
www.un.org/icty/kvocka/triale/judgement/kvo-g011002e.pdf. For further examples 
of potential joinders obstructed by difficulty in obtaining custody, see Press Release, 
ICTY, The Indictment Against Vinko Pandurevic is Unsealed (Dec. 14, 2001), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p651-e.htm; Weekly Press Briefing, ICTY (Feb. 27, 
2002), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty /briefing/PB270202.htm. 
378 ICTY Bulletin, No. 21,July 27, 1998, at 4; see also Sean D. Murphy, Progress and 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal far the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 57, 74-75 (1999) (describing withdrawn indictments); id. at 59 ("Since 1997, 
the ICTY [P]rosecutor has pursued a strategy that calls for indicting only high-level 
offenders .... "); Press Release, ICTR, Tribunal to Target 'Big Fish' (July 3, 1997) (an-
nouncing steps taken to improve "effectiveness and efficiency, including targeting the 
so called 'big fish' who were involved in the 1994 Rwanda genocide"), at 
http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997 /060.htm. At the same 
time, the "trials of accused who are alleged to have been the veritable architects of the 
killings will necessarily be legally and factually more complex and take longer than the 
trials of persons of lesser rank and status." ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at 
para. 42. 
379 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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bunal trials are held far from the locations of the crimes makes it 
time-consuming and expensive for the parties to investigate the cases 
and locate witnesses and evidence.!l8° Witnesses can be particularly dif-
ficult to find because they dispersed following the crimes,sst or be-
cause they fear coming forward.!l82 As mentioned above, parties before 
sso See, e.g., Kupreskic, Appeal Judgement, supra note 350, at para. 44 (describing 
the "numerous practical difficulties that all parties at trial before the Tribunal face in 
locating all relevant witnesses and documentary evidence from distant countries, not 
alwa~s co-operative with the Tribunal"). 
'
81 See ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para. 78 (noting that in 
Bagilishema, fifteen defense witnesses were called from twelve different countries) . 
ss
2 See Christine Chin kin , The Protection of Victims and Witnesses, in SUBSfANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra, note 21, at 456; see also 
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Order in the Matter of the 
Prosecutor's Ex Parte Further Allegations of Contempt, para. II Ouly 19, 2001), at 
http: / / www.ictr.org/ wwwroot/ ENGLISH/ cases/ nyiramasuhuko/decisions/ 19070l.ht 
m; Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Allegations of Contempt, The Harmonisation of the Witness Protection Measures and 
Warning to the Prosecutor's Counsel, para. 2 Ouly 10, 2001) (describing the prosecu-
tion's allegations that members of the defense team contacted prosecution witnesses 
and "attempted to 'mak[e] them change their mind not to testifY for the Prosecu-
tion"'), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ wwwroot/ENGLISH/ cases/nyiramasuhuko/ decisions/ 
100701b.htm; LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN 
RWANDA: A LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL TRIALS, at 
III(D)(4) (1997) (hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT] (detailing violence suf-
fered by ICTR witnesses including raids often targeting genocide victims and "targeted 
killing to eliminate potential witnesses"), available at http:/ / www.lchr.org/ 
pubs/rwanda.htm; SCHARF, supra note 251, at 139 (noting that the prosecution in the 
Tadic case had "been forced to pare down the number of ... [eyewitnesses] because sev-
eral had become unwilling to testifY"). Because the Tribunals' ability to ensure protec-
tion is far more limited than that of a domestic court, Tribunal witnesses have particular 
reason to fear testifying. See Chin kin, supra, at 456 (noting that Tribunals "cannot draw 
upon domestic resources such as police, witness protection programmes and support 
services"). To combat these fears as much as possible, the Tribunals have adopted a 
number of rules providing for the protection of victims and witnesses. See ICIY RPE, su-
pra note 264, at R. 39(ii) (authorizing the Prosecutor to take "special measures to pro-
vide for the safety of potential witnesses and informants" during investigations); ICTR 
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 39(ii) (same) ; ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 69(A) (author-
izing "the non-<lisclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at 
risk"); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 69(A) (same) ; ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 
75 (authorizing the Trial Chambers to order "measures to prevent the disclosure to the 
public or the media of the identity or whereabouts of a victim or a witness"); ICTR RPE, 
supra note 264, at R. 75 (same); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision 
on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 
para. 86 (Aug. 10, 1995) (permitting certain witnesses to testifY anonymously), reprinted in 
1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, 
at 74. Despite their best efforts, the Tribunals are not always able to prevent violence to 
witnesses. In January 1997, "Hutu extremists murdered a witness, her husband, and 
seven children after she appeared before the . . . [ICTR] and was promised protec-
tion. Another tribunal witness was killed with his daughter, brother, nephew and 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 96 2002-2003
96 UNM"RSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1 
the IC1Y in particular have experienced difficulties obtaining access 
to documents and witnesses,383 difficulties which inevitably increase 
the time and cost of trial preparation. The Tribunals often attempt to 
assist the parties in securing evidence and witness testimony,384 but 
these attempts can be unsuccessful and, even when successful, can be 
time-consuming, because the Tribunals themselves have no enforce-
ment mechanisms and thus must rely on states' voluntary compli-
ance.385 Even when states do comply, the logistics can prove daunting. 
For instance, numerous lower-level participants in the Rwandan geno-
cide are currently in Rwandan prisons awaiting trial or serving sen-
tences. Both ICTR prosecutors and defendants frequently seek testi-
mony from these Rwandan prisoners. The Tribunals' rules authorize 
a judge or Trial Chamber to order the transfer of such detained per-
sons, but the party requesting the transfer must first obtain documen-
seven others the previous December." Nasser Ega-Musa, Another Failure of justice in Af 
rica, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1997, atA2l. 
Defense witnesses may also be reluctant to come forward because they fear prosecu-
tion themselves or retaliation at home. See Kupreskic, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
350, at para. 173 (noting that the defense had difficulty persuading Bosnian Muslim 
victims to testify in favor of the Bosnian Croat defendants, even though they were oth-
erwise agreeable to doing so, because the witnesses feared "the condemnation and 
harassment within the close-knit Muslim community that would surely follow from as-
sociating themselves with the Defendants"), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty /kupreskic/ 
appeal/judgement/kup-aj011023e.pdf; SCHARF, supra note 251, at 103 (noting that 
some defense witnesses "dreaded the local warlord, Prijedor Police Chief Simo Drljac, 
who made it clear that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the Tribunal"). Conse-
quently, the Tribunals have authorized protective measures to encourage defense witness 
testimony as well. See id. at 103 (speaking of the use of protective measures such as grant-
ing "temporary immunity to defense witnesses who come to the Hague" and allowing 
others "to testify from Bosnia by video-link"). 383 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, paras. 29-56 (July 15, 
1999) (discussing the appellant's argument that a "lack of cooperation and ... obstruc-
tion" by several governmental authorities in providing access to appellant witnesses com-
promised his case, thereby depriving appellant of a fair trial), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED 
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 327, at 771-78; Dela-
lic, Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 55-57 (describing the issuances of subpoenas 
and other difficulties in obtaining witness testimony), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED 
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 327, at 385-86; 
Weekly Press Briefing, ICTY (Nov. 8, 2000) (addressing questions about the cooperation 
of several nations in providing the tribunal with necessary witnesses and documentation), 
at htt,r.:l /www.un.org/icty/briefing/PB081100.htm. 
3 4 For instance, in Kupreskii:, the Trial Chamber summoned Muslim defense wit-
nesses as "court witnesses" so that the witnesses would not be associated with the Croa-
tian defendants. Kupreskic, Appeal Judgement, supra note 350, at paras. 173-75. 385 See IC1R 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para. 80 (noting that" [ w] ithout 
the cooperation of countries such as Benin, the Congo, France, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Swaziland, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe, none of 
the witnesses would have been able to be heard by the Tribunal"). 
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tation from the detaining state establishing that the witness is not re-
quired for any criminal proceedings in the detaining state during the 
period that the witness is required by the Tribunal, and that the wit-
ness's transfer will not extend the period of the witness's detention.~6 
Even when this documentation is provided, motions for transfer are 
often opposed, thus necessitating an exchange of briefing.387 
Another factor contributing to the considerable length of Tribu-
nal proceedings is the nascent state of the law to be applied in those 
proceedings. The Tribunals were charged with prosecuting genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes at a time when genocide had 
never before been prosecuted, and the contours of all the crimes were 
in some doubt.388 Thus the Tribunals, particularly at the outset, had to 
386 ICTR RPE supra note 264, at R. 90bis. 
387 See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICfR-97-21-T, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Motions for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses and for the Transfer of 
Detained Witnesses, paras. 1-8 (July 24, 2001) (recounting several motions, counter-
motions and supplemental motions relied on by the Tribunal in issuing its decision), 
at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ cases/ nyiramasuhuko/ decisions/2407 
Ol.htm; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Motion to Reinstate a Witness on the List of Witnesses to Be Called at Trial and Order 
for the Transfer of Four Detained Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 90bis, paras. 1-4 (June 
29, 2001) (listing the submissions of the parties, including motions, summaries of wit-
ness testimony and a letter), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/ 
kajelijeli/decisions/ 29060l.htm; Prosecutor v. Bagambiki, Case No. ICTR-99-46-1, De-
cision on the Prosecutor's Motion for the Transfer of Detained Witnesses Pursuant to 
Rule 90bis (Aug. 23, 2000) (considering several briefs and other papers in reaching its 
decision to transfer eleven witnesses to a detention center), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ 
wwwroot/ENGLISH/ cases/Imanishimwe/ decisions/ 230800a.htm. But see Prosecutor 
v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-I, Order for Temporary Transfer of Three Detained 
Witnesses (AFZ, AGI, AHA) Pursuant to Rule 90bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence (Sept. 26, 2000) (granting unopposed motion), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ 
ENGLISH/cases/barayagwiza/decisions/260900.htm; ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra 
note 370, at para. 78 (noting that in Bagilishema, the Victims Support Section produced 
three detainee witnesses from Kigali) . 
388 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, para. 694 
(May 7, 1997) (noting that persecution as a crime against humanity "has never been 
clearly defined"), reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 435; Louise Arbour, Foreword to SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at ix, x 
("[C]ertain elements of certain offences and doctrines of criminal responsibility, and a 
myriad of issues of procedure and evidence remain to be elaborated in all their detail."); 
Schrag, supra note 281, at 18 n.9; Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law, 114 
HARv. L. REV. 1943, 1998 (2001) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("The crimes 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the IClY and the ICTR-genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes as described in the Geneva and Hague Conventions-
were vaguely defined and seldom enforced prior to the creation of the tribunals.") . 
When the Tribunals have been asked to clarify the elements of a crime or defense in 
advance, they have refused. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Order on 
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receive submissions and hear argumentation on issues as fundamental 
as the elements of the crimes with which the defendants were 
charged. The procedures applicable in international tribunals were in 
an even earlier stage of development;389 consequently, the Tribunals 
often have found themselves inundated with pre-trial and trial mo-
tions seeking the resolution of multifarious issues regarding, for in-
stance, the admissibility of evidence,3!1° the form of indictinents,391 the 
protections afforded to victims and witnesses,392 and the length of pre-
'ld . 393 h 394 tna etentwn, among many, many ot ers. 
Esad Land~o·s Request for Definition of Diminished or Lack of Mental Capacity Uuly 
15, 1998), at http://www. un.org/icty I celebici/ trialc2/ order-e/80715MS2.htm. 
389 See W J. Fen rick, International Humanitarian Law and Criminal Trials, 7 TRANSNAT'L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 26 (1997) ("[A]Ithough it is practicable to determine a rea-
sonably specific list of offenses under international humanitarian law, it is much more 
difficult to determine the applicable law for evidentiary or procedural matters .... "). 
390 See, e.g., Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Hearsay, supra note 321, at 
para. 5 (stating that "there is no [ICIY] rule that calls for the exclusion of out-of-court, or 
hearsay, statements," thus requiring a determination of admissibility by the Tribunal), 
reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CAsES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 276 at 195. 
391 See generally Michael J. Keegan & Daryl A. Mundis, Legal Requirements for Indict-
ments, in ESSAYS ON ICIY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK 
MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 123-36 (describing the basic requirements of drafting an 
indictment or charging document for the ICIY). 
392 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, paras. 4-11 (Aug. 10, 
1995), reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 155-56. 
393 See, e.g., Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, paras. 
41-113 (Nov. 3, 1999) (dismissing indictment against defendant as a result of pre-
indictment delay) (on file with author); Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000) (quash-
ing its earlier judgment) (on file with author). 
394 See Blaskic,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 19 (noting that "[t]he proceed-
ings against Tihomir Bla[skici before the Tribunal were complex and at each stage 
gave rise to many questions, often without precedent" and further noting that during 
the "pretrial phase, the Tribunal rendered eighty-two interlocutory decisions"); Dela-
lic,Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 33-83 (noting that "[t]he Trial Chamber had 
been called upon to address a host of unprecedented procedural and substantive is-
sues relating to the trial" and describing them); ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 
370, at paras. 15, 17, 18 (highlighting that in only one year the Trial Chamber ruled on 
twenty-eight motions in Nahimana, thirty-seven motions in Ndayambaje, and eighty-three 
motions in Niyitigeka); id. at annex I (setting forth the pre-trial litigation in 
Bagilishema); id. at annex II (noting that the Trial Chamber was "inundated with pre-
trial motions, which contributed to the delay in the commencement" of trial in the 
"media" cases); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 388, at 1998 (noting that the 
"attorneys who represent the first waves of defendants in international criminal courts 
since Nuremberg must often litigate numerous essential, yet inchoate and untested, 
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The elements of the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction, 
even when clearly delineated, are complex and time-consuming to 
prove. For instance, to prosecute murder as a crime against humanity 
in the IC1Y, the prosecution must prove not only that the defendant 
killed the victim but that the murder was committed as part of an 
armed conflict that was directed against a civilian population.395 To 
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions under article 2 
of the IC1Y Statute, the prosecution must prove that the offenses took 
place in the context of an international armed conflict.396 Establishing 
these and other elements often requires days of witness and expert 
testimony and the introduction of dozens, if not hundreds, of exhib-
its.397 Indeed, whereas the typical domestic criminal case concerns 
questions of law by referring to case law and statutes scattered across the globe, buried 
for fifty years, and written in languages from Norwegian to Hebrew"). 
Although numerous motions can be expected given how new and unsettled this area 
of law is, some motions are frivolous and criticized as such. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, 
Case No. IT-00-39-1, Decision on Motion Challengingjurisdiction-With Reasons, para. 27 
(Sept. 22, 2000) (noting that the "Tribunal as a whole is overburdened with work" and 
admonishing that the "Trial Chambers should not be called upon to adjudicate on ar-
guments in motions that have already been definitively determined by the Appeals 
Chamber"), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty /krajisnik/trialc/ decision-e/00922JN513918.htm. 
395 ICIY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 5. The definition of crimes against human-
ity in the ICTR's statute does not include a nexus to an armed conflict. ICTR Statute, 
supra note 257, at art. 3. 
396 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, paras. 79-84 (Oct. 2, 1995) (citing and 
explaining article 2 of the ICIY Statute); see also W. Hays Parks, 28 CEO. WASH.J. INT'L 
L. & ECON. 207, 213 (1994) (book review) ("[I]t is much easier to gain conviction of 
an accused for the simple and well-established offense of murder than it is to allege-
and ~rove-a war crime ... . "). 
97 See SCHARF, supra note 251, at 137 (noting that the first five weeks of the Tadii: 
trial elapsed "without a shred of testimony as to the alleged crimes of the defendant" be-
cause the prosecution had to prove "that the conflict was international and that the 
abuses were widespread and systematic" and consequently "took a very cautious approach 
and elicited a lot of evidence in support of [that] ... determination"). As former IC1Y 
President McDonald noted: 
It is time-consuming to prove, or to respond to, a charge that offences have 
been committed as part of a widespread or systematic campaign, as is required 
for establishing crimes against humanity. Similarly, proof that a conflict is in-
ternational requires considerable evidence that goes beyond proof of the spe-
cific crimes with which the accused is charged. Finally, proving or defending 
against an allegation of genocide is more complex than the core crime of 
murder. 
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Speech at the Inauguration of New Judges (Nov. 16, 1998), 
quoted in May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250; see also May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 
250 (noting that "it may be necessary for the Prosecution to call evidence relating to 
the historical and political background if these are not familiar to the Trial Cham-
ber"). Moreover, because many witnesses are themselves victims or are relatives o( vic-
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one crime committed in one specific location, Tribunal trials often 
concern widespread atrocities occurring in many locations and taking 
place over a period of months.3!•s The difference in size and scale be-
tween Tribunal trials and domestic trials makes it difficult to compare 
the two, even superficially. Few domestic trials will have as many as 
fifty witnesses; in contrast, only one IC1Y trial so far has had fewer 
than fifty witnesses and most have had more than one hundred, each 
of whom, on average, take up a full trial day.399 
The way in which Tribunal crimes are defined also leads to com-
plexity and inefficiency. Many of the crimes overlap,400 and many of-
fenses can be charged as more than one crime. As one commentator 
noted: 
[T] he four offences set out in the Statute of the Tribunal can be com-
mitted in numerous ways. No less than eight individual types of conduct 
amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The offence of 
violation of customs of war specific to ICIY is not fully defined, rather, 
five acts are indicated as non-exhaustive examples. The rest has to be 
found in customary international law. Therefore, the position of the 
Prosecution has been that it has no choice but to indict for as many 
crimes as appear to have been committed and to introduce as much evi-
tims, "they tell their stories in their own way and at their own pace." Lahiouel, supra 
note 310, at 204. "It is difficult to ensure that the examination is rapidly focused on a 
particular piece of evidence." /d. 
398 See May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 249-50 (discussing the broader scope of 
cases before the Tribunal in comparison with cases before domestic courts). 
399 SeeWald, supra note 288, at 549 (reporting the average number of witnesses 
heard by the Tribunal and the nature of the witnesses' testimony); see also Lahiouel, 
supra note 310, at 204 (discussing delays in a case before the Tribunal due to the large 
number of witnesses called, exhibits required, and other practical considerations); 
Robinson, supra note 52, at 584 (commenting on the large scale of Tribunal hearings, 
specifically with regard to the number of witnesses and the length of their testimony). 
As two ICIY officials have noted: 
[T]he nature of the crimes within the mandate of the IClY is drastically dif-
ferent from the national prosecution experience of any individual. There is 
no legal system in the world that deals on a routine basis with the types of 
cases that fall within the mandate of the IClY or with the limitations that the 
IC1Yfaces in the exercise ofitsjurisdiction. 
Keegan & Mundis, supra note 391, at 124; see also ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 
263, at para. 40 ("It is important to recall, however, that conducting judicial proceed-
ings at the international level is a far more complicated task than at the national 
level."). 
400 See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Introduction to 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 
21 '·at xiii, xiv (noting that certain "crimes tend to fall under more than one general 
heading"). 
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dence and as many witnesses as appear necessary to establish guilt be-
401 
yond a reasonable doubt for all of them. 
101 
Additional delays are caused by the need for language translation. 
While the IC1Y's simultaneous translations of courtroom proceedings 
are considered very good,402 the ICTR has experienced some difficulty 
because the syntax and everyday modes of expression in Kinyar-
wanda-the language spoken by most ICTR witnesses-are complex 
and difficult to translate into French or English.403 In both Tribunals, 
large quantities of documentary evidence also must be translated, and 
these translations can take considerable time.404 Indeed, the transla-
401 Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 203 (footnote omitted). 
402 Problems do arise, however. In the Tadii: trial, for instance, Prosecutor Michael 
Keegan expected a prosecution witness to place Tadic at the scene of one of the crimes. 
When asked whether Tadic was present, however, the witness answered "no," a response 
Keegan later attributed to translation problems. SCHARF, supra note 251, at 162. 
403 See Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 145. The Chamber went on to 
explain that the "difficulties affected the pre-trial interviews carried out by investigators in 
the field, as well as the interpretation of examination and cross-examination during pro-
ceedings in Court." !d. Testimony in Kinyarwanda is first translated to French and then 
from French to English, "entail[ing] obvious risks of misunderstandings in the English 
version." !d.; see also Musema,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 102 
(noting "the significant syntactical and grammatical differences between" French, Eng-
lish, and Kinyarwanda); Rutaganda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 
23 (noting the translation-related difficulties); ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 
263, at para. 40 (listing "interpretation of testimony from Kinyarwanda into French 
and English" as one of the problems contributing to the difficulty of "conducting judi-
cial proceedings at the international level"). The ICTR has, at times, relied on the tes-
timony of a linguistic expert to clarifY the meaning of certain terms, and it has noted 
various cultural factors that affect witness testimony. See Akayesu, Judgement, supra 
note 279, at para. 156 (referring to an expert's testimony that in the Rwandan culture, 
people sometimes do not answer questions directly); Musema, Judgement and Sen-
tence, supra note 336, at para. 103 (noting that "cultural constraints appeared to in-
duce [witnesses] to answer indirectly certain questions regarded as delicate"). In addi-
tion, a linguistic expert testified in Akayesu that "most Rwandans live in an oral tradition 
in which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, often irrespective of 
whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by someone else." Akayesu, 
Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 155; see also Musema,Judgement and Sentence, supra 
note 336, at para. 103 ("[T]here appears ... to be in Rwandan culture a 'tradition that 
the perceived knowledge of one becomes the knowledge of all' .... "). 
404 E-mail from Jenny S. Martinez, former IClY Junior Legal Officer, to Nancy & 
Bruce Combs (Aug. 16, 2001, 22:27:13) (on file with author). Complaints about trans-
lation delay are rampant in the IClY, where the translators are regularly unable to 
meet the word requirements set for them. Interview with F. Indeed, at times, the Tri-
bunals have lacked the resources to translate all the documents that might ideally be 
translated. SeeWald, supra note 288, at 541 (noting that a Trial Chamber was receptive 
to the prosecution's proposal to introduce summaries of witness testimony, but "the 
proposal floundered on the requirement by the Trial Chamber that the summaries be 
given in advance to the defendants in their native language [and] (the translation fa-
cilities of the IClY were not adequate for the job)" (parentheses in original)); Press 
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tion of documents caused sufficient delays in ICTR trials that the Tri-
bunal recently amended its rules to allow defendants to use outside 
translation services instead of relying on the ICTR translation sec-
tion.405 Language difficulties can also impede the speedy issuance of 
judgments. Many, if not all, of the judges can speak both French and 
English at least at a rudimentary level, but most are considerably more 
proficient in one and prefer to work in that language. Thus, the 
judges must wait for drafts of the Tribunals' lengthy judgments to be 
translated before they can be discussed.406 In addition, without the aid 
of simultaneous interpretation, informal oral communications about 
the cases can prove time-consuming and awkward. 
In sum, although the Tribunals' efforts to shorten and simplify 
their proceedings are laudable, they will not result in short, simple 
proceedings. The Tribunals, then, have a functional need for alterna-
tive methods of case disposition, and plea bargaining seems an attrac-
tive means of avoiding the time-consuming, costly trials that otherwise 
must take place. But, as developed in Part II, functional value is not 
the only factor influencing the prevalence of plea bargaining in a 
criminal justice system. Other factors, which will be addressed next, 
include the structure of the criminal justice system and its prevailing 
ideology. 
2. The Structural and Ideological Components 
As a structural matter, the OTP is relatively hierarchical, at least in 
comparison to the offices of most American district attorneys. With 
respect to plea bargaining, specifically, the Prosecutor must approve 
any concessions that are offered as well as the ultimate plea agree-
ment, leaving the Senior Trial Attorneys and their assistants without 
substantial authority over the content of the bargain. Further, the 
Release, ICTR, Media Trial Opens (Oct. 23, 2000) (reporting that the ICTR's Presi-
dent denied a defendant's request to translate all seventy-one issues of a newspaper of 
which the defendant was editor because the Tribunal "did not have the resources" to 
do so), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/245.htm. 
405 See ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para. 58 ("These amendments 
... [n]ow give the defence the option of utilizing outside translation services, instead 
of relying on the ICTR translation section, to translate documents, thus reducing the 
delays caused by the translation of documents .... " (footnote omitted)). 
406 See ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at para. 48 (acknowledging that 
" [ t] he translations of decisions and other documents prepared by the judges . . . [is] a 
major problem"); id. at para. 64 (reporting that although the written judgment in the 
Kayishema appeal was ready in june 2001, "it has not been made available for distribu-
tion, due to translation difficulties"). 
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ideological elements underpinning the adversary system and reinforc-
ing the use of plea bargaining in the United States do not feature so 
prominently in Tribunal proceedings. As Part II described, plea bar-
gaining is most likely to flourish in a procedural system that prizes 
party autonomy and participation and that conceives of adjudication 
largely in terms of its ability to resolve disputes. The Tribunals' initial 
procedures did permit the parties to operate with a great deal of 
autonomy; as a general matter, Tribunal proceedings were structured 
in the form of a contest between two relatively unregulated parties, 
both of whom had substantial control over the development and pres-
entation of their cases. 
However, recent reforms undertaken to expedite proceedings 
have altered, perhaps fundamentally, the nature of Tribunal proceed-
ings by moderating the contest form and by transferring much party 
control to the judges. Although the parties continue to be primarily 
responsible for preparing their cases, the Tribunals now carefully 
monitor that preparation during the pre-trial phase. The parties must 
provide their opponents and the Trial Chamber substantial documen-
tation, which reduces surprise and educates the Trial Chamber about 
the case prior to trial, thus allowing the Trial Chamber to direct sub-
sequent proceedings. In particular, this documentation allows the 
Trial Chamber to restrict the number of witnesses that the parties may 
call and to reduce the amount of time that the parties may use for ex-
amining their witnesses. Although the parties retain primary respon-
sibility for calling, examining, and cross-examining the witnesses that 
do appear, the Trial Chambers have begun playing a greater role in 
that arena as well. Thus, although adversarial elements clearly remain 
in Tribunal proceedings, the proceedings now bear a much closer re-
semblance to the official inquiries of Continental jurisdictions, which 
are predominantly directed from above, by the court, rather than 
propelled from below, by the parties. 
The highly adversarial procedures utilized in the United States re-
flect not only the considerable value placed on party autonomy, but 
also the conception of adjudication as primarily a method of dispute 
resolution. As discussed in Part II, plea bargaining, by which the par-
ties negotiate a mutually beneficial outcome, both reflects and rein-
forces this conception of adjudication in the United States. It is not a 
conception of adjudication, however, that seems appropriate to inter-
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national tribunals prosecuting the gravest of crimes.407 The Tribunals' 
primary and most obvious purpose, of course, is to pass judgment on 
individuals accused of committing crimes within the Tribunals' juris-
diction, a purpose that can be viewed more or less in terms of dispute 
resolution, as comparison of the American and Continental criminal 
justice systems shows. However, unlike any domestic criminal justice 
system, the Tribunals also were established to "contribute to the resto-
ration and maintenance of peace,"408 and to "contribute to the settle-
ment of wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishing 
the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia"409 and 
Rwanda.410 One way that the Tribunals try to do this is by creating a 
historical record,411 which is designed to thwart later attempts at revi-
sionism412 and to help promote reconciliation and healing.413 Under 
407 Dama5ka acknowledges that even in Anglo-American jurisdictions, "criminal 
law enforcement cannot entirely be fitted into the conflict-solving mode of proceed-
ing," but he notes that "more contest forms can be identified in Anglo-American 
criminal prosecutions than in any other contemporary system of criminal justice." 
DAMASKA, FACES OF jUSTICE, sujJra note 53, at 222. 408 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993). 409 Erdemovic, Second Sentencingjudgement, supra note 343, at para. 21. 410 See May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 252 (noting that the IC1Y "was established 
to contribute to peace in the region by dispensing justice and deterring future 
breaches of humanitarian law" and that one way it does so is by providing "a reliable 
historical record"). As Rodrigues and Tournaye state: 
Many victims or their relatives, years later, are still carrying out investigations 
with a view to discovering how and where their friends, neighbours or relatives 
disappeared. Their relentless quest for truth must be addressed as a prerequi-
site to peace, and the Tribunal, notably through its procedure, has to take this 
into account. 
Rodri15ues & Tournaye, supra note 311, at 296-97. 41 See Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2044-46 (discussing how the Tribunals help to 
preserve the collective memory). Alvarez, however, goes on to detail why the demands 
of criminal prosecution preclude the rendering of a nuanced history. /d. at 2055-56. 412 As Madeleine Albright, then-United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 
noted, one of the Tribunals' primary functions is to "establish the historical record be-
fore the guilty can reinvent the truth." Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierar-
chy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 430 (2001). 
Mter the conclusion of the IC1Y's first trial, judge McDonald observed: 
[W]e have begun the task of creating a historical record. In the judgement 
that followed the conclusion of our first full trial, ... we established as a judi-
cial fact what happened in a corner of north-eastern Bosnia in 1992, findings 
that no amount of revisionism or amnesia will erase. 
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Remarks to the Georgetown and George Washington Inter-
national Law Societies, 2d Annual International Law Weekend Conference (Feb. 7, 
1998), quoted in May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 253. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tri-
als have served the same function. See Bernard D. Meltzer, War Crimes: The Nuremberg 
Trial and the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 895, 902 ( 1996) ("The 
evidence of the Holocaust was so strong in 1945 that I doubt that anyone then foresaw 
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these circumstances, the dispute resolution that results from Tribunal 
trials seems much less important than other values that the adjudica-
tion serves.414 The very notion, then, that a Tribunal prosecutor and 
defendant would negotiate for the defendant to plead guilty to a 
crime that does not accurately reflect his criminal behavior, as not in-
frequently occurs in the United States, would seem perverse at best. 
Theoretical and practical considerations aside, certain structural 
aspects of the Tribunals and their procedures may also impede plea 
bargaining. For one thing, the typical Tribunal defendant has com-
mitted large-scale atrocities motivated by intense nationalism or eth-
nic or religious hatred. Such a defendant is more apt to consider a 
guilty plea abhorrent, viewing it as capitulation before an illegitimate 
international body415 than the typical domestic defendant who com-
mits his crimes for more mundane reasons. The nascent state of the 
international criminal law applied in the Tribunals acts as another 
impediment to the conclusion of plea bargains. Most defendants in 
domestic jurisdictions are charged with crimes that have been prose-
cuted hundreds, if not thousands, of times before. The elements of 
those crimes are well-established, and the quantum of proof necessary 
to prove those elements is equally well-established. Thus, a defendant 
considering a guilty plea before a domestic court is well-informed as 
to the likelihood that he will be convicted if he instead proceeds to 
trial. By contrast, at the time the Tribunals were established, the 
the so-called Auschwitz lie-the recent denials that the Holocaust actually happened. 
The trial record surely serves as a corrective of such fantastic revisionism."); Richard A. 
Minear, The Individual, the State, and the Tokyo Trial, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
159, 160 (Chihiro Hosoya eta!. eds., 1986) ("The Tokyo trial was-or purported to be-a 
legal proceeding; but its purpose was as much historical as legal: to establish once and 
for all the record of japanese misdeeds in the Pacific.") . 
m Akhavan, supra note 269, at 766 (positing that individualization of guilt shifts 
victims' anger away from the entire ethnic group, thus promoting reconciliation). 
414 Of course, it is conceivable that plea bargaining can also advance these other 
values. A!; I will discuss below, Tribunal judges have recently begun to claim that guilty 
pleas advance the Tribunals' truth-telling function by conclusively establishing the 
truth in relation to a crime. See infra text accompanying notes 685-95. However, as I 
will discuss, the granting of sentencing concessions and the bargaining process itself 
have the capacity to subvert the Tribunals' truth-telling function as much as to advance 
it. 
415 See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on Preliminary Mo-
tions, para. 5 (Nov. 8, 2001) (noting the defendant's argument that the Tribunal is an 
"illegal entity"), at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/triale/decision-e/11108738168 
29.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion on 
Jurisdiction for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 2 (Oct. 2, 1995) (on file 
with author) (describing the defendant's challenges to the Tribunal, including that it 
is an illegitimate body) . 
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crimes within their jurisdiction and their defenses were relatively 
vague concepts whose elements were anything but clear.416 The con-
tours of the crimes are quickly being refined with each Tribunal trial, 
but uncertainties remain, and these uncertainties may make a trial 
appear a more promising prospect than it otherwise would be. 
Finally, the Tribunal judges' wide discretion in sentencing inhibits 
plea bargaining by making a guilty plea a potentially perilous exercise 
for defendants. George Fisher's examination of nineteenth-century 
Massachusetts criminal proceedings persuasively shows that plea bar-
gaining emerges where defendants can be assured of sentencing con-
cessions in exchange for their guilty pleas.417 In Massachusetts, plea 
bargaining arose initially in cases in which the prosecutor, by drop-
ping charges, had the unilateral power to restrict the sentence that 
the judge could impose.418 Later, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, 
judges also saw the advantages of encouraging guilty pleas, so prosecu-
tors became free to engage in explicit sentence bargaining with the 
assurance that the judges would sentence accordingly.419 In compari-
son, at least until very recently, Tribunal prosecutors could offer Tri-
bunal defendants only weak assurances. Tribunal prosecutors may 
drop charges, but doing so by no means guarantees that the defen-
dant will receive any particular sentence on the remaining charge(s), 
let alone a sentence that the defendant considers acceptable. The 
Prosecutor can, in addition, promise to recommend a certain sen-
tence. Such a promise is of some value, since up until now, a Trial 
Chamber has never imposed a sentence longer than that which was 
sought by the prosecution. Still, the Trial Chambers are by no means 
restricted from doing so,420 and the Appeals Chamber's inclination to 
revise sentences creates an additional worry for a defendant who is 
counting on a reduced sentence as compensation for relinquishing 
his chance for acquittal at trial. 
416 Supra text accompanying notes 388-89. 
417 See generally Fisher, mpra note 24. 
418 /d. at 868-93. 
419 /d. at 864. 
420 See Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, sujnn note 336, at para. 79 ("Although 
the Plea Agreement does indicate a range within which the parties have agreed To-
dorovic's sentence should fall, the Trial Chamber reiterates that it is in no way bound 
by this agreement. It is the Chamber's responsibility to determine an appropriate sen-
tence."); Erdemovic, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 19 ("The 
parties themselves acknowledge that the plea agreement has no binding effect on this 
Chamber."). 
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The foregoing analysis indicates that with respect to plea bargain-
ing, the Tribunals have conflicting tendencies. While certain proce-
dural features of the Tribunals and the purposes they are intended to 
serve can be viewed as militating against plea bargaining, Tribunal tri-
als are exceedingly lengthy, costly, and complex and thus constitute 
ideal targets for alternative methods of disposition. The foregoing 
analysis also suggests that plea bargaining's role in the Tribunals is 
likely to change as the Tribunals and the field of international crimi-
nal law mature. Bargains should become easier to conclude as more 
trials are held because the crimes which form the subject of the trials 
will become better defined and the sentencing practices of the judges 
will become at least somewhat more predictable. Both the prosecu-
tion and the defense will thus be better informed as to the value of the 
rights they are relinquishing and the concessions they will receive in 
return. Further, the longer the Tribunals are in existence and the 
more trials they hold, the less publicity each case will receive. Because 
plea bargains are generally considered unseemly, they are more apt to 
be concluded when they do not fall squarely in the public glare. In 
sum, as the Tribunals conduct more trials, they will begin more closely 
to resemble domestic courts; that is, they will become bodies that 
prosecute relatively well-established crimes, sentence along relatively 
predictable patterns, and conduct their business largely outside the 
public view. For all of these reasons, plea bargaining is more likely to 
occur. The practical need to avoid the lengthy, costly Tribunal trials is 
likely to overshadow any ideological and symbolic factors militating 
against plea bargaining. The next section describes the Tribunals' 
guilty plea cases, and it along with the following section show that plea 
bargaining has evolved from a shadowy, questionable practice to an 
unconcealed, encouraged feature of the Tribunals' administration of 
criminal justice. 
B. The Tribunals' Guilty Plea Cases 
Of the thirty-eight Tribunal defendants who have been convicted, 
nine pled guilty. The circumstances surrounding their guilty pleas 
varied widely as did the resulting sentences. Subsection 1 describes 
the IC1Y cases while subsection 2 describes the ICTR cases. 
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a. Background 
l. The ICTY's Guilty Plea Cases 
[Vol. 151: 1 
From 1945 until 1990, Yugoslavia was composed of six republics: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ma-
cedonia. Most of the republics were predominantly populated by one 
ethnic group with Bosnia-Herzegovina a multi-ethnic exception, hav-
ing substantial Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian populations. For many 
years, these and other ethnic groups lived together peacefully, but the 
economic woes and the end of communist rule in the late 1980s set 
the stage for rising nationalism and ethnic friction. In 1991, the re-
publics began declaring independence from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. While some secessions were followed by only short-lived 
armed conflict, the fighting between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was fierce and lengthy.422 The Bosnian conflict 
resulted in approximately 200,000 deaths,423 approximately 20,000 
rapes,424 the forced relocation of more than two million people,425 and 
th " f . E 'I ,426 e reappearance o concentratiOn camps on uropean sm . 
Fighting continued until 1995 when the Presidents of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, and Croatia entered 
into the Dayton Peace Accords.427 
421 The facts surrounding the war resulting from the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide are too complicated to relate in detail. Conse-
quently, this subsection and the corresponding subsection addressing Rwanda, see infra 
Part IV.B.2, will provide only summary background treatm·ent. 
422 See Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at paras. 7-10 (explaining the history of 
the rep on, the ethnic composition of the region, and the ensuing conflict). 
42 Rosemary E. Libera, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime 
Dama~es, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (2001). 
42 SCHARF, supra note 251, at 52; Makau Matua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The 
Metaf:hor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L LJ. 201, 223 (2001). 
25 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, at xiii (1995); 
Lynn Hastings, Implementation of the Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J. 
INT'LL. 221,221 (2001). 
426 DevelofJments in the Law, supra note 388, at 1953; see also SCHARF, supra note 251, 
at 31-32 (describing reports of ethnic cleansing received by the United States, Britain, 
and France in 1991). 
427 The Accords affirm the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as comprising 
two entities: the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika Srpska. 
In addition, they provide for democratic elections, international monitoring, and hu-
man rights guarantees. Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democ-
racy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALEJ. INT'L L. 103, 105-07 
(2001). For more detailed treatments of the Dayton Peace Accords, see Paola Gaeta, 
The Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 147, 147-50 (1996);John 
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b. Erdemovic 
In July 1995, Serbian forces launched an offensive against the 
primarily Muslim city of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia.428 Thousands of 
Bosnian Muslim civilians fled, some to a nearby United Nations com-
pound and some to the woods.429 Serbian forces separated the Bos-
nian Muslim men from the women and children, transported the men 
to various sites, and executed approximately seven thousand of 
them.4~0 One of these sites was the Branjevo Farm in Pilica, and one of 
the soldiers assigned to the executions was Dra.Zen Erdemovic, a 
Croat, who had reluctantly joined the Bosnian Serb army.431 Erdemo-
vic and the other soldiers shot and killed approximately 1200 un-
armed Muslim men during a five-hour period, with Erdemovic killing 
approximately seventy of them.432 Erdemovic stated that he initially re-
fused to carry out the executions but was threatened with instant death. 
He was told: "If you don't wish to do it, stand in line with the rest of 
thein and give others your rifle so that they can shoot you."433 
The IC1Y had never heard of Drazen Erdemovic or the Branjevo 
Farm until Erdemovic brought himself and the massacre to the Tri-
bunal's attention. While in Belgrade, Erdemovic made several at-
R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of the Peace Agreements for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 226, 226-44 ( 1996). 
428 See Krstic,Judgement, supra note 250, at paras. 11, 31 (describing the religious 
com~osition of Srebrenica and the initial stages of the offensive). 
29 Id. at para. 37. 
430 Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 76; Krstic, 
Judgement, supra note 250, at para. 1. For comprehensive discussions of the Sre-
brenica massacre, see JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A 
WAR CRIME (1996); DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, 
EUROPE'S WORST MASsACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997). 
431 Erdemovic maintained that he had tried to avoid the war altogether. He ig-
nored summonses to join the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was mobilized into the 
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) but left that organization after he was arrested and 
beaten by HVO soldiers for having helped a Serbian woman and her children return 
to their territory. He also unsuccessfully sought to obtain identity papers that would 
have enabled him to go to Switzerland with his wife. Erdemovic, First Sentencing 
Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 79; see also Akhavan, supra note 269, at 791-92 (de-
scribing Erdemovic's efforts to avoid military service). 
432 Erdemovic, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 15. Erde-
movic himself did not know how many he killed, but estimated that it was between sev-
enty and one hundred. During his testimony in the Rule 61 hearing against Karadzic 
and Mladic, Erdemovic stated: "I cannot estimate but, to be quite frank, I would rather 
not know how many people I killed." Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 
Prosecutor's Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, at n.8 (Nov. 11, 1996) [here-
inafter Erdemovic, Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors] (on file with author). 
433 Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 80. 
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tempts to contact the Tribunal, mostly through journalists to whom he 
told his story, and these attempts led to his arrest by Yugoslav authori-
ties!s4 He was subsequently transferred to the Tribunalm and was 
charged with one count of a crime against humanity, and in the alter-
native, one count of a violation of the laws or customs of war.4s6 Im-
mediately upon his arrival at the Tribunal, Erdemovic provided the 
prosecution with a great deal of information about the Srebrenica 
massacres,m and on his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, 
he pled guilty to the count of a crime against humanity.4g8 He also tes-
tified on behalf of the prosecution in the Rule 61 proceedings in the 
Karadzic case.439 The prosecution described ErdemoviC's cooperation 
as "substantial, full and comprehensive" and in particular noted that 
Erdemovic had provided the prosecution with facts of which they had 
previously been unaware, enabling them to initiate on-site investiga-
tions that confirmed Erdemovic's statements.440 Erdemovic also re-
peatedly expressed remorse about what had happened at Sre-
brenica.441 
The Trial Chamber accepted Erdemovic's guilty plea, dismissed 
the alternative war crimes count,442 and subsequently sentenced him to 
ten years' imprisonment.44g The Trial Chamber did not accept Erde-
moviC's claim to have acted under duress because he did not produce 
434 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-9().22-T, Transcript, 31-34, 37-38 (Jan. 14, 
1998) [hereinafter Erdemovic, Transcript] , at http:/ / www.un .org/icty/transe22/ 9801 
14it.html. 
435 Erdemovic, First Sentencing judgement, supra note 330, at para. 2; Erdemovic, 
Transcript, supra note 434, at 25-26. 
436 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-9().22-A,Judgement, para. 3 (Oct. 7, 1997). 
437 Erdemovic, Transcript, supra note 434, at 35-38. 
438 Erdemovic, First Sentencing judgement, supra note 330, at paras. 3, 10. 
439 /d. at para. 6. Rule 61 provides for something of a mini-trial in cases in which a 
warrant for arrest has not been executed within a reasonable period of time. Rule 61 
proceedings allow the prosecution to introduce in open court (and thus preserve) wit-
ness testimony, documentation, physical evidence, and the like. If a majority of the 
Trial Chamber concludes that "there are reasonable grounds for believing that the ac-
cused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall so de-
termine." ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 61 (c) . If a majority of the Trial Chamber 
additionally determines that the failure to execute the arrest warrant resulted from a 
refusal to cooperate by the state concerned, then it can transmit a certification of its 
conclusions to the U.N. Security Council as a basis for possible sanctions. /d. at R. 
61 (d). 
440 Erdemovic, Second Sentencing judgement, sufTTa note 343, at para. 16(iv); Er-
demovic, First Sentencingjudgement, supra note 330, at para. 99. 
441 Erdemovic, Transcript, supra note 434, at 48. 
442 Erdemovic, First Sentencingjudgement, supra note 330, at para. 3. 
443 /d. at text accompanying n.l41. 
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any evidence corroborating that claim.444 The Chamber did, however, 
consider the extreme remorse that Erdemovic repeatedly expressed 
and his substantial cooperation with the prosecution to be mitigating 
factors and discussed these at length, noting in particular that the 
prosecution had made Erdemovic no promises in exchange for his tes-
timony.445 As for ErdemoviC's guilty plea, the Trial Chamber men-
tioned it as a mitigating factor at the very end of the opinion,446 but the 
very cursory reference and its placement indicate that the Trial Cham-
ber did not place substantial weight on it in mitigation. 
Erdemovic appealed, and the Appeals Chamber sent the case back 
to the Trial Chamber.447 In doing so, the Appeals Chamber made cer-
tain pronouncements about the advantages of guilty pleas and plea 
bargaining. Judges McDonald and Vohrah noted that common-law 
countries recognize the benefits that guilty pleas provide "to the public 
in minimising costs, in the saving of court time and in avoiding the in-
444 /d. at para. 91. 
445 /d. at para. 99; see also Erdemovic, Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, 
supra note 432, § E (Nov. 11, 1996) (telling the court that "(n]o promises were made 
by the OTP to Mr. Erdemovic to induce his co-operation"). The Chamber also consid-
ered other mitigating factors: Erdemovic's youth; his subordinate level in the military 
hierarchy; the fact that he did not constitute a danger; the corrigible character of his per-
sonality; and the fact that he would serve his sentence in a prison far from his own coun-
try. Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 111. 
446 Erdemovic, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 111. 
447 The Appeals Chamber held that before a Trial Chamber can accept a guilty plea, 
it must satisfy itself that the plea is voluntary, informed, and not equivocal. Erdemovic, 
Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at para. 8. In a subse-
quent case, defendant Dragoljub Kunarac pled guilty to rape as a crime against human-
ity, Prosecutorv. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Transcript, 5-6 (Mar. 9, 1998), 
but then-President Cassese declined to accept the plea, finding that it was not informed. 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Transcript, 44-45 (Mar. 13, 
1998). 
The Erdemovic Appeals Chamber further held that, all things being equal, an of-
fense charged as a crime against humanity is more serious and should entail a harsher 
penalty than the same offense charged as a war crime. Erdemovic, Joint Opinion of 
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at para. 20. Because Erdemovic was 
charged with alternative counts of a crime against humanity and a war crime and pled 
guilty to the crime against humanity-the more serious crime-the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that his plea was not informed. See id. at para. 26 ("Had he been properly ap-
prised of the less serious charge and his entitlement to plead to it, we have grave doubts 
that he would have continued to plead guilty to the more serious charge."); Prosecutor v. 
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 
para. 5 (Oct. 7, 1997) (finding that while the guilty plea was voluntary, it was not suffi-
ciently infonned or unambiguous to be acceptable). 
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convenience to many, particularly to witnesses."448 They went on to 
opine that the institution of the guilty plea should 
find a ready place in an international criminal forum such as the Inter-
national Tribunal confronted by cases which, by their inherent nature, 
are very complex and necessarily require lengthy hearings if they go to 
trial under stringent financial constraints arising from allocations made 
by the United Nations itself dependent upon the contributions of 
States.449 
Striking a similar note, Judge Cassese's separate and dissenting 
opinion also noted the financial and logistical difficulties of conducting 
criminal trials in international tribunals and concluded that by pleading 
guilty the defendant "undoubtedly contributes to public advantage."4''0 
Judge Cassese went on to describe the benefits that a guilty plea se-
cures for a defendant himself, and in particular noted that "the ac-
cused may expect that the court will recognise his cooperative attitude 
by reducing the sentence it would have imposed had there not been a 
plea of guilty: in other words, the accused may hope that the court 
will be more lenient in recognition of his admission of guilt."451 Judge 
Cassese thus endorsed implicit plea bargaining, but he ended his en-
dorsement there. He went on to say that: 
448 Erdemovic, Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at 
para. 2. 
449 /d. 
450 Erdemovic, Cassese Dissent, supra note 143, at para. 8. The following is Judge 
Cassese's full treatment of the difficulties attendant upon international criminal trials: 
!d. 
It is apparent from the whole spirit of the Statute and the Rules that, by pro-
viding for a guilty plea, the draftsmen intended to enable the accused (as well 
as the Prosecutor) to avoid a possible lengthy trial with all the attendant diffi-
culties. These difficulties-it bears stressing-are all the more notable in inter-
national proceedings. Here, it often proves extremely arduous and time-
consuming to collect evidence. In addition, it is imperative for the relevant 
officials of an international court to fulfil the essential but laborious task of 
protecting victims and witnesses. Furthermore, international criminal pro-
ceedings are expensive, on account of the need to provide a host of facilities 
to the various parties concerned (simultaneous interpretation into various 
languages; provision of transcripts for the proceedings, again in various lan-
guages; transportation of victims and witnesses from far-away countries; provi-
sion ofvarious forms of assistance to them during trial, etc.). 
451 /d. Judge Cassese also noted that by pleading guilty a defendant might "salve 
his conscience and atone for his wrongdoing." /d. He also will "avoid the indignity 
and the possible demoralisation of undergoing a trial," as well as the attendant psycho-
logical ordeal, and he will "eschew the public exposure that may ensue from trial, and 
the adverse consequences for his social position and the life of his family and rela-
tives." /d. 
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[B]oth the Statute and the Rules deliberately do not make provision for 
plea bargaining-or, at least, for any endorsement or acknowledgement 
by the Chambers of out-of-<:ourt plea bargaining. This means, among 
other things, that the framers of the Statute and the Rules aimed at 
averting those distortions of the free will of the accused which may be 
I. k d I b . . 452 m e to p ea argammg. 
113 
At his next appearance before the Trial Chamber, Erdemovic pled 
guilty to the war-crimes charge,m and at the second sentencing hearing, 
the prosecution and defense presented the Trial Chamber with an 
American-style "Plea Bargain Agreement."454 The agreement recorded 
that the parties had agreed, among other things, on the "factual basis of 
the allegations" and, in particular, that Erdemovic had acted under du-
ress.455 The parties further agreed that "seven years' imprisonment 
would be an appropriate sentence in this case, considering the mitigat-
ing circumstances,"456 and the prosecution "agreed not to proceed with 
the alternative count of a crime against humanity."457 At the pre-
sentencing hearing, the prosecution emphasized the enormous value of 
Erdemovic's cooperation458 and the fact that it was offered "freely and 
voluntarily,"45!1 without expectation of leniency,460 and "at some personal 
452 /d. at para. 10. 
453 Erdemovic, Second Sentencing judgement, supra note 343, at para. 8. 
454 /d. at para. 18. 
455 /d. at para. 18(c). 
456 /d. at para. 18(d) . 
457 /d. at para. 18(e) . 
458 Erdemovic, Transcript, supra note 434, at 28. The prosecution noted the par-
ticular value of the information that Erdemovic provided, stating, for instance, that in-
formation regarding the massacre at the Branjevo Farm in Pilica 
was not available to the Office of the Prosecutor in any great detail prior to 
the assistance that was given by Mr. Erdemovi[c]. The location of the site 
was . . . of significant importance to the Office of the Prosecutor and permit-
ted an exhumation to be carried out at the site where the victims were uncov-
ered. 
/d. The prosecution also noted that the IClY had a greater need for such information 
than a domestic jurisdiction because 
/d. 
in national jurisdictions the prosecutor officials [sic] have access to police 
forces who are mobile on the ground and can obtain evidence and informa-
tion much more readily and easily than occurs with the Office of the Prosecu-
tor here in the Tribunal, which to a large extent is dependent upon the co-
operation of states and other international and non-international bodies, be-
fore that information can be collected and gathered. 
459 /d. at 29. 
460 See id. at 38, 46 (asserting that Erdemovic repeatedly did not attempt to trade 
information for a reduced sentence or charge). 
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risk" to Erdemovic himself. 461 In addition, the prosecution empha-
sized that Erdemovic was fully aware that his coming forward would 
likely result in his prosecution for international crimes.462 
While noting that it was in no way bound by the recommendations 
in the plea agreement, the second Trial Chamber stated that it took 
them "into careful consideration" in determining Erdemovic's sen-
tence.463 In addition, the second Trial Chamber showed greater appre-
ciation for the utility of guilty pleas and a greater willingness to reward 
them, perhaps in consequence of the Appeals Chamber's discussion of 
the question. Thus, instead of treating Erdemovic's guilty plea as some-
thing of an afterthought, perhaps as a factor that should not be dis-
cussed too openly, the second Trial Chamber announced that "[a]n 
admission of guilt demonstrates honesty and it is important for the In-
ternational Tribunal to encourage people to come forth, whether al-
ready indicted or as unknown perpetrators."464 The Trial Chamber fur-
ther noted that Erdemovic's "voluntary admission of guilt which has 
saved the International Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy inves-
tigation and trial is to be commended."465 
In March 1998, nearly eighteen months after the first Trial Cham-
ber pronounced its ten-year sentence upon Erdemovic, the second 
Trial Chamber sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.466 Some of 
the difference between the two sentences presumably reflected the be-
lief-which has subsequently been invalidated-that a war crime should 
ordinarily result in a lighter penalty than a crime against humanity. But 
one suspects the second Trial Chamber's greater appreciation for Er-
demoviC's guilty plea also played a role. The Trial Chamber noted the 
benefits that a guilty plea affords to the Tribunal and the desirable 
qualities that it reflects in the defendant who makes it.467 And because 
Erdemovic was that rare defendant whose guilty plea did seem moti-
vated by true remorse and a desire to state the truth, the Trial Cham-
ber's words rang true, which would not always be the case in subsequent 
cases. 
461 /d. at 29. 
462 !d. at 45-46. 463 Erdemovic, Second Sentencingjudgement, sufrra note 343, at para. 19. 
464 /d. atpara.16(ii). 
46~ ld. 
466 /d. at para. 23. 
467 !d. at para. 16. 
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c. Jelisic 
The next IC1Y defendant to plead guilty, Goran Jelisic, was not 
nearly so sympathetic a character as his predecessor. Jelisic was the de 
facto commander of the Luka detention camp, the camp to which Mus-
lim men were transported and imprisoned following the Serbs' May 
1992 attack on Brcko, in northeastem Bosnia.468 Jelisic presented him-
self to his Muslim detainees and later to the Tribunal as the "Serbian 
Adolf' and allegedly told the detainees that 70% of them were to be 
killed and the remaining 30% beaten.469 Jelisic reportedly declared that 
he had to execute twenty to thirty people in a moming before being 
able to drink his coffee and allegedly kept detainees informed of the 
running count of Muslims that he had killed.470 On May 11, 1992, he 
claimed to have killed 150 people.471 • 
In an amended indictment, Jelisic was charged with one count of 
genocide and thirty-nine counts of crimes against humanity and viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war.472 Jelisic pled not guilty to the count 
of genocide, but, after indicating his willingness to plead guilty to thirty-
one of the war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity counts,473 the parties 
prepared an "Agreed Factual Basis for the Guilty Pleas to be Entered by 
Goran Jelisic," and the prosecution dropped the remaining war-crimes 
and crimes-against-humanity counts.474 In the Agreed Factual Basis, 
Jelisic admitted to killing thirteen people,475 inflicting bodily harm on 
four people,476 and stealing money from the Luka camp detainees.477 
More specifically,Jelisic admitted to severely beating some of his victims 
468 Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at paras. 18, 21. 
469 !d. at para. 102. He went on to state that of the 30% who would be beaten, only 
4% "might not be badly beaten." ld. 
470 Id. at para. 103. 
471 !d. 
472 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, Amended Indictment, paras. 1~1 
(Mar. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Jelisic, Amended Indictment], reprinted in Int'l Tribunal far 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible far Serious Violations of Int 'l Humanitarian Law Commit-
ted in the Territary of the Farmer Yugoslavia Since 1991, Y.B. 1998, at 168, U.N. Sales No. 
E.OO.III.P.1 [hereinafter Int'l Tribuna~ 1998 Y.B.] . 
473 Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at paras. 8, 11 , 24. 
474 !d. at para. 10. Compare]elisic, Amended Indictment, supra note 472, at paras. 
1~1. with Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Second Amended Indictment, 
paras. 15-63 (Oct. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Jelisic, Second Amended Indictment], re-
printed in Int'l Tribuna~ 1998 Y.B., supra note 472, at 178. 
m Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at paras. 3, 38. 
476 !d. at paras. 3, 42-44. 
477 ld. at paras. 3, 49. 
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with truncheons and clubs before killing them.478 The Trial Chamber 
noted the "repugnant, bestial and sadistic nature" ofJelisiC's crimes.479 
The Trial Chamber held a trial on the genocide count and acquit-
ted Jelisic after hearing only the prosecution's submissions.480 At the 
pre-sentencing hearing on the counts to which Jelisic had pled guilty, 
the prosecution sought a sentence of life imprisonment.481 The prose-
cution maintained that JelisiC's cooperation had "not been substantial 
and ongoing," and it contended that his guilty plea should not be con-
sidered a substantial mitigating factor. 482 The prosecution maintained 
that, unlike some guilty pleas, JelisiC's did not evidence remorse or 
spare the victims the burden of testifying, since he went to trial on the 
genocide count. 483 Further, the prosecution noted thatJelisic was aware 
of incriminating evidence in the prosecution's possession, and that he 
had admitted little more than what was shown in the evidence.484 
The Trial Chamber did not impose a life sentence but came close, 
sentencing Jelisic to forty years' imprisonment for the crimes to which 
he had pled guilty.1H5 Unlike the second Erdemovil: Trial Chamber, 
which spoke so glowingly about Erdemovic's guilty plea, the jelisif: Trial 
Chamber gavejelisic little, if any, credit for his plea. Although the Trial 
Chamber "considered UeiisiC's] guilty plea out of principle," it went on 
478 !d. at para. 38. 
479 /d. at para. 130. 
180 ld. at para. 15. The Appeals Chamber subsequently reversed the Trial Cham-
ber's conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction on geno-
cide.jelisic, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 57. However, it did not send the case back 
to the Trial Chamber for a new trial. /d. at paras. 73-77. 
481 Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 119; Prosecution v.jelisic, Case No. 
IT-95-10-T, Transcript, 3070, 3132 (Nov. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Jelisic, Transcript], at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe10/991125it.htm. 
482 Jelisic, Transcript, supra note 481, at 3077-79. In particular, the prosecution 
maintained that: 
Uelisic's] cooperation was not significant and did not contribute in a mean-
ingful way. It did not contribute to the effective arrest of other defendants or 
to the effective pursuit of other suspects or targets, and it did not lead to sig-
nificant investigations. The defendant did not surrender himself voluntarily. 
The information provided was not considered by the Prosecution as useful, 
taking into consideration the fact that it was mainly public information or in-
formation of common knowledge, except with respect to his own acts. The 
Prosecution considers part of the information to be unreliable or incorrect 
because of inconsistencies and because of the sanitised version of events 
given. 
/d. at 3078. 
483 /d. at 3079-80. 
484 !d. at 3080-81. 
48
'' Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at pard. 139. 
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to note that Jelisic was fully aware of photographs that showed him 
committing some of the crimes and "demonstrated no remorse ... for 
the crimes he committed."486 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber accorded 
"only relative weight to his plea."487 The Trial Chamber further noted 
that ':JelisiC's crimes were committed under particularly aggravating cir-
,1ssth f: . h dth . . . . 489 Th cumstances at ar outwe1g e e m1t1gatmg circumstances. e 
Trial Chamber noted in particular JelisiC's "cold-blooded" and "enthu-
siastic" commission of the crimes, which, according to the Trial Cham-
ber, attested "to a profound contempt for mankind and the right to 
life."490 
Although Jelisic pled guilty, the case did not involve a plea bargain 
because Jelisic got nothing in return for his plea. According to one of 
JelisiC's lawyers, Jelisic pled guilty, over the objections of his lawyers, on 
the mistaken belief that his guilty plea would be considered substantial 
cooperation with the prosecution.491 In fact, prosecution lawyers told 
Jelisic that they would offer him nothing for his plea492 and true to their 
word, they sought the harshest available sentence. The prosecution did 
withdraw eight of the thirty-nine counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, but it did so as a result of evidentiary deficiencies, not 
to grantjelisic a concession.493 As for the Trial Chamber, by imposing a 
forty-year sentence on the thirty-one-year-oldJelisic,494 it issued the prac-
tical equivalent of a life sentence, showing that no implicit plea bargain-
ing took place. 
486 I d. at para. 127. 
487 Id. 
488 Id. at para. 129. 
489 See id. at para. 134 (explaining why the Trial Chamber imposed such a high 
standard). 
490 I d. at paras. 130-31. 
491 Telephone Interview with Nicola Kostic, Defense Counsel (Oct. 25, 2001). 
492 Telephone Interview with Terree Bowers, former IClY Senior Trial Attorney 
(Oct. 30, 2001). 
493 Id. Indeed, the withdrawal, whatever the reason for it, was not likely to (and did 
riot) result in a substantial sentence reduction given the counts that remained. Of the 
eight dropped charges, four related to the killing of two people, two related to the gen-
eral conditions at the Luka camp, and two related to the torture of a victim that Jelisic 
admitted to killing. While these charges are obviously serious, they do not add substan-
tially in quality or quantity to the egregious criminal conduct to whichjelisic pled guilty. 
494 Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 124. 
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d. Todorovic 
Stevan Todorovic, the third IC1Y defendant to plead guilty, was in-
dicted along with four other defendants for atrocities committed as part 
of the Serbs' ethnic cleansing of Bosanski Samac and Odzak in north-
ern Bosnia-Herzegovina.4!15 Following the Serb take-over of Bosanski 
Samac in April 1992, Todorovic, a wicker-furniture factory executive, 
was appointed Chief of Police of Bosanski Samac.4!16 Todorovic partici-
pated in the take-over of the municipality and in the deportation and 
detention of the non-Serb population.497 While acting as police chief, 
Todorovic engaged in murder, sexual assaults, and beatings.498 As are-
sult of these offenses, Todorovic was charged with twenty-seven counts 
of crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
and violations of the laws and customs of war. 499 
Todorovic pled not guilty to these counts500 and prepared, along 
with his c<rdefendants, for trial. Unlike his c<Xlefendants, however, 
Todorovic held a bargaining chi~the ability to embarrass NATO-
that would assist him in obtaining sentencing concessions. Todorovic 
had been captured by four bounty hunters while in his home in the 
Federal Republic ofYugoslavia.501 He was allegedly dealt a heavy blow 
to the head502 while being transported to Bosnia-Herzegovina and into 
the hands of the NATO forces deployed there (SFOR).503 Upon his 
495 According to the indictment, Croats and Muslims accounted for 17,000 of the 
total population of 33,000 of Bosanski Samac prior to the Serb take-over of the mu-
nicipality in April 1992. By May, 1995, fewer than 300 of the 17,000 Croat and Muslim 
residents remained. Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Second Amended In-
dictment, pard. 8 (Mar. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Simic, Second Amended Indictment], at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sim-r2ai990325e.pdf. 
496 !d. at para. 17. 
47. 
497 Todorovic, Sentencingjudgement, supra note 336, at paras. 35, 42, 45. 
498 !d. at paras. 36-41. 
499 Simic, Second Amended Indictment, supra note 495, at paras. 29-30, 34, 38, 40-
500 Todorovic, Sentencingjudgement, supra note 336, at paras. 2, 4. 
501 See Major Christopher M. Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Crimi-
nals: Privatizing the Enforcement of justice, 50 A.F. L. REv. 215, 217 n.ll (2001); Marlise 
Simmons, War Crimes Court Takes It Easy on a Covperative Bosnian Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 2001, at A4 (reporting that the method of Todorovic's arrest set his case apart from 
others and was a difficult issue for the court to handle). A regional court in Serbia 
subsequently convicted nine people of "kidnapping for money." 9 Convicted of Kidnap 
of War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A15; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovic, 
Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 786 (Dec. 13, 2000) (detailing the defense counsel's 
discussion of Todorovic's capture and his capturers' subsequent prosecution), at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe9/001213.htm. 
502 See Susan Lamb, Illegal Arrest and the Jurisdiction of the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON IC1Y 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, 
at 27, 35 n.33 (discussing Todorovic's injury); Laura Palmer & Cristina Posa, The Best-
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hands of the NATO forces deployed there (SFOR) .503 Upon his arrival 
at the IC1Y, Todorovic asked for an evidentiary hearing to address the 
legality of his arrest.504 Once the Trial Chamber granted his request for 
an evidentiary hearing, Todorovic filed a motion for judicial assistance, 
asking the Trial Chamber to order "NATO/SFOR or other military and 
security forces operating in Bosnia to provide documents and witnesses 
regarding Todorovic's detention" and transfer to Bosnia.50'' The Trial 
Chamber granted TodoroviC's motion, over SFOR's vehement objec-
tions, and ordered SFOR and the states participating in SFOR to pro-
vide Todorovic with, among other things, the names of the persons who 
had transported him to Bosnia-Herzegovina and copies of correspon-
dence, audio and video tapes, and pre- and post-operations reports re-
lating to TodoroviC's arrest.506 NATO, the United States, and several 
other NATO states appealed, and the Appeals Chamber stayed the Trial 
Ch b ' d . . d' I 5o7 am er s eoswn pen mg appea . 
While the case was pending before the Appeals Chamber, 
Todorovic and the prosecution negotiated a plea agreement. Pursuant 
to the plea agreement, Todorovic pled guilty to one count of persecu-
tion as a crime against humanity,508 promised to testifY against his co-
defendants and in other proceedings-one of which may be the 
Milosevif: case509 -and withdrew his motions challenging the legality of 
Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground, 
12 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 361, 382 n.l16 (1999) (repeating the defense attorney's state-
ments that Todorovic was hit in the head with a baseball bat during his capture). 
503 Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating To Interna-
tional Law, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 387,401 (2001). 
so1 Id. 
505 Id. at 401; see also Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion 
for Judicial Assistance to Be Provided by SFOR and Others, para. 1 (Oct. 18. 2000) 
[hereinafter Simic, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance], at http:/ I 
www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3. For a detailed treatment of TodoroviC's motions re-
garding his arrest, see Lamb, supra note 502, at 34-36. 
506 Simic, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance, supra note 505, at disposi-
tion. 
507 Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Decision and Scheduling Order (Nov. 
8, 2000), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/simic/appeal/decision-e/01108JA314063.htm; see 
also Wald, supra note 288, at 549 n.64 (noting the "high-decibel protests by NATO 
countries and SFOR" against the Trial Chamber's order of disclosure). 
508 Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at para. 4. 
509 I d. at para: 84. Todorovic's plea agreement remains under seal, so the particu-
lars of his promises to cooperate are not available. However, a Tribunal prosecutor 
told the New York Times that Todorovic, because of his position, had valuable informa-
tion about the wartime political chain of command-in particular the role of the 
paramilitary groups from Serbia and their connections with the Belgrade government. 
According to the prosecutor, the trail "could well lead" to Milosevic. Simmons, supra 
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his arrest.510 The prosecution, for its part, withdrew the remammg 
twenty-six counts511 and agreed to recommend to the Trial Chamber a 
prison sentence of between five and twelve years.m Both parties agreed 
not to appeal any sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber within that 
range,515 and both parties agreed that if either side did not fulfil its end 
of the bargain, the plea agreement would be dissolved and the case 
would proceed to trial.514 TodoroviC thus represents the first IC'IY case to 
expressly feature plea bargaining. 
Although on the surface, the withdrawal of twenty-six of the twenty-
seven counts would seem a substantial prosecutorial concession, in fact, 
it had limited significance because the one count to which Todorovic 
pled guilty encompassed the offenses contained in the other twenty-six 
counts. Specifically, in the twenty-six counts that the prosecution 
dropped, Todorovic was alleged to have participated in the deportation 
and transfer of non-Serb civilians;515 to have ordered the torture of a 
Muslim civilian;516 and to have killed, beaten, and sexually assaulted 
other, specified non-Serb civilians.517 The one count to which 
Todorovic pled guilty-persecution as a crime against humanity-
charged Todorovic with the same offenses; and in pleading guilty, 
note 501. At TodoroviC's sentencing hearing, the Senior Trial Attorney described To-
dorovic's cooperation with the prosecution as follows: 
I can confirm that Mr. Todorovic has spoken with representatives of our of-
fices on multiple occasions, and on each occasion he has participated in a 
fully cooperative and forthright manner. Some of the information he has 
provided might not have been accessible to the Prosecution but for his coop-
eration. Mr. Todorovic has agreed to continue his cooperation, and there are 
plans to interview him on future occasions. In addition, he has agreed to tes-
tifY at the trial in this case and in other cases in which his assistance might be 
useful. 
Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 54-55 (May, 4, 2001) (on file 
with author). 
510 Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 5. 
511 Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the Prosecution Mo-
tion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending 
Motions, para. 5 (Feb. 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/todovoric/trialc/ 
decision-e/10226DC515095.htm; Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at 
para. 5. 
512 Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 11. 
513 !d. 
514 !d. at para. 8; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 
810-12 (Jan. 19, 2001) (reserving the right of the Prosecutor to reinstate the indict-
ment should the accused fail to fulfil his obligations under the plea agreement), at 
http/ jwww.un.org/icty /transe9/0l 0119iaed.htm. 
"'" Prosecutor v. Simic, Second Amended Indictment, supra note 495, at paras. 38, 
40-47. 
516 !d. at para. 47. 
517 !d. at paras. 43-46. 
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ed Todorovic with the same offenses; and in pleading guilty, Todorovic 
admitted in a written "Factual Basis for the Crimes to which Stevan 
Todorovic has pled guilty" to the same killing, beatings, sexual assaults, 
torture, and deportations that were included in the twenty-six dropped 
counts.518 Thus, the withdrawal of the twenty-six counts should have 
made little or no difference to Todorovic's sentence. The real sentenc-
ing concession bestowed on Todorovic was the prosecution's promise 
not to seek a sentence exceeding twelve years' imprisonment. At 
Todorovic's sentencing hearing, the prosecution opined that had 
Todorovic been convicted at trial, he probably would have been sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from fifteen to twenty-five 
. 5 19 years or more. 
On this point, the Trial Chamber agreed. Although the Trial 
Chamber repeatedly noted that it was not bound by the plea agree-
ment,520 it sentenced Todorovic to ten years' imprisonment521-thus 
within the range specified by the parties-and stated that it would have 
sentenced Todorovic to a much longer term of imprisonment but for 
his timely guilty plea and his cooperation with the prosecution.522 In-
deed, if Todorovii: represents the first IC1Y case in which prosecutorial 
plea bargaining became evident, it also represents the Trial Chambers' 
first explicit blessing of plea bargaining. Specifically, the Trial Chamber 
expressly held "that a guilty plea should, in principle, give rise to a re-
duction in the sentence that the accused would otherwise have re-
ceived."523 In justifying this view, the Trial Chamber not only noted the 
518 See Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 7, 9. 
519 Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 55 (May 4, 2001) (on 
file with author). That estimate seems reasonable: Tadic received a twenty-year sen-
tence for somewhat similar conduct, and Tadic did not hold a superior position as did 
Todorovic. And Jelisic, even after pleading guilty, received a forty-year sentence. Jelisic 
killed more people than Todorovic, so he deserved a harsher sentence, but there are 
many terms of imprisonment that are shorter than forty years and longer than twelve 
years. 520 Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 16, 79, 86. 
521 
Id. at para 115. 
522 Id. at para. 114. The prosecution sought the maximum sentence that it could 
seek under the plea agreement-twelve years-and argued that Todorovic had already 
been compensated for his cooperation and guilty plea by the prosecution's promise not 
to seek a sentence longer than twelve years' imprisonment, so that the Trial Chamber 
should not impose a shorter sentence. ld. at para. 68. The Chamber rejected that ar-
gument, holding that "the fact that an accused has gained or may gain something pursu-
ant to an agreement with the Prosecution does not preclude the Trial Chamber from 
considering his substantial cooperation as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing." Id. 
at para. 86. 523 Id. at para. 80. 
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financial and logistical advantages of guilty pleas,524 it set forth an addi-
tional benefit, stating that "[a] guilty plea is always important for the 
purpose of establishing the truth in relation to a crime."525 Finally, the 
Trial Chamber gave Todorovic credit for remorse. At his sentencing 
hearing, Todorovic had made a statement, expressing his "profound 
repentance and remorse."526 He told the Trial Chamber that he had 
not wanted to become police chief, that he had lacked the courage to 
prevent the atrocities, and that if allowed to return to Bosnia, he would 
"invest every effort in the new multi-ethnic Bosnia" as a means of aton-
ing for his sins.527 The Trial Chamber considered these expressions of 
remorse sincere and treated them as a mitigating factor. 528 
e. Sikirica 
In April 1992, Serb forces took control of the town of Prejidor, in 
northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina and soon after began seizing Bosnian 
Muslims and Bosnian Croats and transferring them to detention facili-
ties. Sikirica involved one of those detention facilities-the Keraterm 
camp-and featured as defendants Dusko Sikirica, Keraterm's Com-
mander of Security, and Damir Dosen and Dragen Kolundzija, two of 
Keraterm's shift leaders.529 Keraterm's detainees were kept in appalling 
conditions. They were confined in crowded rooms where there was so 
little space that they had to take turns standing.r.~o They had little or no 
d. al '1 5~ 1 5~2 d £ d 1 . access to me IC care, tOI ets, or water an were e on y starvation 
rations.m Most detainees were beaten on arrival at the camp,5~4 and 
guards and visitors thereafter beat the detainees at will, killing many of 
them.535 In the camp's most notorious incident-the so-called Room 3 
massacre-Serb forces entered Keraterm, locked approximately 150 to 
72. 
[.24 /d. 
m /d. at para. 81 . 
521i /d. at para. 90. 
f>27 Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/ 1, Transcript, 59-62 (May 4, 2001 ). 
528 Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 92. 
''
29 Sikirica, Sentencingjudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 118, 153, 200. 
530 /d. at paras. 62-63. 
''
31 fd. at paras. 68, 74. 
''
32 fd. at para. 73. 
m fd. at para. 70. Each detainee lost, on average, forty-four pounds. /d. at para. 
,,,. /d. at para. 57. 
''
3
'' /d. at paras. 84-100. 
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200 detainees in a room, and fired upon them with machine guns, kill-
ing virtually all of them.530 
Recounting these and other facts, the indictment charged the de-
fendants with persecution as a crime against humanity and several other 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.537 In addition, the indictment 
charged Sikirica with one count of genocide and one count of complic-
ity to commit genocide.538 All three defendants pled not guilty and pro-
ceeded to trial.539 At the close of the prosecution's case, the three de-
fendants filed motions for acquittal. The Trial Chamber granted 
Sikirica's motion with respect to the counts of genocide and complicity 
to commit genocide/'40 and it granted Dosen's motion with respect to 
four counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes involving the 
beating of detainees because the prosecution conceded that "the only 
evidence connecting Damir Dosen to the alleged incident (was] excul-
• ,Mt patory m nature. 
Following the Trial Chamber's judgment, Sikirica and Dosen put 
on their defenses, but when it came time for KolundZija to put on his 
defense, he instead pled guilty. He and the prosecution entered into a 
plea agreement in which he pled guilty to one count of persecution as a 
crime against humanity, and the prosecution dropped the remaining 
four counts.542 Three days after Kolundzija entered his guilty plea, 
Sikirica and Dosen informed the Trial Chamber that they too had en-
tered into plea agreements with the prosecution wherein they pled 
guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity, and the 
prosecution dropped the remaining counts.543 Although all three de-
fendants pled guilty to the count of persecution as a crime against hu-
manity, they acknowledged varying levels of culpability. The persecu-
tion count alleged persecution by five methods: (a) murder; (b) 
torture and beating; (c) sexual assault and rape; (d) harassment, hu-
536 !d. at paras. 101.{)3. 
537 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Second Amended Indictment Qan. 
3, 2001), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sik-2ai001220e.htm. 
5
!18 !d. at paras. 2&.34. 
539 Sikirica, Sentencingjudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 2-4. 
540 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motions to 
Acquit, paras. 97, 172 (Sept. 3, 2001), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty /sikirica/judgement/ 
010903r98bis-e. pdf. 
541 !d. at paras. 134, 151. 
542 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 12-13; Prosecutor v. 
KolundZija, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Admitted Facts Relevant to the Plea Agreement for 
Dragan KolundZija, para. 7 (Sept. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Kolundiija, Plea Agreement] 
(on file with author). 
543 Sikilica, Sentencingjudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 14-15. 
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miliation, and psychological abuse; and (e) confinement in inhumane 
conditions.544 Sikirica acknowledged participating in all of those meth-
ods and in particular admitted to killing one detainee;545 Dosen admit-
ted to participating in (b), (d), and (e) ;546 and Kolundzija admitted only 
(e).547 All three defendants acknowledged the murders and beatings 
that took place at Keraterm and the inhumane conditions prevailing,548 
but the plea agreements also noted the defendants' limited responsi-
bilities. They stated, for instance, that none of the defendants had had 
the power to punish subordinates549 and that they had little, if any, abil-
ity to prevent other persons, not on the staff, from entering Keraterm at 
will and mistreating the detainees.''50 Sikirica's and Dosen's plea agree-
ments stated that they were not responsible for ensuring adequate food, 
water, clothing, medical assistance, and accommodation for the detain-
ees,551 and Dosen's and Kolundzija's plea agreements noted certain ef-
forts that those defendants had made to assist detainees.5''2 
The Sikirica plea agreements and sentencing proceedings bore 
great similarity to those of TodoroviC. As in TodoroviC, the prosecution in 
Sikirica agreed to recommend sentences that fell within specified 
ranges, and both parties agreed not to appeal any sentence that fell 
within that range.5''~ Specifically, the prosecution agreed to recommend 
M
4 /d. at para. 18. 
545 Id. at paras. 18, 21. 
Mo /d. at para. 26. 
547 /d. at para. 32. 
548 Kolundzija, Plea Agreement, supra note 542, at para. 3; Prosecutor v. Dosen, 
Case No. IT-95-8-T,Joint Submission of the Prosecution and the Accused Damir Dosen 
Concerning a Plea Agreement and Admitted Facts, paras. 8-10 (Sept. 6, 2001) [herein-
after Dosen, Plea Agreement] (on file with author); Prosecution v. Sikirica, Case No. 
IT-95-8-T, Joint Submission of the Prosecution and the Accused Dusko Sikirica Con-
cerning a Plea Agreement and Admitted Facts, paras. 8-10 (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter 
Sikirica, Plea Agreement] (on file with author). 
54
!
1 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 19, 27. 
IJIJO 
· · /d. at paras. 20, 28, 34. 
551 /d. at paras. 19, 27. 
552 Kolundzija, Plea Agreement, supra note 542, at paras. 4-5; Dosen, Plea Agree-
ment, supra note 548, at para. 13; see also Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, 
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, paras. 70, 86 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica, 
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief] (recording that while not responsible for prisoner 
conditions, Sikirica attempted to improve them) (on file with author); Sikirica, Sen-
tencingJudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 27, 29, 33-35 (stating that all three defen-
dants attempted to improve conditions of detainees). Indeed, at trial, forty-one prose-
cution witnesses testified about Kolundzija's efforts. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-
95-8-T, Transcript, 5773 (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica, Transcript] (on file with 
author). 
r.ss Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37. In 
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sentences between ten and seventeen years' imprisonment for Sikirica, 
between five and seven years' imprisonment for Dosen, and between 
three and five years' imprisonment for Kolundzija.554 Further, each of 
the Sikirica defendants, like Todorovic, made statements at the sentenc-
ing hearing expressing his remorse. While the Keraterm statements 
were not identical, they were quite similar both to each other and to 
TodoroviC's. They all emphasized that they had not worked at 
Keraterm voluntarily; that they were sorry that they had not done more 
to prevent the atrocities; and that, when they returned to Prejidor, they 
would speak out against ethnic divisions and try to promote reconcilia-
tion and harmony.555 One significant difference between Sikirica and 
Todorovii:, however, is that the Sikirica defendants did not promise to 
cooperate with the prosecution. 
The Trial Chamber also followed Todorovii: in its treatment of sev-
eral sentencing issues. First, the Trial Chamber sentenced the defen-
dants to terms of imprisonment within the ranges set forth in the plea 
agreements; specifically, it sentenced Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundzija to 
prison terms of fifteen years, five years, and three years, respectively.556 
Second, over the prosecution's objection, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that the defendants' statements of remorse were sincere and treated 
them as mitigating factors. 557 Finally, and most importantly, the Sikirica 
Trial Chamber reiterated Todorovii:'s endorsement of guilty pleas and 
indeed expanded upon it. Todorovic had pled guilty before his trial 
began, and after noting the savings that thus had accrued to the Tribu-
nal, the Todorovii: Trial Chamber went on to note that: 
[A] plea of guilt will only contribute to the above-described public ad-
vantage if it is pleaded before the commencement of the trial against the 
accused . . . . [I]f pleaded at a later stage of the proceedings, or even 
after the conclusion of the trial, a voluntary admission of guilt will not 
Sikirica's plea agreement, the prosecution also agreed not to appeal the Trial Cham-
ber's decision that Sikirica had no case to answer with respect to the genocide counts. 
Sikirica, Plea Agreement, supra note 548, at para. 5(b). 
554 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37. Also, like 
Todorovic, the prosecution in Sikirica recommended the maximum sentence for each 
defendant. Sikirica, Transcript, supra note 552, at 5687; Sikirica, Sentencing Judge-
ment, supra note 355, at para. 42. 
555 Sikirica, Transcript, supra note 552, at 5718-20, 5736-37, 5741-43. 
556 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at para. 245. 
557 !d. at paras. 152, 194, 230. The prosecution had maintained that neither Sikirica 
nor Dosen had shown any remorse. Id. at paras. 141, 174; see also Sikirica, Prosecution's 
Sentencing Brief, supra note 552, at para. 56. 
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save the International Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investi-
. d . 1558 gauon an tna . 
Sikirica involved just such "late" guilty pleas and required the Trial 
Chamber to determine what, if any, mitigating value should attach to 
them. The Sikirica Trial Chamber reiterated TodoroviC's conclusion that 
a guilty plea assists the Tribunal not only by saving it time and resources 
when it is timely made, but also, no matter when it is made, by contrib-
uting "directly to one of the fundamental objectives of the International 
Tribunal: namely, its truth-finding function."559 The Trial Chamber 
thus held that a defendant who enters a late plea will not get full credit-
as does a defendant who pleads guilty before trial-but he still stands to 
receive some credit.560 Indeed, with respect to Sikirica, the Trial Cham-
ber stated that even though his plea was very late, "he would have re-
ceived a much longer sentence" had he not pled guilty.561 
On December 28, 2001, the ICTY added Rule 62ter, entitled "Plea 
Agreement Procedure" to its RPE. Rule 62ter(A) provides that if a de-
fendant pleads guilty to one or more counts of the indictment, the 
Prosecutor may apply to amend the indictment accordingly, submit that 
a specific sentencing range is appropriate, and/ or not oppose a request 
by the defendant for a particular sentence or sentencing range. Sub-
section (B) states, however, that "[t]he Trial Chamber shall not be 
bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A)."562 Rule 62ter 
does not provide for anything new; it merely identifies the practices 
that had been taking place and reiterates the Trial Chambers' ulti-
mate sentencing discretion. The appearance of the rule, however, 
serves to publicize and legitimize the practices. 
558 Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 81. 
559 Sikirica, Sentencing judgement, supra note 355, at para. 149. 
560 !d. at para. 150. The Trial Chamber gave Kolundzija "close to the full credit for 
his guilty plea" because he pled guilty before the commencement of his case in defense. 
!d. at gara. 228. 
5 !d. at para. 234. Sikirica's plea agreement states that the prosecution would not 
have accepted a plea along the lines set forth in the agreement before trial, noting, 
among other things, that the second amended indictment included genocide charges 
which the Trial Chamber subsequently dismissed. Sikirica, Plea Agreement, supra note 
548, at para. 5(e). The Trial Chamber did not mention this point, but it may have in-
fluenced its decision to grant Sikirica a substantial sentencing discount, since it indi-
cates that Sikirica's guilty plea was as timely as it could have been. 
562 IC1Y RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62ter. 
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2. The ICTR's Guilty Plea Cases 
a. Background 
The years leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide saw other 
smaller-scale massacres of the Tutsi and the exile of thousands of Tutsi 
to neighboring countries.563 Rwanda became an authoritarian state in 
the 1970s; it was ruled by Hutu President Habyarimana and had a single 
political party, the Republican Movement for Democracy.564 During 
these years, the exiled Tutsi formed an army, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and engaged in several clashes with the Rwandan govern-
565 
ment. Mter the Rwandan government and the RPF fought to a stand-
still in the early 1990s, they entered into the Arusha Accords, which 
provided, among other things, for a new transitional government with a 
prime minister acceptable to both sides and for multi-party general 
elections with the full participation of the RPF.566 However, President 
Habyarimana began to undermine the Accords as soon as he adhered 
to them and, in particular, attempted to shore up support among his 
fellow Hutu by relying on "the unifying specter of a common enemy"-
the Tutsi.567 Habyarimana's government established a training camp for 
563 See BALL, supra note 288, at 159-60; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 47, 50; 
William A. Schabas, justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: .Searching 
for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 523-524 ( 1996). 
564 PAUL j. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, 
AND THE U.N. CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 14 (2000) (noting Habyarimana's overthrow of Kay-
ibanda, Rwanda's previously elected president); MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 
50 (discussing Habyarimana's government); Carroll, supra note 372, at 167-68 (descril:r 
ing Rwanda's government as a "one-party system"). 
565 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 50; Carroll, supra note 372, at 168. 
566 BALL, supra note 288, at 162; MAGNARELLA, supra note 564, at 16-17; MORRIS & 
SCHARF, supra note 253, at 50-51. 
567 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 51; see also Drumbl, supra note 374, at 558-
59 (detailing the tactics used by the Habyarimana government to ensure Hutu sup-
port) . Drumbl states: 
!d. 
The Habyarimana government used the failed [RPF] invasion as an excuse to 
arrest tens of thousands and massacre hundreds of Tutsi . Fear of the RPF was 
falsely whipped up among the Hutu population by a staged attack on Kigali , in 
which Habyarimana soldiers fired into the air to create the illusion of an at-
tack. During this time period, the Hutu government began to develop a 
propaganda machine calculated to instill within the Hutu citizenry a fear of 
the Tutsi. It was frequently emphasized in rural villages that Tutsi "devils" 
lurked in the bushes and were about to attack .. . . Peasants were told by offi-
cials that their umuganda (a day of unpaid labor, usually once a month, for 
public service projects, akin to the conJt!e in European medieval society) would 
be satisfied if they spent the day killing Tutsi under official supervision . 
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Hutu militia to indoctrinate them in ethnic hatred and instruct them 
on methods of mass murder. The trainees later became members of 
the militia known as the lnterahamwe. The government also distributed 
millions of dollars worth of firearms and machetes throughout the 
country. [168 
Immediately after President Habyarimana's plane was shot down on 
April 6, 1994,569 Hutu soldiers, the Presidential Guard, and the Intera-
hamwe militia began to hunt down and kill Tutsi and moderate Hutu. 
These armed forces conducted house-to-house searches, killing all the 
Tutsi they could find and murdering Tutsi who had taken refuge in 
churches, hospitals, schools, and Red Cross buildings.''70 Two days after 
Habyarimana's death, an interim government was established in 
Rwanda without a single Tutsi minister.571 Mter hundreds of thousands 
ofTutsi and moderate Hutu had been massacred, the genocide came to 
an end approximately one hundred days after it had begun when the 
572 RPF conquered the Rwandan army. 
b. Kambanda 
Jean Kambanda was prime minister of the interim government of 
Rwanda, established after President Habyarimana's death.573 Kambanda 
was arrested in Kenya along with several other former members of the 
!X>B MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 52. As William Schabas described it: 
Extremist elements refused to accept the Arusha compromise. Habyarimana's 
personal commitment to Arusha also seems questionable, and in any case, 
members of his entourage took direct steps to sabotage the agreement. They 
set up a private radio station, Radio-Television Libre Mille-Collines, which bat-
tered Rwanda with hate propaganda over the following months. Secretly, they 
imported arms from abroad and organized militias, notably the Interahamwe, 
for the coming holocaust. Lists were prepared designating Tutsi houses so as 
to expedite the killings once the order was given . 
Schabas, supra note 563, at 524. 
5
tl
9 See Pauline Jelinek, Rwanda, Burundi Leaders Are Killed in Crash-A Rncket Was 
Fired at Plane, Diplomats Report, BOSfON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1994, at 2 (reporting the down-
ing of the plane). 
r'
70 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 53-54 (describing the violence that 
ensued after Hutu extremists accused the RPF of assassinating Habyarimana); Jose E. 
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE]. 1NT'L L. 365, 390 
(1999) (detailing the events that immediately followed Habyarimana's death). For a 
detailed and grisly description of the massacres, see BALL, supra note 288, at 164-70. 
571 Beresford, supra note 279, at 103; F07mer Rwandan Prime Minister to Appear in 
War Crimes Court for Pre-Sentencing Session, INTERNEWS (Aug. 21, 1998), at http:/ I 
www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports/ICfRNewsAug98.html. 
572 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 58. 
!)?g 
See id. at 55. 
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interim govemment,574 and he was charged with six counts of genocide 
and crimes against humanity.575 Immediately upon his arrest, Kam-
banda expressed his intention to plead guilty and began cooperating 
with the prosecution. Kambanda provided the OTP with nearly ninety 
hours of recorded testimony to be used in subsequent trials of senior 
political and military leaders.576 The prosecution described Kambanda's 
cooperation as "invaluable."577 However, by thus cooperating with the 
prosecution, Kambanda placed his family at risk of retaliation, so the 
prosecution arranged for protective measures, including the relocation 
ofKambanda's family to a different country.578 
At his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber in May 1998, 
Kambanda pled guilty to all the counts in the indictment.579 Specifi-
cally, Kambanda and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement in 
574 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note I, at para. 1; Press Release, 
ICTR, Rwanda: Top Figures of Former Regime Arrested (July 18, 1997), at http:// 
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/061.htm. 
575 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 3. Specifically, 
Kambanda was charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, murder as a crime against 
humanity, and extermination as a crime against humanity. /d. Kambanda was not in-
dicted until approximately three months after he was arrested. Press Release, ICTR, 
Former Prime Minister Kambanda and Nsabimana Indicted (Oct. 17, 1997), at http:// 
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/085.htm. 
576 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 23. 
577 /d. at 22-23; see also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript, 
12 (Sept. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Transcript] (informing the court of Kam-
banda's cooperation with the prosecution) (on file with author) . The prosecution de-
scribed Kambanda's cooperation thus: 
The accused has assisted the Prosecutor in interpreting the horrific events 
that occured [sic] in Rwanda between 7 April and 7 July 1994, as well as direct 
evidence involving other accused and suspects. Without disclosing the sub-
stance of his audio recorded statement, his testimony has enabled the Prose-
cutor to have first hand information, and evidence of such key facts as the 
meeting between the Council of Ministers and Prefets held on 11 April 1994, 
where the topic of massacres committed against the civilian population was 
raised; the contents of deliberations and decisions agreed upon by consensus 
in the numerous closed sessions of the Cabinet; the involvement of Ministers, 
senior Military officers and Prefets in the commission of offences within the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal. 
Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 23. 
578 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 21, 23. The 
prosecution noted in addition that defendants collaborating in a substantial way with 
the prosecution "may be the target of intimidation, physical threats and even assassina-
tion." /d. at 21; see also Interview with M (Oct. 31, 2001) (noting that Kambanda's co-
operation placed him and his family at risk). 
579 Press Release, ICTR, Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda Pleads Guilty 
to Genocide (May 1, 1998), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/ 
1998/118.htm. 
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which Kambanda admitted, among other things, that in 1994 a wide-
spread and systematic attack took place against the civilian population 
of Tutsi, the purpose of which was to exterminate them.580 Kambanda 
acknowledged his de jure and de facto authority over members of the 
government, the civil service, and the military.581 Kambanda further 
admitted to participating in the planning and execution of the massa-
cres by, among other things, distributing arms and ammunition to vari-
ous groups, setting up roadblocks to facilitate the massacres, and using 
media broadcasts to incite and encourage the massacres.582 Kambanda 
also agreed to testifY for the prosecution in subsequent cases.583 
Kambanda's plea agreement stated that the parties had made "no 
agreements, understandings or promises" with respect to Kambanda's 
sentence,584 and.when it came time for sentencing, the prosecution had 
a difficult line to walk. It wanted to recognize the substantial assistance 
that Kambanda had provided, and it wanted to encourage other defen-
dants to do likewise, but it could not ignore the "heinous and intoler-
able" nature of the crimes for which Kambanda was convicted.585 So, 
580 Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at para. 18. 
581 /d. at paras. 21-22. 
582 /d. at paras, 23-40; Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 
39. In addition to admitting the facts specifically relevant to the charges against him, 
Kambanda also attested to facts potentially relevant to other cases. For instance, Ram-
banda "acknowledge[d] the use of the media as part of the plan to mobilize and incite 
the population to commit massacres of the civilian Tutsi population[,]" and specifically 
identified the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) as "a radio station whose 
broadcasts incited killing, the commission of serious bodily or mental harm to, and per-
secution of[,] Tutsi and moderate Hutu." /d. at paras. 39(vi)-(vii). These "admissions" 
are relevant to the prosecution's case against Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco 
Barayagwiza, founding members of the RTLM. Further, Kambanda's Plea Agreement 
implicates Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former Minister of Family and Women Affairs and a 
defendant in another ICTR case, in the massacres. Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra 
note 4, at para. 36; Press Release, ICTR, Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda 
Pleads Guilty to Genocide, supra note 579. 
583 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 47; Lawyer for the 
.Former Rwandan Prime Minister Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998) at 
http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports/ICTRNewsSep98.html. 
584 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 48. Indeed, ac-
cording to the former ICTR Chief of Prosecutions, Mohamed Othman, Kambanda's 
defense counsel was aware that the prosecution was going to recommend a life sen-
tence. Interview with Mohamed Othman, supra note 7. 
585 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 2; Kambanda, 
Transcript, supra note 577, at 6-11. At the pre-sentencing hearing, the prosecution be-
gan by stating that it had to "think very seriously" before making its sentencing rec-
ommendations. /d. at 6. After emphasizing the gravity of the crime of genocide and 
the need to draw the attention of those who in the future may consider the commis-
sion of genocide, the prosecution also stated its belief that justice and reconciliation 
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the prosecution tried to have it both ways. The prosecution sought a 
sentence of life imprisonment for Kambanda, arguing that "the maxi-
mum penalty envisaged by the Tribunal's sentencing regime[] is the 
only appropriate sentence for the grave offences to which the accused 
has pled guilty."586 At the same time, the prosecution asked that any fu-
ture application for pardon or commutation of sentence "be consid-
ered favorably on the basis of past, current and future significant coop-
eration extended to the prosecution."587 
As for Kambanda's guilty plea, both the prosecution and defense 
urged the Trial Chamber to interpret the plea as a sign of Kambanda's 
"remorse, repentance and acceptance of responsibility,"588 but the Trial 
Chamber did not seem convinced. Since his sentencing hearing was 
held approximately two years before TodoroviC and .Sikirica were de-
cided, Kambanda did not yet know that a statement of remorse, how-
ever implausible, would constitute a mitigating factor, and he conse-
quently chose not to make a statement at his sentencing hearing. 
Referring to Kambanda's silence, the Trial Chamber noted that, despite 
his guilty plea, "Kambanda has offered no explanation for his voluntary 
participation in the genocide; nor has he expressed contrition, regret 
or sympathy for the victims in Rwanda, even when given the opportu-
nity to do so by the Chamber."589 The Trial Chamber further noted that 
"remorse is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a 
guilty plea."590 At the same time, the Trial Chamber did acknowledge 
that most jurisdictions consider an admission of guilt to be a mitigating 
factor and that Kambanda's guilty plea is likely to encourage other indi-
viduals to acknowledge their own guilt.591 Consequently, the Trial 
Chamber recognized Kambanda's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, but 
would be better served "when people come forward voluntarily and openly before 
[the] court to help [it] to understand ... because there cannot be reconciliation when 
the truth is not known." Id. at 8. 
586 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 2. 
587 /d. The prosecution also argued that Kambanda's cooperation had already been 
compensated for, as it were, by the protective measures given to his family. /d. at 23; 
Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 49. 
588 Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 52. 
589 Id. at para. 51. Almost three years later, the ICTR Registrar, responding to a 
report critical of the Tribunal, had more generous words for Kambanda's guilty plea. 
He stated: "The confession, conviction and sentencing of the former Prime Minister 
of their country for genocide was a cathartic moment in the post-genocide healing +in 
Rwanda." Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the 
Report of the International Crisis Group, supra note 374. 
590 Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 52. 
591 Id. at paras. 52, 61. 
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it nonetheless concluded that "the aggravating circumstances surround-
ing the crimes committed by Jean Kambanda negate the mitigating cir-
cumstances,"592 and it sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment.593 
Outraged, Kambanda appealed and immediately ceased cooperat-
ing with the prosecution.594 He further sought to revoke his guilty plea 
and to proceed to trial,595 asserting on appeal that he had been "forced" 
to sign a "fabricated" plea agreement.596 Appealing his sentence also, 
Kambanda maintained that the Trial Chamber had failed to apply the 
general principle of law that a guilty plea "as a mitigating factor carries 
with it a discount in sentence."597 The Appeals Chamber rejected Ram-
banda's arguments. It affirmed his conviction, holding that his guilty 
plea was voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and supported by a factual 
basis.5\18 As for his sentence, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial 
rm /d. at para. 62. 
59
'
1 !d. at Verdict. 594 Letter from Carla Del Ponte to Agwu Okali, ICTR Registrar, supra note 7; In-
terview with Mohamed Othman, supra note 7. 
595 Kambanda, Appeal, supra note 8, at para. 3. 
5
!JG Prosecution v. Kambanda, Case No. 97-23-A, Provisional Appellant's Brief and 
Motion for Extension of Time-Limits and for Admission of New Evidence on Appeal 
Pursuant to Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, paras. 10, 12 
(Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with author); see also Kambarida "Forced" to Sign Guilty Plea, 
IRINNEWS.ORG (June 27, 2000), at http:/ /www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportiD=241 
8&SelectREgion=Creat_Lakes&SelectCountry=RWANDA. Kambanda also claimed in-
effective assistance of counsel. One week after he was sentenced, Kambanda sent a bit-
ter, five-page letter to the Tribunal registry accusing his lawyer of working against him. 
Former Rwandan Prime Minister Who Pleaded Guilty to Genocide Insists upon the Lawyer of His 
Choice, INTERNEWS (Oct. 14, 1998), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ 
ICTR_reports/ICTRNewsOct98.html. In submissions to the Appeals Chamber, Kam-
banda claimed, among other things, that his guilty plea was not informed because he 
was not adequately advised by his counsel. Specifically, he stated that his counsel: 
[D]id not take affirmative action on his client's behalf, that in the space of two 
years counsel and accused "had only one hour's consultation", and that coun-
sel "did not study the case completely nor did he investigat[e] in order to 
evaluate the file and to inform Kambanda properly. In doing so, Kambanda 
did not plea guilty informed [sic], since he himself did not know the ins and 
outs of the charges brought against him, nor did he know the ins and outs of 
the guilty plea. 
Kambanda, Appeal, supra note 8, at para. 67. The ironic feature of Kambanda's com-
plaints about his trial counsel before the Appeals Chamber is that they were made by 
appellate counsel who, themselves, seemed barely competent. See, e.g., id. at para. 79 
(noting that the relevance of the passage counsel cites "is unclear"); id. at para. 96 
(noting that with respect to five grounds for appeal "[t]he Appellant puts forward no 
arguments in support of these grounds, in either the Appellant's Brief or the Appel-
lant's Reply"). 
1)97 
· /d. at para. 10. 598 ld. at paras. 64, 78, 87, 95. 
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Chamber clearly considered Kambanda's guilty plea, along with several 
other factors, as mitigating circumstances.599 The Appeals Chamber fur-
ther held that the weight to be attached to mitigating circumstances is a 
matter for the discretion of the Trial Chamber, and because the crimes 
for which Kambanda was convicted were of the most serious nature, the 
Trial Chamber could not be held to have abused its discretion in sen-
tencing Kambanda to life imprisonment.600 
c. Serushago 
The next ICTR defendant to plead guilty, Omar Serushago, volun-
tarily surrendered himself to the authorities in the Ivory Coast in June 
1998, when he had not yet been indicted or included on the list of sus-
pects wanted by Rwandan authorities.601 He had been cooperating with 
the prosecution even before he surrendered602 and played a vital role in 
an operation, code-named NAKI, which led to the arrests of several 
high-level ICTR defendants, including Kambanda and Georges Rug-
giu,603 whose case will be discussed next. Following Serushago's surren-
der, the prosecution drew up a five-count indictment, and during his 
initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, Serushago pled guilty to 
four of the five counts. Specifically, Serushago pled guilty to genocide; 
and to murder, torture, and extermination, as crimes against humanity; 
and the prosecution dropped the fifth count, of rape,604 which accused 
Serushago of not preventing his subordinates from raping.605 In a plea 
599 !d. at paras. 120-22. 600 !d. at paras. 124-26. 
601 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 1, 34. 602 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39, Transcript, 14-15 (Jan. 29, 
1999) [hereinafter Serushago, Transcript] (on file with author). 603 See Militia Leader Who Confessed to Genocide Gets Fifteen Years in Prison, INTERNEWS 
(Feb. 5, 1998) (reporting the arrest of Kambanda), at http:/ /www.internews.org/ 
activities/ICTR_reports/ICTRNewsFeb99.htm; Press Release, ICTR, Rwanda: First 
Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested (July 23, 1997) (reporting the arrest of Georges Rug-
gio), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/062.htm; Press 
Release, ICTR, Rwanda: Top Figures of Former Regime Arrested (July 18, 1997) (re-
porting Kambanda's arrest as a result of the NAKI operation), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/ 
wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997 /061.htm. 
604 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 2-4. A press release announcing 
Serushago's guilty plea and his plea agreement announced, somewhat implausibly, 
that the plea "agreement is not a plea bargain." Press Release, lCTR, Former Militia 
Leader, Omar Serushago Pleads "Guilty" to Genocide and Other Crimes but "Not 
Guilty" to Rape (Dec. 14, 1998), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ 
PRESSREL/1998/155.htm. 605 See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-1, Indictment, paras. 5.10-
5.11 (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with author). 
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agreement, Serushago admitted to having been a de facto leader of the 
Interahamwe in the Gisenyi prefecture and to having commanded five 
lnterahamwe militiamen.606 Serushago supervised a roadblock, at which 
he searched for Tutsi and ordered his subordinates to execute them.607 
Specifically, Serushago killed four Tutsi personally and his subordinates 
killed thirty-three.608 Serushago further admitted that, on the order of 
his superiors, he and his militiamen abducted numerous Tutsi and 
transported them to an execution site where they were killed.609 Se-
rushago also acknowledged that he participated in several meetings, 
held by civil and military authorities, during which the progress and 
smooth operation of the massacres were discussed and encouraged.610 
Indeed, in the context of these and other "admissions" in his plea 
agreement, Serushago implicated no less than twenty-nine named indi-
viduals, and he attested to numerous facts that are seemingly relevant 
only to future prosecutions of other defendants.611 
Serushago acknowledged in the plea agreement that "sentencing is 
at the entire discretion of the Trial Chamber,"612 and the prosecution 
606 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 25 (viii), 29; see also Serushago, 
Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 16. 
607 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 25(vii). 
608 Militia Leader Who Confessed to Genocide Gets Fifteen Years in Prison, supra note 603. 
609 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 25 (ix)-(xii). 
610 /d. at paras. 25(xv)-(xvii); see also Serushago, Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 18 
(admitting attendance at secret Hutu meetings). 
611 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-37, Plea Agreement Between Omar 
Serushago and the Office of the Prosecutor, paras. 18-23, 25, 28-28, 31-33 (Dec. 4, 
1998) [hereinafter Seurshago, Plea Agreement] (on file with author). Serushago, like 
Kambanda, acknowledged the occurrence of a "widespread and systematic attack" on ci-
vilian Tutsi and moderate Hutu "on political, ethnic or racial grounds," which resulted in 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands and was carried out in order to exterminate the 
Tutsi. Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 25(i); see also id. at para. 25(xxii) 
(admitting most victims were killed because they were Tutsi). Serushago went on to 
describe various meetings, and he named the high-level political leaders and local 
authorities who conducted those meetings and the orders that they gave, id. at para. 
25(iii); see also id. at paras. 25(vii), (xv)-(xvi) (describing a meeting that Serushago at-
tended and naming other attendees), even though Serushago himself does not appear 
to have attended all of the meetings that he described. !d. at para. 25(v) (Serushago 
stating he was informed by Thomas Mugirareza and Jumapiri Nyaribogi of the orders 
given during the meeting); see also id. at para. 25(xvii) (describing a meeting in Gisenyi 
and subsequent orders to execute certain Tutsi and Hutu). Serushago also identified 
the leaders of the militiamen most involved in the masSacres in the Gisenyi prefecture. 
/d. at para. 25(vi). Serushago concluded by declaring that "[m]ilitary officers, members 
of the Interim Government, militia leaders and Civilian authorities, planned, prepared, 
instigated, ordered, aided and abetted their subordinates and others in carrying out the 
massacres of the Tutsi population and their 'accomplices."' /d. at para. 25 (xxiv). 
612 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note 611, at para. 40. 
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made no promises as to its sentencing recommendations. Like Ram-
banda, however, Serushago placed himself and his family at risk of re-
taliation,m so the OTP "undert[ook] to ensure the protection and 
safety" of Serushago's wife and children.614 The prosecution also noted 
the "valuable information" that Serushago had provided "in some of its 
most important investigations," and stated its expectation that Se-
rushago would continue to cooperate.615 Like Kambanda, Serushago 
agreed to testify on behalf of the prosecution in future trials616 but, un-
like Kambanda, Serushago is holding up his end of the bargain. He has 
been described as a "key witness" in the sc:rcalled media trial and in the 
military trial617 and has already given his testimony in the former.618 At 
his pre-sentencing hearing, Serushago tearfully begged for the forgive-
ness of his country and of the Tutsi.619 
The prosecution recommended a sentence of not less than twenty-
five years,620 but the Trial Chamber sentenced Serushago to only fifteen 
years' imprisonment621 and thus rendered Serushago the first ICTR de-
fendant to receive a sentence of less than life imprisonment.622 In its 
613 See Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602, at 25 (informing the court of the in-
herent risks of cooperating with the prosecution, including risks to Serushago's fam-
ily). 
614 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note 611, at para. 45. Serushago reportedly 
was quite aware of the danger in which his cooperation and guilty plea placed him and 
repeatedly asked for security to be provided when he appeared in court. See Mary Ki-
mani, Former Rwandan Militia Leader Asks for the Forgiveness of Rwanda, INTERNEWS Uan. 
29, 1998), at http:/ /internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports/ICTRnewsJAN99.html. 
615 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note 611, at paras. 43-44. 
616 /d. at para. 41. 
617 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Order for the Continued De-
tention of Omar Serushago in the ICTR Detention Facility in Arusha (Apr. 3, 2001); 
Mary Kimani, 'Media Trial': Key Prosecution Witness Fails to Testify, INTERNEWS (Nov. 14, 
2001) (reporting that Serushago did not testify as scheduled because of illness but was 
planning to testify the following day), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ 
ICTR_Reports/ICTRNewsNov01.html. 
618 See Mary Kimani, Media Trial: Genocide Suspect Was Member of 'Death Squad,' Wit-
ness Alleges, INTERNEWS (Nov. 15, 2001) (reporting Serushago's testimony against de-
fendants in the "Media Trial"), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ 
ICTRNewsNovOl.html. In addition to implicating defendants Barayagwiza and Ngeze 
in the genocide, Serushago also claimed that Ngeze had written to him in August 2001, 
urging him not to testify for the prosecution. See Mary Kimani, Media Trial: 'Hassan 
Ngeze Did Not Want Me to Testify,' Genocide Convict Claims, INTERNEWS (Nov. 15, 2001), at 
http:/ /www.in ternews.org/ activities/! CTR_Reports/1 CTRN ewsN ovO 1.h tml. 
619 Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602, at 38-44; Militia Leader tVho Confessed to 
Genocide Gets Fifteen Years in Prison, supra note 603. 
620 Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602, at 14. 
621 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at Verdict. 
622 Of the eight convicted ICTR defendants, five have received sentences of life 
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sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber had little to say about Se-
rushago's guilty plea, although it duly noted the plea as a mitigating fac-
tor.623 The Trial Chamber seemed more impressed with Serushago's 
substantial and ongoing cooperation with the prosecution624 and his 
"[p]ublic expression of remorse and contrition."625 Despite the com-
parative leniency of the sentence, Serushago appealed, contending that 
the Trial Chamber had failed to give due weight to the mitigating fac-
tors in his case and arguing that his sentence was manifestly excessive in 
light of the sentencing practices of the Rwandan courts.626 The Appeals 
Chamber rejected Serushago's contentions with little discussion and af-
627 firmed the fifteen-year sentence. 
d. Ruggiu 
The third and most recent ICTR defendant to plead guilty is Geor-
ges Ruggiu, a Belgian. Ruggiu developed an interest in Rwanda and its 
politics in the early 1990s when he met Rwandan students, who were his 
neighbors in Belgium.628 He subsequently became one of the key play-
ers in the Rwandan community in Belgium, participating in mcyor po-
litical debates and meeting with President Habyarimana several times.629 
Ruggiu became radically opposed to the RPF, and in late 1993, he 
imprisonment. Since Serushago, two other ICTR convicts have received terms less 
than life imprisonment, one of whom-Georges Ruggiu-also pled guilty. See supra 
note 356 (listing prison terms for all defendants convicted by the Trial Chambers). 
623 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 35. The Trial Chamber's discus-
sion of Serushago's guilty plea as pertaining to his sentence consisted of the following: 
/d. 
It is important to recall that the accused pleaded guilty to four counts, namely 
genocide and three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermina-
tion, torture). As the Chamber established, his guilty plea was made voluntar-
ily and was unequivocal. Omar Serushago clearly understood the nature of 
the charges against him and their consequences. 
624 !d. at para. 31. 625 /d. at para. 40. 
G21.i Serushago, Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 6. 
627 !d. at paras. 21-34. 
tl
28 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 38. At Ruggiu's pre-
sentencing hearing, Ruggiu's lawyer maintained that Ruggiu "had come to know 
Rwanda through highly partisan friends who gave him a biased idea of the political 
situation in the country." How Belgian journalist Became Involved in Hate Media, 
INTERNEWS (May 15, 2000), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ 
ICTRNewsMayOO.html; see also Prosecution v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32, Transcript, 
109-12 (May 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu, Transcript] (tracing Ruggiu's introduction 
to Rwandan politics) (on file with author). 
629 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 41. 
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moved to Rwanda and began work as a journalist and broadcaster for 
the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) ,630 the govern-
ment radio station whose broadcasts had for years incited ethnic ten-
sion and ethno-political murders.631 Ruggiu used his broadcasts to en-
courage the killing of Tutsi and to accuse Belgium of various subversive 
actions, including assassinating President Habyarimana and supporting 
the RPF.632 
Ruggiu was arrested in July 1997 in Kenya as part of the NAKI op-
eration633 and was indicted on one count of public incitement to com-
mit genocide and one count of persecution as a crime against human-
ity.634 Ruggiu initially pled not guilty to the charges,635 but he began 
cooperating with the prosecution in July 1999 and was conspicuously 
absent from the list of media defendants scheduled to have a joint 
trial.636 In May 2000, Ruggiu changed his plea to guilty and entered 
into a plea agreement with the prosecution in wliich he admitted to 
making various broadcasts, which encouraged the killing of Tutsi.637 
Ruggiu also attested in his plea agreement to a series of facts relevant to 
future prosecutions and, in particular, relevant to the prosecution of 
RTLM officials Nahimana and Barayagwiza.638 Ruggiu agreed to con-
Gsa /d. at para. 41. 631 /d. at paras. 41-42; see also Alvarez, supra note 570, at 392 (describing RTLM 's 
role in the killings) . 632 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 44(iv)-(v), 50. 633 Press Release, ICfR, Rwanda: First Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested (July 23, 
1997), at http:/ /www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/ PRESSREL/1997 /062.htm. 634 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-1, Amended Indictment, 12-15 
(Dec. 18, 1998) (on file with author). Ruggiu was also indicted on counts of conspir-
acy to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, murder as a crime against humanity, 
and extermination as a crime against humanity. /d. 635 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 4. 
636 Mary Kimani, Hate Media Journalist Scheduled to Plead Guilty to Genocide Charges, 
INTERNEWS (May 9, 2000) , at http:/ / www.internews.org/ activities/ ICfR_Reports/ 
ICfRNewsMayOO.html. 637 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 7, 44. 
638 For instance, Ruggiu not only acknowledged the statements that he broadcast 
over RTLM, but also "admit[ ted] that all [RTLM] broadcasts were directed towards rally-
ing the population against the 'enemy,' the RPF and those who were considered to be 
allies of the RPF." /d. at para. 44(i). Ruggiu further acknowledged "that RTLM broad-
casts reflected the political ideology and plans of extremist Hutu, ... [and] that RTLM 
broadcasts incited young Rwandans, lnterahamwe militiamen and soldiers to engage in 
armed conflict against the 'enemy' and its accomplices and to kill and inflict serious bod-
ily and mental harm on Tutsis and moderate Hutu." /d. at para. 44(xi). Finally, Ruggiu 
"admit[ ted] that RTLM broadcasters, managerial and editorial staff bear full responsibil-
ity for the 1994 massacre of Tutsis and Hutu opposition party members." /d. at para. 
44(xiii). 
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tinue cooperating with the prosecution,639 and, like Serushago, he has 
done so. 640 As in Scrushago and Kambanda, the prosecution made Rug-
giu no promises about his sentence,641 but it did promise to contact Bel-
gian authorities to seek their cooperation in ensuring the safety of Rug-
. , f: .1 642 gm s am1 y. 
The Trial Chamber issued its sentencing judgment in June 2000, 
and, as in the IC1Y, the Chamber's view of guilty pleas seems to have 
evolved. Kambanda, the ICTR's first defendant to plead guilty, was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and thus appeared to obtain no benefit for 
having pled guilty. Serushago, the ICTR's next defendant to plead 
guilty, did receive a relatively lenient sentence following his guilty plea, 
but the Trial Chamber did not discuss in any detail the role played by 
the guilty plea. By the time Ruggiu was decided, the ICTR, like the 
IC1Y in TodoroviC and Sikirica, was expressly willing to recognize the 
benefits that guilty pleas afford the Tribunals. It noted, for instance, 
that guilty pleas "facilitate[] the administration of justice by expediting 
proceedings and saving resources" and that Ruggiu's guilty plea "has 
spared the Tribunal a lengthy investigation and trial, thus economising 
time, effort and resources."643 Accordingly, like the TodoroviC and 
Sikirica Trial Chambers, the Ruggiu Trial Chamber announced that 
guilty pleas will be compensated by sentencing discounts; the Trial 
Chamber held that it "considers that it is good policy in criminal mat-
ters that some form of consideration be shown towards those who have 
confessed their guilt, in order to encourage other suspects and perpe-
trators of crimes to come forward."644 As for Ruggiu's case in particular, 
the Trial Chamber opined that his guilty plea "reflects his genuine 
awareness of his guilt, especially since he changed his plea after much 
reflection."645 According to the Trial Chamber, Ruggiu's "acknow-
ledgement of his mistakes and crimes is a healthy application of reason 
639 Kimani, supra note 636. 
640 Interview with E (Nov. 26, 2001). 
641 See Ruggiu, Transcript, supra note 628, at 65, 69-70 (recording Ruggiu's admis-
sion that he received no promises in exchange for his plea); Prosecution v. Ruggiu, 
Case No. ICTR-97-32-DP, Plea Agreement Between Georges Ruggiu and the Office of 
the Prosecutor, paras. 220-30 (May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu, Plea Agreement] 
(on file with author). 
642 Ruggiu, Plea Agreement, supra note 641, at para. 226. 
643 Ruggiu,judgement and Sentence, sujJra note 339, at para. 53. 
644 !d. at para. 55. The Trial Chamber went on to say that "[i]t is important to en-
courage all those involved in crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 to confess and ad-
mit their guilt." !d. 
645 !d. at para. 54. 
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and sentiment, which illustrates the beginning of repentance."646 Like 
Serushago, Ruggiu had begged for forgiveness from survivors and vic-
tims' families during his pre-sentencing hearing,647 and the Trial Cham-
ber considered these expressions of remorse a mitigating factor. 648 The 
Trial Chamber also noted Ruggiu's "substantial cooperation" with the 
prosecution as a mitigating factor. 649 The prosecution recommended 
concurrent twenty-year sentences for each count,650 but the Trial 
Chamber instead sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment. 
Ruggiu did not appeal, becoming the first ICTR defendant to fail to 
take advantage of that right. 
C. The Evolution of Plea Bargaining in International Criminal Prosecutions 
The cases described above show an evolution in the way the Tribu-
nals conceive of and practice plea bargaining. When the Tribunals 
were first established, plea bargaining was looked upon with some sus-
picion. The Tribunals' civil lawyers and judges were unfamilia,r, and 
hence uncomfortable, with the practice, and the vital task with which 
the Tribunals had been entrusted-to bring justice to war-tom lands 
through the prosecution of those responsible for mass atrocities-
seemed too noble to be sullied by bargaining. Consequently, when the 
United States proposed including a provision in the Tribunals' RPE 
authorizing the prosecution to grant defendants full or limited testi-
monial immunity in exchange for their cooperation, that proposal was 
rejected. As then-ICIY President Cassese put it: "The persons appear-
ing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual as-
sault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhuman acts. Mter 
due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune from 
prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testi-
mony may otherwise be."651 That view likewise prevailed with respect to 
sentencing concessions for guilty pleas. Although prosecutors schooled 
in common law systems understood well that defendants were unlikely 
to plead guilty unless they were promised a sentence reduction, the 
general feeling at the Tribunals' inception was that the crimes within 
646 /d. at para. 55. 
647 Mary Kimani, Prosecution Asks for a Twenty Year Sentence for Hate Media Journalist, 
INTERNEWS (May 15, 2000), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ 
ICTRNewsMayOO.html. 
648 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 69-72. 
649 /d. at paras. 56-58. 
650 /d. at para. 81 . 
651 SCHARF, supra note 251, at 67. 
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the Tribunals' jurisdiction were too grave to be bargained over. If every 
case went to trial, so be it. 
The manifest difficulties delineated above of bringing even some of 
the cases to trial, however, have caused an evolution in the perception 
of plea bargaining at the Tribunals. The Tribunals have had little 
choice but to recognize the utility of guilty pleas as well as the necessity 
of plea bargaining to secure those pleas. The practice of plea bargain-
ing has developed in a slightly different fashion in each Tribunal. Both 
utilize implicit plea bargaining; that is, both Tribunals' Trial Chambers 
have made clear that defendants will receive a sentence reduction if 
they plead guilty. In the ICTY, in addition, the prosecution and defense 
engage in explicit bargaining over the prosecution's sentencing rec-
ommendations, and the Trial Chambers have thus far sentenced within 
the range upon which the parties agreed. ICTR prosecutors have made 
no similar promises to that Tribunal's defendants. Finally, neither Tri-
bunal has engaged in charge bargaining. Although Tribunal prosecu-
tors have withdrawn charges following a guilty plea, the withdrawal of 
those charges cannot be considered instances of charge bargaining. In 
jelisii: and Kolundiija, charges were withdrawn because they lacked evi-
dentiary support; in Serushago, the withdrawal of the one charge should 
have had no effect on the sentence;652 and in the remaining cases, the 
defendants pled guilty to crimes that substantially encompassed the 
conduct alleged in the withdrawn counts. 
A summary recapitulation of the cases reveals the course of plea 
bargaining's evolution. At the IC1Y, plea bargaining did not appear to 
play an obvious role until Todorovii:. The ICTY's first guilty plea in Er-
demovii: was secured without plea bargaining because Erdemovic was 
that very unusual defendant whose guilty plea was not motivated by a 
desire to secure sentencing concessions.653 Erdemovic essentially volun-
teered himself to the ICTY when the Tribunal had never heard of him 
or the executions in which he participated and immediately began co-
6
r'
2 See ICTR Bulletin No.2, Musema's Genocide Conviction Upheld 2 (Dec. 2001) (not-
ing that although the Appeals Chamber quashed Musema's conviction for rape, it up-
held his conviction for genocide and extermination and held that "the quashing of his 
conviction for rape could not affect the exceptional gravity of the crimes for which he 
had been convicted" and thus refused to lower his sentence), at http:/ I 
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/bulletin/ dec/ decOl. pdf. 
m Erdemovic, Transcript, supra note 434, at 38 (recording that an OTP investiga-
tor who conducted numerous interviews with Erdemovic opined that Erdemovic's "mo-
tivation is not to please the Office of the Prosecutor to get some weakening of his pos-
sible punishment, he was very clear on that point since the beginning"). 
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operating with the prosecution in every way possible.654 According to 
the prosecution, Erdemovic "never tried to bargain anything, ... never 
asked if his collaboration would be of help for him in judicial terms."655 
Rather, he wanted "the truth to be known about these events and he 
want[ ed] the people who are responsible for these events to face jus-
tice."656 Plea bargaining was still something of a confusing concept to 
the Tribunals' civil lawyers at the time of Erdemovic, a fact reflected in 
Judge Cassese's comments about the practice in that case. Mter stating 
that a defendant who pleads guilty can expect "that the court will be 
more lenient,"657 Cassese went on to say that the drafters of the statute 
and rules deliberately omitted any endorsement of out-of-court plea 
bargaining so as to "avert[] those distortions of the free will of the ac-
cused which may be linked to plea bargaining. "658 Cassese does not ex-
plain just what "distortions of the free will" would be produced by out-
of-court plea bargaining that would not equally be produced by the im-
plicit plea bargaining that Cassese himself endorses. Any distortion of 
the defendant's free will results from the fact that the defendant re-
ceives a reduction in sentence if he pleads guilty. Whether that reduc-
tion follows out-of-court bargaining with the prosecutor or an in-court 
dispensation is irrelevant. 
The IC1Ys second guilty plea, in Jelisii:, also did not involve plea 
bargaining, but for a very different reason: the prosecution refused to 
bargain because Jelisic had nothing to offer. JelisiC's guilty plea to the 
war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity charges did not save the prose-
cution any time and expense because Jelisic insisted on going to trial on 
the genocide charge, and the facts supporting that charge overlapped 
almost entirely with the facts supporting the charges to which Jelisic 
pled guilty. Further, the prosecution had photographs of Jelisic com-
mitting many of the crimes,659 and it believed that his conviction on the 
counts to which he pled guilty was virtually assured. Thus, the prosecu-
tion had no interest in offeringjelisic concessions to self-convict. 
654 !d. at 35-38, 43-47 (describing Erdemovic's cooperation); Erdemovic, Brief on 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 432, § C & n.24 (noting that "Erdemo-
vic had expressed a strong desire to surrender to the authorities here in The Hague" 
even though doing so "would most likely result in criminal liability"). 
655 Erdemovic, Transcript, supra note 434, at 46. 
656 /d. at 38. 
657 Erdemovic, Cassese Dissent, supra note 143, at para. 8. 
658 /d. at para. 10. 
659 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Transcript, 2615-17 (Nov. 10, 
1999), at http:/ / www.un.org/ icty/ transel0/ 991110ed.htm. 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142 2002-2003
142 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1 
In Todarovii: and Sikirica, by contrast, the defendants did have bene-
fits to offer the prosecution, and they did expect something in return 
for them; consequently, the cases were plea bargained. In TodoroviC, 
the prosecution saved the time and expense of a trial and stood to save 
the time and expense of an appeal; it obtained Todorovic's cooperation 
and future testimony; and it silenced Todorovic's embarrassing inquir-
ies into his arrest. In return, the prosecution promised to withdraw 
twenty-six counts and to recommend a sentence of not longer than 
twelve-years' imprisonment.660 The obviousness of the quid pro quo was 
highlighted by the plea agreement's provision that if Todorovic failed 
to fulfil his obligations under the plea agreement, the prosecution 
could reinstate the entire indictment and proceed to trial.661 The 
prosecution had clearly learned a lesson from Kambanda.662 
As noted above, the primary benefit Todorovic received from the 
plea agreement was the prosecution's lenient sentencing recommenda-
tion, but because the Trial Chamber was in no way bound by the prose-
cution's recommendation, Todorovic took a risk. The fact that a Trial 
Chamber had never before imposed a sentence longer than that sought 
by the prosecution must have provided Todorovic some comfort. But 
because in Todarovii: the prosecution, at least in theory, was recom-
mending a sentence shorter than what would otherwise have been ap-
propriate for the crimes in question, the Trial Chambers' past treat-
ment of prosecutorial recommendations was not necessarily relevant. 
What was relevant, however, was that the Tribunal's Trial Chambers, 
like the judicial branches of many domestic jurisdictions, stood to gain 
almost as much from the plea bargain as the prosecution. The Tribu-
nals are overworked. They spend vast sums of money to conduct very 
few trials and are roundly criticized for that fact. 663 The judges them-
selves spend considerable time debating proposals to improve effi-
ciency, and they spend more time still responding to the suggestions 
and criticisms of others.664 Improvements have been made: procedural 
rx.o Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 801-03 (Jan. 19, 2001 ), 
at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe9/010119iaed.htm. 
""
1 !d. at 810-ll. 
'";
2 However, this remedy also has its problems. During TodoroviC's pre-
sentencing hearing, judge Hunt repeatedly raised his concern that TodoroviC's testi-
mony in subsequent cases will be deprived of considerable credibility because he 
stands to have his plea agreement dissolved if he does not "fulfil his obligations." !d. at 
805-06, 812-14. 
,;,;
3 See sujJra note 374 and accompanying text. 
t;n
4 See Jorda Report, supra note 367 (suggesting reforms and responding to the 
proposals of a U.N.-appointed expert group which reviewed the IC1Y's efficiency); 
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reforms have been undertaken, ad litem trial judges have been ap-
pointed, and the Appeals Chamber has been enlarged by the addition 
of two judges. But none of these reforms, however efficacious, can 
compare to the dispatch with which a guilty plea disposes of a case, and 
in TodoroviC, the prosecution sweetened the deal with the promise not 
to appeal any sentence falling within the agreed-upon range, a promise 
that must have seemed especially attractive to judges accustomed to ap-
pellate reversal. 
With these advantages in mind, the TodoroviC Trial Chamber not 
only sentenced Todorovic within the agreed-upon range, but it gave no-
tice to all future defendants that guilty pleas would be rewarded with 
sentencing concessions. And it was scarcely more than a month after 
the TodoroviC Trial Chamber made this announcement that the Sikirica 
defendants pled guilty and agreed to terms similar to those appearing 
in TodoroviC. Despite the TodoroviC Trial Chamber's favorable stance on 
plea bargaining, the Sikirica defendants still had some reason to fear 
that they would not receive sentence reductions. The TodoroviC Trial 
Chamber had promised leniency only to defendants who made "timely" 
guilty pleas.665 Sikirica's and Dosen's guilty pleas came after their 
cases had been fully tried; only Kolundzija's guilty plea saved the Tri-
bunal any time at all. Further, Todorovic had extended substantial 
cooperation to the prosecution. The Sikirica defendants did not, and 
the last defendant to enter a guilty plea without cooperating with the 
prosecution-Goran Jelisic-received a forty-year sentence. But the 
Trial Chamber did not let the Sikirica defendants down. Because their 
tardy guilty pleas did not generate all the benefits of timely guilty 
pleas, the Trial Chamber held that the defendants were not entitled to 
"full credit;"666 it made clear, however, that a guilty plea, whenever 
made, justifies some credit. Future defendants can plead guilty with 
the expectation that they will receive some sentencing concessions 
Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the Report of 
the International Crisis Group, supra note 374 (responding to the International Crisis 
Group's critical report, which stated, among other things, that the ICTR's record of 
nine verdicts in seven years is "lamentable"). The U.N.'s Inspector General has pro-
duced two reports detailing waste and managerial problems at the ICTR. McNerney, 
supra note 374, at 189; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 139 and 141, at 
2-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (1997) (criticizing the ICTR's administration and manage-
ment, and finding, among other things, that not a single administrative area of the 
ICTR registry "functioned effectively"); Beresford, supra note 279, at 130-31 (summa-
rizing the Office of Internal Oversight Services report). 
r.or. Todorovic, Sentencing judgement, supra note 336, at para. 114. 
&;r. Sikirica, Sentencing judgement, supra note 355, at para. 150. 
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even if they wait until the last possible moment to plead and fail to 
cooperate with the prosecution. 
The ICTR's evolution towards accepting plea bargaining followed a 
similar path. The first ICfR defendant to plead guilty-Jean Kam-
banda-thought that he and the prosecution were plea bargaining. 
Kambanda pled guilty at his first appearance; he immediately began 
providing the prosecution with invaluable information, and he prom-
ised future cooperation and testimony. Kambanda, not surprisingly, 
expected leniency in return/"'' but no true bargaining took place be-
cause the prosecution never promised Kambanda anything.668 Indeed, 
under the circumstances, the prosecution really could not promise 
Kambanda anything. Kambanda was the highest-ranking political 
authority in Rwanda during the genocide. Given his high-level status 
and substantial involvement in the planning and execution of the 
genocide, if anyone deserved a life sentence, it was Kambanda.669 No 
matter how much assistance Kambanda offered, the prosecution simply 
could not request a more lenient sentence without generating horren-
dous publicity. For these same reasons, the Trial Chamber could not 
engage in implicit plea bargaining and impose a more lenient sentence. 
The prosecution and the Trial Chamber avoided a public relations 
disaster by requesting and imposing a life sentence on Kambanda, but 
Kambanda's subsequent disavowal of his guilty plea and his refusal to 
continue cooperating caused no small amount of trouble. Fortunately 
for the ICTR, the next defendant to plead guilty-Omar Serushago-was 
of sufficiently minor status that the prosecution could request a twenty-
five-year sentence, and, more importantly, the Trial Chamber could 
impose a mere fifteen-year sentence. The Serushago Trial Chamber said 
little about the value it placed on Serushago's guilty plea, but by the 
time the same Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu, plea bargaining had 
become sufficiently well-accepted that the Trial Chamber could publicly 
667 At the pre-sentencing hearing, Kambanda's lawyer asked for a sentence of no 
longer than two years' imprisonment. Kambanda, Transcript, supra note 577, at 33; 
Lawyffl' for the Former Rwandan Prime Ministffl' Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 
4, 1998), at http:/ /www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ICTRNewsSep98 
.html. 
668 The prosecution did implement protective measures for Kambanda's family, 
but those measures only became necessary as a result of the cooperation Kambanda 
agreed to provide. Thus, they cannot be seen as compensation for Kambanda's coop-
eration or his guilty plea. 
669 Jean Paul Akayesu, the first person the ICTR convicted of genocide, received a 
life sentence, and he was just a relatively lowly mayor of the Taba commune. Akayesu, 
Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 54. 
HeinOnline -- 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 145 2002-2003
2002] PU'A BARGAINING OFINTt.RNA110NAL CRIMt"'S 145 
announce that guilty pleas were to be encouraged by granting "some 
form of consideration" to those who make them.670 
Thus, both Tribunals came to endorse plea bargaining. Flush with 
the success of obtaining custody over more and more important defen-
dants, the Tribunals now must also succeed in managing their dockets 
effectively. With that need in mind, they have turned to plea bargain-
ing. In this way, the Tribunals' functional need for expeditious alterna-
tives to necessarily lengthy trials trumped the structural and ideological 
features that seemed to militate against plea bargaining. That it did 
should come as little surprise. Even on the Continent, caseload pres-
sures and the introduction of certain adversarial procedures have in-
creased the use of bargaining analogues, thus showing that criminal jus-
tice systems, whatever their structure or ideological underpinnings, 
must find some way of adapting to work pressures. 
While adapt they must, structure and ideology play a significant role 
in determining the way in which a criminal justice system adapts. Spe-
cifically, the way in which the Tribunals conceive of and practice plea 
bargaining reflects their unique amalgam of adversarial and non-
adversarial procedures and the purposes for which the Tribunals were 
established. As noted above, Tribunal proceedings are more party-
dominated than Continental proceedings but more judge-dominated 
than American proceedings. In keeping with this balance of power, 
then, Tribunal parties can bargain about sentence recommendations, 
but Tribunal judges retain firm control over the ultimate sentence. 
Whereas many American judges happily admit to following the prose-
cution's recommendations in every case671 and American federal judges, 
among others, must accept an agreed-upon sentence or allow the de-
fendant to withdraw his plea,672 Tribunal judges jealously guard the sen-
tencing function, repeating over and over that they are not bound by 
any agreements reached by the parties.673 
The Tribunals' greater orientation toward establishing truth is also 
reflected in the forms of plea bargaining that have emerged, and par-
ticularly in the fact that neither Tribunal has practiced charge bargain-
ing.674 The Tribunals consider that one of their primary purposes is to 
670 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 55. 671 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 13, at 1063-65 & n.21 
(providing statistics as to how many recommendations are followed by various judges). 672 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 1003. 673 Of course, by sentencing within the range agreed upon by the prosecution, the 
Chambers implicitly legitimize the Prosecutor's recommendations. 674 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (defining charge bargaining). 
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create a historical record. Because charge bargaining virtually always 
distorts the factual basis upon which a conviction rests, its use would se-
verely undermine that purpose. American prosecutors routinely charge 
crimes that they cannot prove and accept pleas to lesser crimes that the 
defendant clearly did not commit, practices consistent with a dispute-
resolution orientation but hardly likely to "establish[] the truth behind 
the evils perpetrated" in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.m Indeed, 
for charge bargaining to be a viable form of plea bargaining at the Tri-
bunals, the factual distortion would have to be especially great because 
Tribunal prosecutors have little power to manipulate sentences through 
their charging decisions. That is, the Trial Chambers have such broad 
sentencing discretion, and the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction 
are so grave, that a prosecutorial promise to withdraw a· few charges 
here and there will not provide a defendant adequate certainty that he 
is getting something for his plea. So long as the remaining charges are 
sufficiently serious, a Trial Chamber may well sentence a defendant to 
the same term of imprisonment. In other words, while an American de-
fendant can plead guilty to manslaughter instead of first-degree murder 
and be assured of a sentence reduction, a Tribunal defendant who ad-
mits to killing five people and beating twenty in satisfaction of charges 
that he killed eight people and beat thirty can be assured of nothing. 
Thus, in order to provide the defendant with anything close to certain 
value for his plea, the prosecution would have to withdraw charges in 
such a way as to fundamentally alter the criminal conduct at issue. That 
is something Tribunal prosecutors have not been willing to do. 
The Tribunals' treatment of guilty pleas, once made, also reflects 
their orientation toward establishing truth and the substantial in-
volvement of Tribunal judges. Before accepting a guilty plea, the 
Trial Chamber must satisfy itself not only that the plea is voluntary, in-
formed, and unequivocal, but also that there is a factual basis for the 
plea. 676 While some American jurisdictions now also require judges to 
make a determination as to the accuracy of the plea,677 Tribunal 
judges appear less inclined to rely blindly on the agreement reached 
by the parties. In Ruggiu, for instance, the Trial Chamber actively 
questioned the prosecution as to various details of the crimes and 
challenged its interpretation of certain facts. 678 Further, Tribunal plea 
67~ Erdemovic, Second Sentencing judgement, supra note 343, at para. 21. 
670 ICIY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(B) . 
677 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 1000. 
678 Ruggiu, Transcript, supra note 628, at 76-101. 
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agreements typically contain a detailed recitation of the facts, 679 and 
these are often published, almost in their entirety, in the Trial Cham-
bers' judgments along with background facts to provide the context in 
which to understand the defendants' admissions. While these judg-
ments are shorter than those following a full-scale trial, they nonethe-
less provide substantial information about the crimes and thereby 
contribute to the creation of a historical record. 
The Tribunals' practice of plea bargaining has also avoided thus 
far many of the abuses associated with American plea bargaining. For 
instance, because the Tribunals' work is so widely publicized, the Tri-
bunals are less inclined to issue excessively lenient sentences to en-
courage guilty pleas since such sentences generate bad press. Prose-
cutors are also less likely to base their sentencing concessions on the 
strength of the evidence because making vastly different sentence rec-
ommendations for defendants indicted for similar wrongdoing is dif-
ficult to justify publicly. In addition, the Tribunals' broad disclosure 
obligations prevent prosecutors from using an information differen-
tial to mislead defendants. 68° Finally, plea bargaining has proven es-
pecially valuable to the Tribunals because, unlike most American plea 
bargaining in which the only benefit to the prosecution is the guilty 
plea itself,681 in virtually every case of Tribunal plea bargaining, the 
prosecution has also benefited from the defendant's substantial coop-
eration. The inclusion of substantial cooperation makes Tribunal 
plea bargaining less objectionable as a theoretical matter because, by 
exchanging sentencing concessions for information leading to the 
conviction of more serious offenders, the government trades com-
mensurate things: "It agrees to a sacrifice of its legitimate penological 
objectives in one case in exchange for an opportunity to further simi-
lar but more important penological purposes in others."682 As a prac-
tical matter, obtaining substantial cooperation is vitally important to 
679 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, Factual Basis for the 
Charges to Which Goran Jelisic Intends to Plead Guilty (Sept. 29, 1998) (supporting 
specific counts to which the defendant pled guilty with witness statements) (on file 
with author); Ruggiu, Plea Agreement, supra note 641 (containing twenty-two pages 
and 181 paragraphs offacts supporting the plea). 
68
° Cf. Mann, supra note 193, at 286 (noting that because Israeli prosecutors know 
that defendants will receive all relevant information through disclosure mechanisms, 
the prosecutor's "representation of the case to the defendant's attorney must be tightly 
rooted in the evidence [thus] ... [t]here is little room for puffing in this procedural 
settinf). 
68 Gifford, supra note 13, at 44. 
682 Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 671. 
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the Tribunals. Unlike the Nuremberg prosecutors who had the benefit 
of a voluminous paper trail, IC1Y and ICTR prosecutors must obtain 
information from human sources,683 and the best human sources as to, 
say, a particular command structure or the orders given within that 
structure, are likely to be the subordinates who received those orders. 
In sum, the Tribunals have reconciled their conflicting tendencies. 
They have begun practicing plea bargaining to expedite proceedings, 
but they have been practicing it in a way that is largely compatible with 
their unique procedural amalgam and institutional goals. The Tribu-
nals themselves have justified their practice of plea bargaining on sev-
eral grounds, and this Section ends with an assessment of those justifi-
cations. The Trial Chambers have candidly acknowledged the financial 
and administrative benefits of guilty pleas, but they have gone on to 
maintain that guilty pleas indicate certain desirable character traits in 
defendants who make them and advance the Tribunals' truth-telling 
function . 
Turning to the first justification, the Trial Chambers have consid-
ered a guilty plea as evidence of honesty684 and of an "acknowledge-
ment of [the defendant's] mistakes and crimes," which "is a healthy 
application of reason and sentiment."r.sr. These statements, reminiscent 
of similarly naive-sounding platitudes appearing in decades-old Ameri-
t;s& 
can cases and scholarly literature, have no factual basis. Indeed, em-
683 See Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2066 ("In the Tadii: case, the vast bulk of the evi-
dence to convict came not in the form of ... written records of atrocities, as at 
Nuremburg-but through the oral testimony of ... live eyewitnesses .... "); Meltzer, 
supra note 412, at 908 ("Nor does the ICIY have Nuremberg's paper trail. ... Hence, 
the ICIY must rely heavily on oral testimony from witnesses .... "). 
684 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 55; Erdemovic, Sec-
ond SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at para. 16(ii). 
685 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 55. 
f>8f> For instance, in 1968, the American Bar Association Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice offered six possible justifications for granting sentencing concessions 
to defendants who plead guilty, including that by pleading guilty, the defendant "has 
acknowledged his guilt and shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his con-
duct." ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
PLEAS OF GUILlY § 1.8(a) (ii); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 ( 1970) 
(indicating that a defendant who pleads guilty "demonstrates by his plea that he is 
ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of 
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than 
might otherwise be necessary"); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) (noting the argument that "the defendant's choice of plea shows whether he 
recognizes and repents his crime"); Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d 102, 105 n .8 
(Pa. 1977) (noting that "it is argued that a guilty plea indicates a first step toward re-
habilitation and, conversely, that a refusal to plead guilty indicates a lack of remorse 
and repentance"). But see Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 
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pirical studies indicate that the primary difference between defendants 
who plead guilty and those who do not involves the ability to calculate 
risk. Defendants who plead guilty make a rational calculation and opt 
for the course of least punishment. Most similarly situated defendants 
who insist on a trial do so because of an overly optimistic assessment of 
the likelihood of acquittal. That is, good judgment and self-interest in-
spire most guilty pleas, not honesty, responsibility, or any other virtue.687 
One can assume that by attributing positive character traits to defen-
dants who plead guilty, the Trial Chambers are attempting to differen-
tiate the sentences they impose on defendants who plead guilty from 
the harsher sentences they impose on defendants who do not, on 
grounds more penologically relevant than the guilty plea itself. While 
the Trial Chambers' desire to blur the harsh realities of plea bargaining 
is understandable, they do not advance their cause by making indefen-
sible statements. 
As for the truth-telling justification, at first glance, it is not particu-
larly compelling. In most of the Tribunal cases involving guilty pleas, 
the defendants have not admitted to anything more than that which the 
prosecution was intending to prove at trial. Such guilty pleas, then, ar-
guably would not advance truth-telling unless the defendants would 
otherwise have been acquitted. In other words, one could argue that 
when the factual basis of the conviction would be the same for a convic-
tion following a trial as a conviction following a guilty plea, the guilty 
plea advances truth-telling only to the extent that it renders the convic-
tion a certainty. 
Although that analysis may be persuasive with respect to domestic 
crime, it does not adequately capture the complex role of truth-telling 
in the international tribunals. Truth-telling is not valuable as an end in 
itself but as a means of promoting healing and reconciliation, and 
whether or not it advances those ends has a great deal to do with how 
the truth is told. Specifically, there is a profound difference between 
facts found by a judge and facts admitted by a perpetrator in how those 
facts are received and in their potential to promote reconciliation. For 
every Damir Dosen and Omar Serushago, there are thousands who be-
haved similarly and will not be prosecuted, and many others who bene-
fited from their violent acts-Serbs who appropriated the homes of Mus-
lims after their rightful inhabitants were expelled and Hutu who 
stepped into powerful positions, even if only briefly. While any convic-
661-62 (refuting the argument that guilty pleas are evidence of remorse and repen-
tance); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 723 (same). 
687 See Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 13, at 661-69. 
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tion can lead to deterrence, self-conviction has the additional potential 
to encourage those similarly situated to reflect on and face up to their 
roles in the horror. And, as importantly, it has considerable potential 
to bring closure to victims and enable them to forgive. The defiant 
Slobodan Milosevic,688 who disdains even the attempt to hold him ac-
countable, is far more likely to fuel further ethnic hatred and revenge 
than the seemingly repentant Kambanda, who, in his lawyer's words, 
"felt that he had a duty to himself, to his own country to tell the truth 
• 689 
about Rwanda and the genoctde." 
Whether that potential for enhancing reconciliation is realized 
depends largely on the circumstances of the self-conviction, and in 
particular on the defendant's perceived motivation for pleading 
guilty. To put it bluntly, guilty pleas that seem to be motivated by sin-
cere remorse and a genuine acknowledgement of wrongdoing are 
much more likely to encourage dialogue and forgiveness than guilty 
pleas that appear motivated solely by sentencing concessions. Ram-
banda himself provides a perfect example. Before being sentenced, 
Kambanda "declare[d] that his prime motivation for pleading guilty 
[was his] profound desire to tell the truth ... [and] his desire to con-
tribute to the process of national reconciliation."690 Building on this 
theme at the pre-sentencing hearing, Kambanda's lawyer read a letter 
Kambanda had received from a woman whose husband and three 
children had been killed in the genocide. Mter recounting her loss, 
she stated: 
688 On Milosevic's first appearance before the IC1Y, he announced: "I consider 
this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment." Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Transcript, 2 (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Milosevic, July 3 
Transcript], at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe54/010703IA.htm. The Trial Chamber 
eventually turned off Milosevic's microphone when he continued in the same fashion. 
See id. at 5 ("The Interpreter: I'm sorry, the microphone is not on."); Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Transcript, 19-20 (Aug. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Milosevic, 
Aug. 30 Transcript] ("The Accussed: ... [C]an I speak or are you going to tum off my 
microphone like the first time?"), at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm. 
Milosevic refused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, Milosevic,July 3 Transcript, supra, 
at 4, and he refused to inform himself as to the crimes charged against him in the in-
dictment. Milosevic, Aug. 30 Transcript, supra, at 8-10; see also MiloseviC Brings Air of Scorn 
to Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,July 4, 2001, atA7 (reporting Milosevic's refusal to hear the in-
dictments against him). In subsequent court appearances, Milosevic has continued to 
show nothing but contempt for the Tribunal that he refuses to recognize. MiloseviC Again 
Defies Tribunal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2001, at 7 ("After four months in prison, 
former President Slobodan Milo§evic remained combative Monday, denouncing new war 
crimes charges by U.N. prosecutors and scorning three lawyers assigned to his defense."). 
689 Kambanda, Transcript, supra note 577, at 25. 
690 Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at paras. 4-5. 
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[N]aturally, I would always have reasons to hate you until the end of my 
days. I have every reason to become an extremist. However, your [guilty 
plea] rekindles hope in me particularly because the perpetrators of the 
genocide if they recognize their guilt [sic], reconciliation among Rwan-
dans would become inevitable.691 
151 
However much Kambanda's guilty plea might initially have advanced 
reconciliation and forgiveness, those goals were dealt a severe blow 
when Kambanda, not receiving the sentence reduction he expected, 
stopped cooperating with the prosecution, disavowed his guilty plea, 
and attempted to litigate his guilt. 
The Tribunals, thus, attempt to use the guilty plea's potential to 
promote reconciliation as a justification for rewarding it with sentenc-
ing concessions, but rewarding it with sentencing concessions under-
mines its potential to promote reconciliation. Indeed, the only way to 
be sure that a defendant has the "right" motivation for pleading guilty 
is to eliminate any other motivation-that is, to eliminate sentencing 
concessions. However, that is not a viable option because doing so 
would substantially reduce the number of guilty pleas. Perhaps with 
these realities in mind, the Trial Chambers continue to reward guilty 
pleas with sentencing concessions but at the same time encourage de-
fendants to couch them in the right language by treating statements 
of remorse as mitigating factors, and by commenting negatively when 
such statements are not forthcoming.692 Indeed, the Trial Chambers 
seem so keen to encourage statements of remorse that they have 
treated as mitigating factors statements that do not even sound espe-
cially remorseful. For instance, Todorovic spent more time describing 
the horror of war in his town and the difficulties that Todorovic himself 
suffered than he did expressing remorse for his part in creating much 
of that horror. Todorovic further sought to diminish his responsibility 
by claiming that he never wanted to be police chief but that "destiny or 
a set of unfortunate circumstances put [him] in that position, and at 
the worst possible time, the time ofwar."693 Finally, although Todorovic 
691 Kambanda, Transcript, supra note 577, at 28. 
092 See., e.g., Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgement, para. 513 
(Mar. 15, 2002) at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/trialc2/judgement/krn-
g020315e.pdf;Jelisic,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 127 (stating that the accused 
showed no remorse in trial, and that the remorse he expressed to the expert psychia-
trist was of questionable sincerity); Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, 
at para. 51 (commenting that Kambanda has not "expressed contrition, regret or sym-
pathY- for the victims in Rwanda"). 
693 Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 59 (May 4, 2001) (on 
file with author). 
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pled guilty to beating one man to death, severely beating numerous 
others, and sexually assaulting others still, he said nothing of those acts 
in his statement but rather noted only that "he lacked the courage to 
prevent the illegal and inhuman activities that were going on."694 The 
Sikirica defendants appear to have modeled their statements on 
Todorovic's, so they are not much better. Yet the Chambers, eager to 
promote reconciliation, excerpt the best parts of the statements for the 
judgment, pronounce the statements "sincere,"6!)5 and treat them as 
mitigating factors. Although the Trial Chambers' efforts are not espe-
cially adept, their motivations are understandable. 
CONCLUSION 
States have traditionally been rather chauvinistic about their own 
criminal justice systems and suspicious of foreign systems. Indeed, prior 
to the mid-1960s, criminal procedure was of relatively little interest to 
comparativists.696 About that time and following, however, American 
scholars, dissatisfied with certain inefficiencies of the American criminal 
justice system, and in particular with the widespread use of plea bar-
gaining needed to counteract those inefficiencies, looked with longing 
to the simple, efficient Continental criminal proceedings that could be 
provided to virtually all criminal defendants. But, while many reforms 
were discussed, few were undertaken.697 In more recent years, Conti-
nental countries, now imposing their criminal sanctions on more ethni-
cally diverse populations, have adopted certain adversarial procedures 
that better reflect the distrust with which minority populations often 
view governmental officials. The systems have therefore converged to 
some degree, but they still retain their essential features. In particular, 
the United States has retained most of its adversarial trial procedures 
and thus continues to maintain its heavy reliance on plea bargaining 
694 /d. at 59-60. Todorovic also stated that he "didn't have sufficient courage or de-
termination to prevent volunteers and local criminals from committing evil and plun-
derinR the non-Serb population." /d. at 59. 
69
' Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 152, 194, 230; see also 
Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at para. 92 (pronouncing To-
dorovic's expressions ofremorse "genuine"). 
H!lG See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 177, at i; see also Joachim Herrmann, Criminal 
justice Policy and Comparatiuism: A European Perspective, in COMPARATNE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 52, at 130-37 (finding that comparativists considered 
criminal justice "an exclusively domestic matter" until the need for reform arose in 
post-Socialism Eastern Europe). 
0!1
7 See Jorg et al., supra note 112, at 48-49, 54 (noting calls for reform, but lament-
ing that fundamental changes have not occurred). 
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while Continental countries still provide comparatively simple and in-
expensive trials and continue to provide them to virtually all defendants 
charged with serious crimes. 
The judges of the IC1Y and ICTR had the opportunity to blend the 
best of both systems when they drafted the Tribunals' procedural rules, 
and although their initial amalgam was predominantly adversarial in 
character, the judges did not provide for the mainstay of adversarial 
procedures, the plea bargain. With few, if any, defendants in the dock 
and consequently few trials on the horizon, there was little reason to 
provide for expedient alternatives to trial. Further, Tribunal judges 
from civil law countries were unfamiliar with plea bargaining, and the 
whole idea of it appeared unseemly and inconsistent with the noble 
mission that the Tribunals had undertaken. Noble as it may be, how-
ever, the Tribunals' mission has been a difficult one to fulfil. Tribunal 
crimes are complex and usually cannot be proved without the testimony 
of dozens of witnesses and the admission of boxes of exhibits. Wit-
nesses and evidence are far away, difficult to locate, and costly to trans-
port to the Tribunals. Witnesses must be protected and evidence must 
be translated. Tribunal proceedings consequently take forever and cost 
the moon. 
During its eight-year existence, the IC1Y has amended its RPE 
twenty-two times, with many, if not most, of those amendments seeking 
to make Tribunal proceedings quicker and more efficient.698 The Tri-
bunals have thus adopted many Continental procedures, and in doing 
so, have significantly altered the nature of Tribunal proceedings. The 
introduction of these more efficient procedures helps, but many of 
the reasons that Tribunal trials are so long and complex are not ame-
nable to remedy by procedural rule. Pre-trial judges can review wit-
698 Most other amendments can be classified as gap-filling; the early versions of the 
RPE were understandably brief and general, see Michele Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, 
"When the Statute and Rules Are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON 
ICIY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIEllE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 
27, at 65-66 (noting that the Rules of Evidence and Procedure are "fairly basic"); Jon 
Gina & David Tolbert, The Office of the President: A Third Voice, in ESSAYS ON IC1Y 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, 
at 86 ("The initial version of the Rules was necessarily limited in scope."); Developments 
in the Law, supra note 388, at 1985 ("Although the rulemakers codified the procedures 
to a greater extent than had their predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, they also in-
tentionally left the Rules vague, expecting many of the details to be worked out 
through amendments and case-by-case adjudication."), and many of the amendments 
provided necessary detail as the Tribunals resolved unforeseen difficulties, see Askin, 
supra note 251, at 19 ("During the course of [the TadiC] trial, many Rules were added or 
amended to reflect evolving needs and unforeseen circumstances affecting the defendant 
and the victims and witnesses."). 
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ness lists, for instance, but they cannot make those witnesses easier to 
find or less expensive to transport and protect. Relieving much of the 
burden of Tribunal trials requires eliminating some of those trials al-
together. So, while the Tribunals adopt more and more non-
adversarial procedures, they have at the same time begun practicing 
that hallmark of the adversary system-plea bargaining. 
Plea bargaining practices vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
and the Tribunals have developed forms of plea bargaining that re-
flect their unique procedural amalgam, institutional structure, and 
wide-ranging goals. Plea bargaining practices at the Tribunals are 
more circumscribed than they are in the United States, and despite 
bargaining between IC1Y prosecutors and defendants over sentence 
recommendations, Tribunal judges continue to exercise considerable 
control over the sentencing function. Further, plea bargaining at the 
Tribunals is thus far practiced at the margins. Occasional Tribunal 
defendants plead guilty, in contrast to the United States, where only 
occasional defendants have trials. Plea bargaining does not occur in 
every Tribunal case or even in most every case. Indeed, more than 
one Tribunal prosecutor told me that they do not initiate plea discus-
sions; although they are happy to respond to any offers made by de-
fense counsel, they do not feel comfortable beginning the negotia-
tions. Although this reticence might fade as more plea bargaining 
takes place, it highlights the fact that plea bargaining is not currently 
considered the primary method of case disposition, as it is in the 
United States, but a useful expedient in the occasional case. 
Even occasional instances of plea bargaining are distasteful to pur-
ists, but the "culture of impunity" 699 that provides context to the Tri-
bunals' establishment and current operations cautions against seeking 
ideal international criminal prosecutions. Atrocities that we would 
now label genocide or crimes against humanity have taken place 
throughout human history,700 yet they have virtually never been pun-
699 Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects and Pitfalls, 1 
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 13,23 (1999) (describing the "'culture of impunity,' where en-
forcement of humanitarian law is the rare exception and not the rule" (footnote omit-
ted)). 
700 Howard Ball states: 
Whether it was the poisoning of springs and wells to kill the enemy, showing 
no quarter to a defeated enemy in the field, mistreating prisoners of war, lay-
ing siege to undefended towns populated by civilians, or intentionally killing 
groups of people, young and old alike, because of race, color, religion, or 
ethnicity, the world has for centuries experienced war, war crimes, and acts of 
brutality that violated the customs and conventions of war and the "con-
science" of humanity. 
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ished by criminal sanctions.701 The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were 
supposed to usher in an era of accountability for international 
crimes,702 but a violent and bloody fifty years passed703 before the in-
ternational community mustered the political will to establish the 
BALL, supra note 288, at II; see also Jean Graven, Les crimes contre l'humanite, 76 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 427, 433 (I950) (noting that crimes against humanity are as old as humanity 
itself); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Genocide: A Crime Against Mankind, in SUBSTANTIVE 
AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2I, at II7-I8 
(noting that "[t]he history of the human race abounds with episodes of genocide" and 
chronicling some of them). 
701 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANI1Y IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 570-7I (2d rev. ed. I999) (listing mass atrocities that were not prose-
cuted); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 3 (I996) ("Silence and im-
punity have been the norm rather than the exception .... "); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The 
Future of International Criminal justice, II PACE INT'L L. REv. 309, 3I2 (I999) (describing 
the twentieth century as one in which approximately 250 conflicts around the world led 
to an estimated 70 to I70 million deaths through genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes, with virtually none of the perpetrators brought to justice). 
702 SCHARF, supra note 25I, at xiii ("There was hope that the legacy of Nuremberg 
would be the institutionalization of a judicial response to atrocities committed by any-
one, anywhere around the globe."). 
703 See id. (noting Stalin's purges, China's Cultural Revolution, Cambodia's killing 
fields, and Argentina's Dirty War, among other massacres); Akhavan, supra note 269, at 
8I5 ("Idi Amin, Mengistu, Pol Pot, Sadaam Hussein, and a litany of other mass mur-
derers living without fear of punishment underscore[s] the tragic culture of impunity 
that has prevailed in the international arena for so long."); Makau Mutua, Never Again: 
Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, II TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. I67, I69 
(I997) ("The horrors in Cambodia under Pol Pot, Uganda under Idi Amin, Guatemala 
under the military, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, among many others, did little to 
push states to national or international prosecution of heinous crimes against civilian 
populations."). 
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and other 
treaties require states parties to prosecute offenders in domestic courts, such courts 
have been severely underutilized for the prosecution of international crimes. See John 
Dugard, Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Punishment of 
Offenders, 324 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 445, 453 (I998) (noting that "[n]ational courts have 
a poor record when it comes to the prosecution of war crimes and other international 
crimes ansmg out of armed conflicts"), http:/ /www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/ 
5cacfdf48ca698b641256242003b3295 I 1 daee6e828886ai f4I2566c7005I c269?0penDocu 
ment; Axel Marschik, The Politics of Prosecution: Eurapean National Approaches to War Crimes, 
in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 65, 87 (Timo-
thy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., I997) (noting that there have been no war 
crimes trials in the United Kingdom since the I950s); see also Douglass Cassel, The ICC's 
New Legal Landscape: The Need to E.xpand U.S. Domestic jurisdiction to Prosecute Genocide, War 
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 378, 38I-87 (I999) (discuss-
ing the inability of United States courts to prosecute many instances of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes for lack of appropriate domestic jurisdiction and sub-
stan tive legislation). 
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ICTY and ICTR. 704 And once the Tribunals were established, the in-
ternational community provided them only inconstant support, fund-
ing them inadequately at their outsets70' ' and failing to assist them-
particularly the ICTY-in obtaining custody over defendants.701; In 
704 The proposal to create an international criminal tribunal to prosecute those 
responsible for the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia met with considerable opposi-
tion. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, An International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia?, 
6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 7, 17 (1994) (describing the ICTY as "a model of the legal order 
under which the Jaws of war are administered by an 'impartial' agent of organized hu-
manity," and criticizing it for its "fundamental incompatibility" with the Westphalian 
model, "under which the laws of war are administered by each body corporate of the 
international legal order within its own competence"). Some argued that the Tribunal 
would obstruct peace negotiations. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 250, at 
202.{)3; MERON, supra note 281, at 282 (suggesting that the Tribunal may "obstruct 
peace negotiations" because "those who make decisions at the negotiating table . . . 
[would not] agree to provisions that might endanger their leadership and bring them 
to justice"); Akhavan, supra note 269, at 738 (noting that "commentators of a realist 
persuasion suggested that the ICTY was ... an impediment, and not a contribution , to 
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia"); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in 
Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 500.{)2 (1994) (arguing that it is not realistic to expect 
Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian political and military leaders who are potential targets 
of the Tribunal "to agree to a peace settlement in Bosnia if, directly following the 
agreement, they may find themselves in the dock"). Others objected to the Tribunal's 
establishment by means of a Security Council resolution. See, e.g., BASSJOUNJ & 
MANJKAS, supra note 250, at 203 ("Some [Security Council] members . .. felt that such a 
judicial organ should be established by the [General Assembly] or by a multilateral 
treaty."); Simonovic, supra note 272, at 444-45 (noting that "Brazil and China expressed 
concern that the interpretation of Security Council powers had been overstretched" 
and that "Mexico presented an official report, challenging the Security Council's 
authority to act as it did"). Scharf thus considered it "(a]gainst great odds" that the 
ICTY was in fact created. SCHARF, supra note 251, at xv; see also Christian Tomuschat, 
International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRJM. L.F. 237, 
237 (1994) ("One may call it truly amazing that the international community, acting 
through the Security Council, has been able to set up two international criminal juris-
dictions in the recent past."). 
705 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 382, at VI(B) (describing the 
ICTR's funding as "inadequate and unpredictable since its inception"); MERON, supra 
note 281, at 280 (mentioning the ICIY's "budgetary difficulties"); RATNER & ABRAMS, 
supra note 259, at 188 (noting both Tribunals' "resource problems"); SCHARF, supra 
note 251, at 79-84 (detailing the ICIY's funding difficulties); Catherine Cisse, The In-
ternational Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 115 (1997) (stating that the ICTR's "inade-
quate budget" Jed to inefficient work); Meltzer, supra note 412, at 908 (noting the 
ICTY's "serious underfunding and understaffing"); Sara Darehshori, Inching Toward 
Justice in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998, at A25 (reporting that when co-counsel in 
Akayesu arrived in Arusha, she and her approximately twelve office-mates "created 
makeshift desks by removing doors from their hinges and placing them on crates . . . 
fought over garbage cans, which [they] used as chairs [and that] .. . . [t]he one tele-
phone line was erratic"). 
706 See supra text accompanying notes 281-86. As one commentator noted in 1999, 
"[a]lthough the political will existed to establish a criminal tribunal for the purposes of 
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other words, the international community's commitment to ending 
impunity for mass atrocities is, at best, a fragile one. 
Whether the establishment of international criminal tribunals, ad 
hoc or permanent, is the most appropriate response to large-scale vio-
lence is a controversial question that cannot be addressed here.707 But 
assuming that international prosecutions are a desirable response in 
at least some circumstances, those prosecutions must be conducted at 
a cost and length palatable to the international community. Since 
they were created, the IC1Y has spent nine years and nearly $500 mil-
lion to dispose of fourteen cases,708 and the ICTR has spent eight years 
and more than $400 million to dispose of nine cases,709 statistics that 
can do the cause of i'nternational criminal justice little good. Plea 
bargaining, though problematic for a host of reasons, will enhance 
the Tribunals' productivity, and will probably enhance the likelihood 
that future international criminal prosecutions are undertaken. Given 
the short and troubled history of international criminal justice, that 
benefit may be worth the costs. 
trying individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the political will 
apparently does not exist to arrest and detain such individuals to enable the Tribunals 
to function as designed." Penrose, supra note 281, at 361. 
707 For assessments of various responses to mass violence, see MARTHA MINOW, 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MAsS 
VIOLENCE 48-51 (1998); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 131-200; ALFRED P. 
RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-85 (1997); Payam Akha-
van, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 7, 7-31 (2001); Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2108-12; Kenneth Anderson, Nurem-
berg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 292-
94 (1994) (book review). 
708 IC1Y Key Figures, at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last up-
dated July 24, 2002). 
70 See Coalition for International Justice, Frequently Asked Questions-ICTR (provid-
ing budgetary figures from 1996-2000), at http:/ /www.cij.org/index.cfm?fuse 
action=faqs&tribuna1ID=2 (last visited Aug. 6, 2002); Financing of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwan-
dan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States Between 1 january and 31 December 1994, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm., 
55th Sess., Agenda Item 128, at para. I, U.N. Doc. A/55/692 (2000) (appropriating 
more than $93 million for 2001); Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Be-
tween 1january and 31 December 1994, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 
132, at para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/248 (2001) (appropriating over $192 million for 
the biennium 2002-2003). 
